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PREFACE 
Ontology-the study of what there is-is one of the oldest areas of philosophical 
inquiry. Among contemporary philosophers engaged in ontology, Rudolf Carnap and W. 
V. Quine have had a sizable influence, especially among Anglo-American philosophers. 
The aim of this dissertation is to develop a method of doing ontology that borrows from 
both of them. Occasionally ideas are used from one that may perhaps appear to conflict 
with stated views of the other. It is not the purpose of this dissertation just to defend both 
or either of these philosophers. Rather, the purpose is to make use of ideas from each 
that seem theoretically useful. Where their work seems unclear or problematic, and thus 
in need of interpretation, my rule has been to interpret so as to make the resulting view 
useful for my own project. If the result seems not to adequately represent the views of 
either philosopher, then so much the worse as an interpretation-this study is not 
intended merely as a commentary. 
I should like to acknowledge the help of my committee in writing this dissertation. 
In particular, I have benefitted the most from my acquaintance with Professor Paul 
Moser. If there is anything of value in this dissertation it is in large part due to his 
influence on my thinking. Lastly, I should like to thank my father, Edgar Owen, for all 
of his help and support in bringing this project to completion. 
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CHAPTER I 
REALISM AND ONTOLOGY 
Introduction 
Realism, in a minimal sense, is the doctrine that there is something independent 
of our cognitive activity, i.e., some "way things are" independent of our conceiving. 
This might include objects, events, as well as their properties. This is a minimal view 
since it does not specify what exists, or what there really is as opposed to what there 
merely seems to be. As stated, this is a metaphysical doctrine, since it is concerned only 
with issues of existence, and not with any epistemic, alethic, or semantic issues. This 
contemporary doctrine is distinct from its predecessor of the same name, the view that 
abstract entities have conceiver-independent existence. This latter view is about the nature 
of universals; as such its opponent is nominalism. The contemporary doctrine of realism 
is opposed to, among other views, idealism of the sort that says, following Berkeley, that 
to be is to be perceived or conceived; that the way the world is is a function of our 
cognition, and not simply that cognition bears on the way we know what the world is 
like. Whereas this sort of idealism is epistemic, realism is non-epistemic. 
In spite of the intuitive plausibility of realism, the view has been under attack for 
at least as long as it has been in existence as a doctrine distinct from its predecessor of 
the same name. As early as the 1930's we find that RudoJf Carnap, the Logical-positivist, 
was no friend of realism, nor of anti-realism either, for Carnap was no friend of 
2 
metaphysics generally. More recent attacks on realism come from many comers. One 
strategy, endorsed by Hilary Putnam, is that the very idea of realism is incoherent, that 
it lacks any clear-cut meaning, and hence cannot be intelligibly embraced as a 
philosophical doctrine. Another strategy, endorsed by Rorty and the "neo-pragmatists," 
urges us to drop the doctrine altogether since it seeks a foundation in certainty-the 
Cartesian quest-that cannot be had and that we don't actually need anyway. 
Recently Paul Moser has formulated an argument aiming to show that, while 
realism may indeed be true, we have no non-questionbegging way of ever telling when 
we have any knowledge of the realist world. 1 He main1a.ins, contra Putnam, that the 
doctrine is quite intelligible, and that, contra Rorty, it cannot be dismissed quite as easily 
as the pragmatists would have us believe. If his argument is successful, then not only is 
realism doomed, but so is metaphysics generally, traditionally understood as knowledge 
about reality rather than knowledge of mere appearance. Consequently, Moser maintains 
that if we aim to meet skeptical challenges, the only justifiable position we can take on 
such issues, i.e., one that does not rely on assumptions that beg questions against the 
skeptic, is that of agnosticism. This is the view that we are in no position to either affirm 
or deny metaphysical propositions. 
Ontology has often been taken to be a paradigm case of metaphysical inquiry. It 
is that branch of philosophy that asks about the nature of being and beings. Some 
examples of ontological questions are, 'What is being?', 'What sorts of beings are 
1Paul Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), chap. 1. 
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there?', 'Why is there something rather than nothing']'. Ontological questions do not ask 
what being seems to be like, or what sorts of beings there seem to be, or why there 
seems to be something rather than nothing. Ontology is the study of what there really is, 
not what there merely appears to be. 2 The distinction we make between seeming, or 
appearance, and reality is just the distinction between what we conceive or perceive, and 
reality as it is independent of our conceiving or perceiving. Since realism is concerned 
with reality itself, and not merely appearances, and ontology is that discipline concerned 
with the nature of being, as opposed to how being merely appears, ontology would seem 
to be necessarily realist. But if realism is in trouble, then so is ontology-or is it? 
The chief concern of this dissertation is chiefly with ontology. A defense is 
offered for a non-realist method of doing ontology. Thus, the chief task is with what 
might be called "meta-ontology." This is the study of various methods of doing ontology, 
rather than the study of various ontologies. This method is intended to be neutral with 
respect to any particular ontology. In the last chapter~ however, we will step down from 
the meta-level and defend a particular ontological view, namely, a version of physicalism 
inspired largely by Carnap. The view defended there is labeJed "logical physicalism" so 
as to distinguish it from contemporary metaphysical views. But before proceeding to the 
2There is, of course, the issue of what actually appears. Presumably, even when 
I am being merely appeared to in some way, there :is something that is appearing, that 
is, I am actually in some particular mental state. We can distinguish here between 
realism as the view that there are objects independent of our conceiving, and realism as 
the view that there are objects independent of the mental. The former allows for the 
reality of mental events, whereas the latter would deny that such appearances are real. 
I take it that conceiver-independence is the more general form of realism, for it allows 
for realism about mental states, as well as realism about non-mental objects. 
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meta-ontological issues directly, we need to examine the doctrine of realism in some 
detail and some of the arguments for and against it. As we will see, there is more than 
one notion of realism in circulation, and different ways of defending these different 
realisms, as well as different arguments against realism. 
Metaphysical Realism 
Michael Devitt distinguishes between three doctrines of realism: 
Weak, or Fig-Leaf, Realism: Something objectively exists independently of the 
mental. 
Common-Sense Realism: Tokens of most current observable common-sense and 
scientific physical types objectively exist independently of the mental. 
Scientific Realism: Tokens of most current unobservable scientific physical types 
objectively exist independently of the mental. 3 
These three doctrines of realism are distinguished by what they say exists. Weak realism 
asserts the existence merely of something, we know not what, perhaps a sort of Kantian 
noumenal world. Common-Sense realism asserts the existence of the medium-sized 
objects of ordinary experience, e.g., tables, trees and dogs. Scientific realism asserts the 
existence of such entities as atoms, quarks, gluons, muons, fields, forces and the other 
exotic stuff of atomic and sub-atomic physics, i.e., objects that cannot be perceived 
directly by the senses. Some of the objects of scientific-realism may even be 
unperceivable in principle by humans. 
What makes all three of these different doctrines versions of realism is their 
3Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2d ed. (Cam bridge, MA.: Basil Blackwell 
Inc., 1991), 23-24. 
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positing of something existing independently of human conceiving. Realism generally, 
on this approach, is the view that something exists in such a way that its existence is not 
dependent on the activity of any conceiver. Put another way, it is the view that what the 
world is like is not a function of the way conceivers take it to be. This is a metaphysical 
view of realism; it is a doctrine about what reality is like. It is this metaphysical doctrine 
of realism that will be our chief concern. 
Dummett's Semantic Realism 
As indicated earlier, there are other notions of realism, some of which are non-
metaphysical. The most widely held non-metaphysical notion of realism in circulation is 
that of Michael Dummett. Let's look briefly at what Dummett says about realism. 
Dummett has stated that "the whole point of my approach to these problems has 
been to show that the theory of meaning underlies metaphysics. If I have made any 
worthwhile contribution to philosophy, I think it must lie in having raised this issue in 
these terms. "4 Dummett has, as much as any philosophet can be said to, taken the 
"linguistic turn." Consequently, he states the doctrine of realism accordingly: 
I shall take as my preferred characterisation of a dispute between realists and anti-
realists one which represents it as relating, not to a class of entities or a class of 
terms, but to a class of statements, which may be, e.g., statements about the 
physical world, statements about mental events, processes 01 states, mathematical 
statements, statements in the past tense, statements in the future tense, etc. This 
class I shall, from now on, term 'the disputed class'. Realism I characterise as 
the belief that statements of the disputed class possess an objective truth-value, 
independently of our means of knowing it: they are true or false in virtue of a 
4Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigma~ (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1978), xl. 
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reality existing independently of us. 5 
This characterization of realism looks for all purposes like a bit of semantic theory. It 
seems to be a view about the nature of the truth values held by some particular kinds of 
sentences. If we hold to the metaphysical doctrine of realism, we might be justified in 
thinking that Dummett is just not talking about the same thing as we are, that he has 
changed the subject, or, at the very least, that he holds a different concept of realism 
than, say, Devitt. In this case, substantive disputes between Dummett and others may be 
impeded by verbal disagreement over what is to count as the doctrine in dispute. 
This would, perhaps, be too quick, for Dummett claims that he is indeed talking 
about the metaphysical doctrine of realism. He describes realism as the view that certain 
of our statements are about "an objective reality existing independently of ourselves. "6 
Realist claims are "ontological. "7 Realism is opposed to phenomenalism and idealism. 8 
This suggests that Dummett is indeed talking about the metaphysical doctrine of realism 
as Devitt understands this doctrine. Perhaps the difference between Dummett and Devitt 
is not in terms of the doctrine of realism per se, but rather the choice of method for 
dealing with metaphysical problems. Let's look at what motivates Dummett's semantic 
method for dealing with metaphysical problems. 
Dummett has two reasons for employing a lingui~tic method as a way of dealing 
with metaphysical issues. First, when we employ traditional metaphysical approaches, 
5Ibid., 146. 
6lbid., 228. 
7Ibid.' 230. 
8Ibid., 145, 147. 
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we find eventually that, 
We don't know how to resolve these disputes. The moves and counter-moves are 
already familiar, having been made repeatedly by philosophers on either side 
throughout the centuries. The arguments of one side evoke a response in certain 
of the spectators of the contest, those of the other side sway others of them; but 
we have no criterion to decide the victors. No knock-out blow has been delivered. 
The decision must be given on points and we do not know how to award points. 9 
Dummett's view is not that metaphysical strategies for solving philosophical problems 
have failed to produce results. Quite the contrary; they have lead to an abundance of 
results, most all of which are now well-known. Consequently, philosophers have taken 
up sides, each defending their respective positions by means of now familiar moves and 
counter-moves. The problem is that we do not seem to have any way of deciding who 
are the winners and losers. We lack a sufficient criterion for what will count as a correct 
conclusion. Since neither side seems to have effected a clear knock-out blow, using the 
analogy of a boxing match, the winner must be decided by points. Dummett's claim is 
that we have no criterion for deciding how to award points. 
What does it mean to say that we don't know how to award points? This is subject 
to more than one interpretation. On one reading, it amounts to the claim that we do not 
know what to count as a virtue for some theory and what to count as a liability. This is 
not a good interpretation. There are numerous criteria in circulation for determining the 
virtues and liabilities of a theory, such as principles of parsimony, e.g., Occam's razor, 
Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation, pragmatic considerations as to whether the theory 
does the work one intends it to, logical considerations of probability, possibility, etc., 
9Michael Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metapnysics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 12. 
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evidential considerations, and so on. If anything, we have an over-abundance of criteria 
for determining the virtues and liabilities of a theory. 11 seems just wrong to say that we 
do not know how to award points owing to a lack of criteria. This makes the problem 
an epistemic one, a failure to have knowledge of criteria and how to employ them. This 
seems to be plainly false. 
Another, more plausible view, is that we don't know how to award points because 
we have no way of settling on criteria for the goodness of a theory that will be acceptable 
to every party in the debate. The idea here is tha1, for any criterion we might adopt, 
there will always be some party that will dispute the choice of that particular criterion. 
The problem, according to this view, is not epistemic; it is not that we lack knowledge 
of various criteria and how to use them. Rather, the problem of deciding on correct 
criteria is itself, perhaps, yet another metaphysical problem, and so will be subject to 
dispute just like other metaphysical problems. 1f this is what Dummett is claiming, and 
this may be an overly-generous reading of Dummett, what he needs to show is, first, that 
the choice of criteria is itself a metaphysical, rather than some other sort of problem, and 
second, that such criteria are, in principle, unobtainable. 
Let's grant, for purposes of argument, that the problem is indeed metaphysical, 
and not just epistemic or semantic. The problem with Hllrnmett's reasoning is that we 
do not find an argument that it is, in principle, not possible to arrive at such criteria. He 
instead appeals to historical failures to arrive at such criteria. But philosophers have been 
making this sort of claim for perhaps as long as their have been philosophers. The length 
of time the disputes have been going on is frrelevant. One can easily imagine students 
9 
at the Lyceum complaining about how they are still arguing over the same old problems 
Socrates worried about, with no end in sight. Although Dummett may well be right that 
we still lack the needed criterion, short of showing that we cannot in principle have such 
a criterion, this argument will fail to convince. 10 
Dummett's second reason for employing a linguistic method in dealing with 
metaphysical problems is that, 
metaphysical questions are formulated in terms of the appropriate picture of the 
reality to which our statements relate: the picture of an objective disposition of 
matter within space-time, existing in supreme indifference to us and the way it 
impinges on us, as against the picture of a world of sense perceptions, out of 
which we construct the material uni verse as a representation of their complicated 
regularities. 11 
Each particular metaphysical theory, on this view, employs a different "picture" and so 
reaches a different view. The problem is that the proponents of these positions "debate 
in favour of one or other of these competing pictures as if they were rival hypotheses to 
be supported by evidence. "12 Dummett thinks this is just the wrong approach: "what we 
need to do is formulate theses which are no longer in pictorial language but which 
embody the intended applications of these pictures. "13 His mg,gestion is that once we do 
1
°It is just this sort of principled argument that Moser mounts against realism. 
Namely, Moser's argument is one that aims to show that we cannot have non-
questionbegging grounds for justifying any claims of me1aphysica1 knowledge. His 
argument does not show that we cannot have metaphysical knowledge. Rather, the issue 
is that we have no way of determining, in a manner that does not beg any questions 
against certain forms of skepticism, when we are in possession of such knowledge. See 
Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, 27. 
11Dummett, Logical Basis, 338. 
12Ibid. ' 339. 
13Ibid. 
10 
this we will see that such theses belong to one or another theory of meaning. 
Consequently, "when we have resolved the issue about the correct meaning-theory, then 
we shall surely find that one or another of the rival pictures will force itself on us, unless 
it proves that we want to reject all the competing pictures. ~i.i. 
Why should we agree with Dummett that realism is (necessarily?) merely 
"pictorial"? Dummett does not appear to have any argument for this view. And why 
should we think realism is any more pictorial than any other philosophical position? Does 
Dummett think that all philosophers who discuss and dispute such views are making no 
theoretical claims whatsoever? This seems highly implausible, for, as we will see in a 
discussion of Putnam, there does seem to be sufficient cognitive content to realism, 
contrary to what some philosophers have said. But let's grant, at least for the sake of 
argument, that metaphysical propositions are merely pictorial and harmfully so in the 
way he says. Let's look at Dummett's suggestion for expunging the pictures and making 
realism into a thesis with some cognitive content. 
Dummett's solution is to interpret metaphysical theses such that they become 
semantic theses. We then see a possible way of resolving metaphysical disputes, namely, 
by embracing a particular theory of meaning. But if this is to be the approach, why 
should we think that theories of meaning are themselves any less pictorial than 
metaphysical theories? Dummett seems to think that arriving at the correct theory of 
meaning will be unproblematic. Why is this? 
For Dummett, the way to arrive at the correct tbeocy of meaning is to embrace 
14lbid. 
11 
both pragmatism and verificationism: "if the demand for stability is acknowledged to be 
just, verificationist and pragmatist meaning-theories are not genuine rivals but 
complementary aspects of a single enterprise which alone can fully describe the working 
of that most profound of all human creations, language. "15 The pragmatic component is 
relatively unproblematic; it requires that we "derive, from the content of a statement, as 
determined by its consequences, what is to count as verifying it. " 1~ It is the verification 
condition that is problematic. 
Dummett is no crass verificationist, for, as he says, "a verificationist theory 
cannot crudely identify the truth of a statement with its having been verified, on pain of 
being unable to recognize quite simple reasoning as valid." 11 The task is that "it must 
explain truth as attaching to a statement in some such way as that it does so when the 
statement either has or could have been verified." 1~ So far so good, but next he says: 
Whatever the correct formulation should be, the resulting notion of truth will not 
be subject to the principle of bivalence. Jt was precisely the observation that the 
language contains sentences for which we have no gro11nd for assuming that they 
will, or even can, be either verified or falsified that provided one reason for 
overthrowing the truth-conditional meaning-theory. 1 ~ 
So, in order to maintain the verificationist part of the correct meaning theory we must 
give up bivalence. This does not, however, necessitate giving 11p Logic altogether, 
15Ibid., 321. 
16Ibid., 320. 
17Ibid., 318. 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid. 
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according to Dummett. Rather, we "must hold that reality is in some degree 
indeterminate ... [that] reality itself is indeterminate; it has gaps, much as a novel has 
gaps, in that there are questions about the characters to which the novel provides no 
answers, and to which there therefore are no answers. " 2() Dummett has now arrived at 
the position that reality itself is indeterminate, and he does not, apparently, mean by this 
that reality is as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics says it is. Rather, 
the claim is that there are "gaps" in reality itself, and not just in our explanations of 
reality. 
How are we to think of this in anything other than pictorial terms? What could 
it possibly mean to say that reality has gaps? Dummett suggests that, 
A verificationist might be able to fashion a semantics of possible 
worlds-alternative plenary descriptions of reality, relative to each of which 
bivalence holds-attributing to each speaker a conception of what it is for any 
given statement to be true in any one such world. ff he interprets the logical 
constants as obeying the two-valued semantics relatively to each world, he will 
obtain a classical logic; but he may still identify assertibility (absolute truth) with 
truth in all worlds, so that bi valence will fail and reallty will still have gaps. 21 
Dummett's suggestion here is to identify the gaps with the denial of the principle of 
bivalence. On this view, to say that reality has gaps is just to say that there are more 
than two truth-values. The way to do this is to construct a semantics of possible worlds 
such that truth obtains relative to each particular world, and bivalence fails for statements 
about all worlds. There are, however, two problems with this approach. First, identifying 
the gaps with bivalence would make them merely semantic rather than features of the 
2
°Ibid. 
21Ibid., 319. 
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world. This would, of course, make them less pictorial, but Dummett insists that the 
gaps are features of the world, and not merely of logical or semantic systems. Second, 
it is only at the level of statements about all possible worlds that gaps occur, and not in 
any particular world. This would seem to imply that, in order for any particular world 
to have gaps, all of them must, in some sense, be real. In other words, Dummett must 
embrace modal realism, a view that one imagines he would find quite abhorrent. 
The upshot of all of this is that Dummett seems not to escape the charge of 
relying on pictures rather than theories any better than does the realist. Whereas it does 
seem that we can make sufficient cognitive sense of realism, it is not at all obvious that 
equally good cognitive sense can be made of the idea that reality has gaps and that we 
must abandon the principle of bivalence. Realism would thus seem to remain unharmed 
by Dummett's attack. Let's tum next to Putnam, s challenge to realism. 
The Incoherence Argument Against Realism 
Some philosophers have argued that the very idea of realism, construed as a 
metaphysical doctrine, is incoherent. On this Yiew we can dismiss realism as a viable 
philosophical position on semantic grounds: it can't be made good sense of, so we have 
no clear idea what it is that it asks us to affirm. One of the chief exponents of the 
incoherence argument against realism is Hilary Putnam. 
Putnam finds that a useful way of viewing the philosophical debate over realism 
and anti-realism is by analogy with the debate oYer the ~onect interpretation of the 
theory of quantum mechanics. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, "any application of the theory requires that, in addiJion to the 'system' being 
14 
talked about, there be 'apparatus' or an 'observer' which is JWt included in the system. "22 
The point here is that quantum mechanical descriptions, unlike classical mechanical ones, 
make essential reference to some observer or apparatus. Such descriptions do not capture 
the observer-neutral properties of the system. Rather, quantum mechanical descriptions 
capture only observer-dependent properties; observer-neutral properties, if we can 
meaningfully say there are such things, are inaccessible to quantum mechanical 
description. According to this view "every property of the system i.s considered to have 
meaning and existence only in relation to a particular measuring apparatus in a 
particular experimental situation. "23 Such claims might be taken as an endorsement of 
idealism, or perhaps phenomenalism. Putnam does, however, allow that there is 
something observed, even if all our knowledge of it is observer-dependent. This 
something is not completely malleable, and resists our efforts to shape it as we will. 24 
22Hilary Putnam, Realism With a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 4. 
23Ibid. 
24Putnam allows here for an intelligible notion of mind-independent reality, while 
maintaining that any specific claims about the nature of such reality are meaningless. If 
the idea of a "limit concept" is intelligible, then it seems possible that we can have such 
concepts, and yet be unable to make any claims about what such concepts denote. For 
example, I have a concept of the edge of the physical universe. Yet it seems possible to 
hold that it makes no sense to talk about what is or is not on the other side of the edge 
of the physical universe. If there is something on the other side, then it must itself be 
part of the universe, since my concept 'universe' is that it contains everything. If there 
is nothing on the other side, then in what sense is there an edge to the universe? This 
appears to be a case of my having an admittedly "slim" concept of something about 
which I am unable to predicate any meaningful claims. The notion of a malleable, yet 
unknown, reality is this sort of concept. It is intelligible, but it isn't enough to support 
realism. 
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Putnam draws two implications from this view of quantum mechanics which have 
a bearing on philosophy. First, "in principle, then, there is no 'quantum mechanical 
theory of the whole universe'. "25 This is so because of the necessary reference to some 
observer, himself always excluded from the system being described. Second, there is no 
"picture of the universe which is so complete that it actually includes the theorist-
observer in the act of picturing the universe," i.e., no '"God's-Eye View' of the whole 
universe. "26 The longing for just such a view is what prompted Einstein's response to the 
Copenhagen interpretation and John Wheeler's "many worlds" interpretation. 27 Putnam 
uses these implications of the Copenhagen interpretation to recast the debate over realism 
as the debate over the possibility of an observer-neutral description of the world. On this 
construal those who subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation are anti-realists, (or at 
least non-realist), while those who hold out for an observer-ne11traL description are 
realists. 
Putnam concludes that, given this way of casting the problem, realism as the view 
that something is conceiver-independent, must be abandoned. The notion of a "cut 
between the observer and the system" can be formulated "'by saying that the observer can 
take as large a totality as he wishes as the system (excluding totalities which include 
himself in the act of performing the meas11rem ent), but that he him self (or at least part 
25Ibid., 4. 
261bid., 5. 
27Ibid.' 6-8. 
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of himself) must always lie outside the system. ,,zs This formulation highlights the role 
of the conceiver in the very concept of reality, or as Putnam puts it, the relationship 
between system and observer. Putnam's own view, "internal realism,~ is the view that 
the very idea of reality necessarily includes some notion of conceiver-dependence on pain 
of being unintelligible. According to Putnam, there is in all our representations of the 
world a necessary reference to some observer, himself not an element of the world 
described. Consequently, all our representations of the world are of the world as it is for 
some observer, and not of the world as it is conceiver-independendy. 
What should we make of Putnam's talk of a "God's eye view2~ The realist can 
admit, with no problem whatsoever, that all our representations are perspectival. Indeed, 
it is difficult to even imagine what non-perspectival tepresentation would actually be like. 
Why should we think that it follows from this that perspectival tepresentations cannot be 
of reality as it is independent of any conceivers1 Furthermore, why should we think that 
realism requires a complete and total representation of the world, a representation that 
includes the conceiver within the description, something Putnam says cannot be done? 
Contrary to what Putnam says, we can have representations of conceiver-
independent reality that do not require a "God's eye view. ~ Here is how to have them. 
Consider your concept of 'horses'. This complex concept will perhaps include component 
concepts such as 'mammal', 'four-leggedness', 'suitable for riding by humans', 'carriage-
drawing' and 'whinnying'. You may have acquired these concepts by various means, 
e.g., reading about horses, seeing pictures of horses, hearing stories about horses, etc. 
28Ibid.' 17. 
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Let's grant that all of this conceptual information derives, at some point, from 
acquaintance with horses or pictures and descriptions of horses. Now in order to have 
a conceiver-independent concept of horses simply take this concept and consider it as 
applying to horses regardless of any human conceiver's conception of horses. In other 
words, imagine that horses are the way you actually do conceive of them perspectivally 
even though there are no conceivers present. Jmagine, for instance, that horses as we 
conceive of them now were just like this prior to the evolution of human beings. This 
concept of 'horse' will now have all the content it needs in order to count as a legitimate 
concept, but will make no essential reference to a conceiver. The realist will also 
maintain that, although such representations are perspectival, it is nonetheless a 
representation of conceiver-independent reality. Jf this concept is intelligible, and has the 
content it seems to have, then it seems that we can have concepts of conceiver-
independent objects, and Putnam is either mistaken, or he just fails to have the same sort 
of concepts. 
If this is correct, Putnam's objection to realism can be overcome. But let's take 
a critical look at Putnam's alternative view to realism-internal reaJism. Putnam can be 
understood as subscribing to the following thesis: 
IR: All our representations of some object X are of X-as-conceived, and not of 
X as it is independent of any conceiver.1~ 
29Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Morar Sciences (London: :R<>utledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978), 138. See also his Reason, Troth afUi Hif;tory (Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 61, 102; Realism anti Reason (Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 84; Representations afUi Realil)I (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT 
Press, 1988), 115. 
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IR accurately states what is essential to internal realism. It directly challenges the 
very possibility of realism. It allows the realist his notion of a conceiver-independent 
reality, but prohibits him from making any claims about such a reality. IR is not merely 
the claim that all representations of the world are representations for some representor. 
It is trivially true that if there are any representations then there is some representor. 
Internal realism asserts the non-trivial claim that there are no intelligible representations 
of the world thought of as conceiver-independent. JR is also broad enough to capture 
Putnam's view of our representations of our own language. 
One problem for IR stems from the analogy with quantum mechanics. The lesson 
Putnam draws from quantum mechanics is that all representations of quantum mechanical 
objects make essential reference to some observer. This is not neceswily true. Surely 
we can imagine a physicist forming a representation of a quantum mechanical object 
whirling about a particle accelerator while nobody is watching. What we, perhaps, cannot 
represent is that we could have any knowledge of unobserved quantum particles. This, 
however, is an epistemic issue that is distinct from the issue of how we form 
representations. The former is concerned with evidence and truth conditions; the latter 
is concerned with conceptualization and imaginability. 
As has been shown, we seem able to form representations of objects as they are 
in themselves, unobserved by any conceiver. This requires only that we distinguish 
between the what some concept of something may be relative to f01 its meaning, and the 
object referred to by the concept. The relativity of objects to something, e.g., a conceiver 
or a language, does not follow from the relativity of the concept to something for its 
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meaning. By keeping this distinction clear, the intelligibility of realism is preserved. The 
lesson here is that there is no semantic shortcut to anti-realism. J() We can meaningfully 
assert the thesis of realism without threat of unintelligibility. If there is a good argument 
against realism it must at least presume the intelligibility of realism. Moser's argument, 
which we shall look at next, grants the intelligibmty of realism, and attempts to 
undermine it by appeal to some of its own assumptions, or at least assumptions that any 
realist ought to accept. 
Moser's Ar&ument A&ainst Realism 
Paul Moser has constructed an argument aiming to show that "if we demand 
support for our beliefs from agnostic-resistant non-questionbegging epistemic reasons, 
then we should withhold judgement on the truth of both ontological realism and 
ontological idealism about objects and essences. "31 Failure to employ non-
questionbegging reasons on the part of the realist will result in a failure to persuade 
certain skeptics, since they will always have available the reasonable option of asking 
why anyone should accept question-begging reasons. AfteraJI, by using question-begging 
reasons one can defend any position. Consequently, Moser endorses philosophical 
agnosticism, the view that we should withhold from making judgements about 
metaphysical claims generally, if we aim to defend them against skep1icaJ challenges. 
Moser's notion of ontological realism is what we have generally been calling 
3
°Moser, Philosophy After Objecti\!ity, 33-37. 
31Ibid., 41. 
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realism. He contrasts ontological realism with ontological idealism so as to mark the 
distinction between whether the objects a realist has concepts of are conceiver-
independent or conceiver-dependent. Ontological agnosticism is the view that neither of 
these opposing positions can be affirmed. The argument is, thus, much more general than 
an argument aimed just at realism. It is an argument aimed at any metaphysical claim 
about the nature of reality as it is conceiver-independently. Idealism, as well as realism, 
makes such claims, since idealism claims that reality is conceiver-dependent, and not 
merely because we think it is. For the idealist, the fact that reality is conceiver-dependent 
is not a fact about conceivers, but about reality itself. Both realism and idealism are, in 
this sense, metaphysical views. The argument is not very long, although it has far-
reaching consequences, and is worth quoting in full: 
1. Ontological knowledge, by definition, is knowledge of conce1vmg-
independent reality: for example, knowledge that a conceiving-independent 
fact obtains, such as a conceiving-independent fact entailing the existence 
of an essential property or a physical object. 
2. Our effectively discerning (that is, discerning with non-questionbegging 
evidence) that anyone, including ourselves, has knowledge of conceiving-
independent reality requires that we have effective access to conceiving-
independent reality: that is, access whose use is not a source of 
questionbegging evidence regarding the pertinent questions concerning 
whether one actually has knowledge of conceiving-independent reality. 
3. Access to anything by spatio-temporally :finite conceivers, such as 
ourselves, depends on features or processes of conceive1:s-for example, 
perception, memory, introspection, testimony, intuition, common-
sense-that are subject to effectively unanswerable questions about 
whether they decisively influence or create what is accessed: in particular, 
questions about whether their input conveys :something that exists 
independently of one's conceiving of it. 
4. Hence, spatio-temporally finite conceivers, suclt as ourselves, cannot, or 
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at least do not, have effective access to conceiving-independent reality. 
5. Hence, we cannot effectively discern that we have ontological knowledge, 
even if we happen to have it. 3z 
If our aim is to have non-questionbegging reasons for metaphysical knowledge, then this 
argument shows that we should reject realism. It does not follow, however, that we 
should thereby embrace idealism, or any other anti-reahst position, insofar as such 
positions require non-questionbegging reasons for support of theiI metaphysical claims. 
Moser's argument supports a conditional agnosiicism about metaphysical .knowledge 
claims. It is conditional in that it is aimed only at those who attempt to provide non-
questionbegging support for their metaphysical claims. The argument does not claim that 
realism as a metaphysical position is incoherent. It allows for the intelligibility of the 
concept of realism. It is aimed instead at metaphysical cJaim s by realists to know what 
the world is like. This will include the metaphysical claim that the world is such that it 
does contain conceiver-independent items. Although this claim does not specify in detail 
what such items are, or what features they have, it is a knowledge cJaim insofar as it 
claims to state what the conceiver-independent world is like. 
Premise 1 gives a definition of what reaJists have typically understood by 
ontological knowledge. Although Moser calls this ••ontological"' knowledge, we could just 
as well call it "objective," or "metaphysical" knowJe.dge. Use of 'ontological' here 
designates knowledge of what there is. The argument wiJI, however, cover more than just 
ontological knowledge. It covers any and all aJleged knowledge of conceiver-independent 
32Ibid., 41-42. 
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reality, i.e., metaphysical knowledge generally. The distinction employed here is between 
ontological knowledge and metaphysical knowledge where the former is a subset of the 
latter. Ontological knowledge is knowledge having to do with the nature of being and 
issues of what there is. This need not exhaust all metaphysical knowledge. For example, 
metaphysical knowledge of the nature of causality can usefully be distinguished from 
ontology. As will be seen later, the term 'ontology' can usefully be employed to 
designate a subject of study that does not fall prey to Moser's argument. The point here 
is just that, understood in this way, Moser's argument is aimed at metaphysical 
knowledge generally. 
Premise 2 sets a necessary requirement for our being able to determine, in a non-
questionbegging and epistemically relevant way, w'1en someone, ourselves included, has 
metaphysical knowledge. Notice, this is not a requirement for '1aving metaphysical 
knowledge. The argument is not concerned with the issue of what epistemic conditions 
are required for having knowledge. Whatever those conditions are, this argument is 
intended to be neutral on that issue. The point at issue in premise 2 is. whether we can 
determine if someone has metaphysical knowledge without appealing 1oques.tion-begging 
evidence. 
Premise 2 requires of the realist that, in order to effectively settle his claim to 
having metaphysical knowledge, he "produce a means of access 10 conceiving-
independent reality that does not involve begging pertinent questions about whether that 
means of access is indeed a reliable, or (typically or even sometimes) successful, avenue 
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to conceiving-independent reality. "33 Keep in mind that premise 2 is not a requirement 
that we must know that we know; premise 2 does not require second-order knowledge 
in order to discern that there is first-order knowledge. The access in question need not 
necessarily itself be known by the knower. 
This requirement is not, however, limited only to 1he realist. Premise 2 claims 
that anyone who would determine whether or not someone, themselves included, has 
objective knowledge requires this sort of non-questionbegging, epistemic access just in 
order to make such a determination. So, for example, we can imagine one sort of skeptic 
who argues that the realist lacks the required epistemic access. This skeptic must herself 
have such access, however, in order to make such claims in a non-questionbegging way. 
Moser's agnosticism aims to avoid this sort of skepticism. It takes the view that the 
agnostic need not have this access himself just in order to challenge tbe realist. The 
agnostic claims only that anyone who would claim to bea.ble to discern whether someone 
does have such knowledge, requires such access. Consider, for e;{ample, two 
philosophers: N the non-realist, and R the realist. R claims to have objective knowledge; 
N challenges R's claim to objective knowledge on grounds that R lacks the required 
epistemic access. In order for N to effectively discern that R does not have objective 
knowledge, N herself is required to have such access. Otherwise N herself will be guilty 
of question-begging against the realist. The question js, what non-que~tionbegging 
reasons can N give in support of her claim that R does jn fact not have the knowledge 
that he claims to have? And here N is herself caught in the same trap a~ R. 
33Ibid., 42. 
24 
Premise 3 claims that all relevant epistemic access appears to be irredeemably 
suspect. It seems to be part of "the inescapable human cognitive predicament" that beings 
such as ourselves, i.e., spatio-temporal beings, are unable to have the required sort of 
access, because we have no non-questionbegging means of determining whether any 
access to anything at all does not affect what is accessed in an epistemicall y relevant 
way.34 In other words, given any particular sort of access, e.g., intuition, perception, 
etc., we apparently have no way to judge whether this access is reliable, for we require 
the very access in question in order to make such a determination. Consequently, if we 
did have the required access, we would, in virtue of having it, have a way of answering 
the skeptical questions regarding its reliability. 
Imagine then that realist R claims to have access of type A to conceiver-
independent reality. Skeptic S challenges R, asking him to give non-questionbegging 
reasons for his claim that A is in fact the sort of access tha1 he R needs in order to have 
metaphysical knowledge. If R has access A then he must be able to give non-
questionbegging reasons for his claim that A is 1he required sort of access, otherwise R 
could claim that any sort of access is sufficient to meet the challenge. The question is, 
can R give any non-questionbegging reasons for thinking tha1 A is in fact an epistemically 
reliable means of access to conceiver-independent reality? Premise 3 says no, because 
justification of any such claim will be suspect on grounds 1hat i1 itself requires the very 
access in question in order to give non-q uestionbegging reasons for the claim that A is 
in fact the required sort of access. But this jus.t begs the very question at iss.ue since R 
34Ibid.' 43. 
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is employing A in order to substantiate his claim that A has the required sort of 
reliability. This is clearly a circular strategy; it will fail utterly to convince the skeptic. 
Consider the Snellen chart test for eyesight as an example of the problem involved 
here in testing the reliability of the access in question. The Snellen chart consists of 
various letters of various sizes correctly identifiable by the "normal eye" from a 
particular distance. The point, for purposes of the argument for agnosticism, is that, "the 
Snellen standard for normal vision is based loosely on an assumed statistical average 
concerning human visual perceivers, not on considerations purporting to indicate 
objective reliability of vision," and thus "we cannot presume the reliability of our vision 
to deliver non-questionbegging epistemic reasons in favor of the reliability of our 
vision. "35 The Snellen chart is used to test for whether some indi.vidual has average 
vision. 36 It is misguided to think that it does anything more than this. Premise 3, argues 
for the general claim that we have no such reliable access to anything. 
Premise 4 is entailed by premise 3. If we have no reliable access to anything, then 
we have no reliable access to conceiver-independent reality. Hence, we conclude from 
premise 4 that we have no non-questionbegging way of determini11g that we have 
35Ibid., 45. 
36There are, of course, other reasons for taking a Snellen test. One may just wish 
to see better than one currently does. One would then take a Snellen test for purposes 
of obtaining corrective lenses. This is, of course, a good reason for tahd11g the test, but 
such reasons are irrelevant for purposes of the present argument. Furthermore, it doesn't 
follow that because one can see better with corrective lenses, prescribed on the basis of 
results from a Snellen test, that one is therefore seeing what there c. really"' is in some 
conceiver-independent manner. There are no metaphysical eye-glasses that can provide 
the required access to conceiver-independent reality. 
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metaphysical knowledge, even if we do in fact happen to have such knowledge. The 
argument shows that we have no non-questionbegging reasons for claiming that we have 
metaphysical knowledge, even we have such knowledge. Thus, Moser's agnosticism is 
the view that we should avoid making claims of having metaphysical knowledge since 
we have no non-questionbegging way of discerning that we do have such knowledge. 
A pressing question for agnosticism is whether Moser himself is malcing a claim 
to have metaphysical knowledge. Premise 3 appears to be a claim about what certain 
perceivers are really like. In particular, it appears to claim that as spatio-temporal 
conceivers we cannot have the required sort of non-questionbegging access to anything. 
The issue facing premise 3 is whether it makes a claim to know what spatio-temporal 
conceivers are really like. If it does, then in order to affirm it we require the same sort 
of access mentioned in premise 2. But if this is the case, then the argument collapses, 
since the argument aims to show that precisely this sort of access in unavailable. 
This objection overlooks an old and forceful reductio strategy practiced by 
Pyrrhonian skeptics: 
An agnostic's reductio strategy claims that 011 assumptions made by typical 
realists, we cannot have an effective challenge to, or defense again st, agnosticism 
about realism. Given such a strategy, an agnostic need not countenance 
ontological knowledge to challenge such knowledge. An agnostic can consistently 
hold that, on typical realist (defining) criteria for justification, we are justified in 
endorsing the premises of the previous agnostic argument. The uductio strategy 
does not entail (or otherwise indicate) that the realist criteria in Cl uestion are 
suitably effective, or non-questionbegging, as an avenue to ontological 
knowledge. An agnostic thus has plenty of room to escape the threatening 
inconsistency. 37 
37Ibid. ' 50. 
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The agnostic need not make metaphysical claims himself in order to run a convincing 
argument against the realist. The questionable premise(s) are laid down as what would 
be acceptable to a realist on his own tenns, thus, it is the realist who accepts the 
premise(s) in question. This sort of agnosticism is plausible and can be consistently 
maintained, even though it itself lacks the required epistemic access. It can challenge the 
realist on his own terms without thereby succumbing to a counter-challenge. Agnostics 
merely employ as one of the steps in the argument a condition that the realist must 
accept; agnostics themselves need not accept this condition as applying to their own 
position, for they 
can consistently offer neither a claim to the reliability of reductfo inferences nor 
a claim to the meaningfulness of an agnostic truth-claim about which someone might be 
agnostic. Still, they can issue challenges that one conceptually cannot meet. Even if these 
challenges (semantically or pragmatically) "presuppose" certain claim~, agnostics need 
not make any unconditional commitment to the truth of what is thereby preSllpposed; they 
need not grant that presuppositions are objectively true or otherwise favorable to the 
cause of realism. Agnostics can consistently proceed just "for the sake of challenge. "38 
The point is that agnostics need not be committed even to the truth of their own 
arguments, since they are not affirming any positive claims about the nature of conceiver-
independent reality. Agnostics can successfully offer challenges to the realist who then 
has two alternatives: one, show that the challenge can be met by refuting or posing 
successful objections to the argument, or two, refuse to respond to the argument. If the 
realist can successfully rebut the agnostic's argument, the possibility of the truth of his 
own position is preserved. Taking the second strategy wiJI always leave the realist open 
to charges of appealing to question-begging assumptions from the ag11osfic. At the very 
38Ibid., 56. 
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least, the realist who appeals to these sorts of assumptions ought, at least for the sake of 
intellectual honesty, to make explicit that he is in fact begging questions against the 
skeptic. What is important for the present point, however, is that the agnostic need 
nowhere affirm the truth of his own premises just in order to make the argument militate 
against the realist. 
Failure to recognize the validity of this strategy is perhaps what motivates a facile 
rejection of skepticism as being self-refuting. Such objections assert that the skeptic is 
caught in a self-contradiction due to his use of claims in an argument that are inconsistent 
with his own position. The problem with this strategy is that it assumes that the person 
using the argument must himself grant its validity. This is not a required assumption. The 
force of this argumentive strategy is just that it requires only that the penon to whom the 
argument is directed against accept the premises. In this sense, it is a kind of ad 
hominem argument, although not merely ad hominem. So Long as the realist to whom the 
argument is directed accepts the premises, then the argument will carry sufficient weight 
against realism. The person stating the argument is under no obligation 10 accept the 
argument unless he too employs a position against which the argument is directed, e.g., 
an idealist running an argument against a realist. Since Moser is an agnostic, in the 
strictly qualified sense, he need not be compelled to accept any of the assumptions of this 
argument as militating against his own position. This sort of agnos1icism hoists the realist 
on his own petard, leaving the agnostic untouched. It is as if the agnostic has gathered 
together various components from among the realist's own store, combined them in a 
particular way, and then offered them back to the realist. 
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The realist may, after being confronted with this argument and its outcome, 
perhaps take the view that the entire argument can be rejected on grounds that it leads 
to an implausible skepticism. Michael Devitt, for example, says that "scepticism is 
simply uninteresting; it throws the baby out with the bath water. "3!1 But as Moser points 
out, "one pressing question is whether realists actually have a real baby-that is, 
effectively supportable ontological knowledge-to throw out. "4<l Roderick Chisholm, on 
the other hand, in discussing the problem of the criterion, begins with the "common-
sense conviction that there are things that I know-such things as the fact that at this 
moment I am in a room with other people. "41 Since there aJe things, on Chisholm's 
view, that are known, then it must at least be possible to give some account of 
knowledge. The problem with Chisholm's strategy is that it does not prope1ly challenge 
the kind of agnosticism we have been discussing. The kind of agnosticism described does 
not say that we cannot have knowledge. It also does not claim that we cannot know 
anything about our sensory experiences. Furthermore, it does not prohibit meaningful 
theorizing about the nature of knowledge. It is aimed only at knowledge of conceiver-
independent reality. Unless one takes the view that knowledge must be of conceiver-
independent reality, this sort of objection from Chisholm is misplaced. It is only the 
realist (as well as the idealist) who is challenged, and not the project of epistemology 
generally. 
39Devitt, Realism and Truth, 75. 
4
°Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, 46. 
41Roderick Chisholm, "Reply to Amico on the Problem of the Criterion," 
Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 232. 
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If the argument for agnosticism is good, and it does appear to be so, then non-
questionbegging claims to metaphysical knowledge must go by the board. Of course, we 
may yet be in possession of such knowledge, for the argument does not show that we are 
incapable of having such knowledge. The argument shows only that we cannot ever 
objectively verify that we are in possession of it. Hence, it is a moot point to maintain 
that we can still have such knowledge, for such having in the ab~nce of verification will 
provide scant comfort to the metaphysically inclined. But before we leave realism behind, 
let's look at Michael Devitt's strategy for saving realism. He claims to have an 
"inference to the best explanation" style argument for realism. Let's look at Devitt's 
defense of realism to see if it can escape Moser's agnosticism. 
Devitt's Argument for Realism 
Devitt's positive argument for realism is as follows: 
1) My perceptual experiences of common-sense objects are of the sort: "it is as 
if there is a blue cup in front of me. " 
2) What is the best explanation of 1? 
3) The best explanation of 1 is that there is a blue cup in front of me. 
4) Therefore, realism is correct. 42 
Premise 1 aims to capture what it is like to have an experience of a common-sense 
object, rendered in such a way so as not to µresuppose the existence of the object. 
Premise 2 calls for the "best explanation" of L Premise 3 gives us the answer to 2, i.e., 
realism about blue cups, thus providing support for realism generally. 
42Devitt Realism and Truth, 74-75. 
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Devitt calls the argument an "inference to the best explanation. "43 He seems 
occasionally willing, however, to settle for a merely "good" explanation.44 Although the 
criterion for a best explanation can plausibly be considered to be higher than that for a 
merely good explanation, let's not quarrel with that issue. The argument is not, however, 
without problems. 
First of all, not all of one's perceptual experiences of common-sense objects are 
equally well explained by realism. For example, perceptual experiences of apparent 
puddles of water on the road are not always explained by there being water on the road. 
One may, in fact, be having a sensory illusion. Nevertheless, puddles of water surely 
count as common-sense objects. It may be that the sensory illusion has extemal causes 
of the sort specified by realism, namely, physical heat waves causing one's retinas to be 
irradiated in a certain way. One may be unable, however, to infer the existence of these 
sorts of causes just from perceptual experience alone. It takes experimental investigation 
and a good portion of scientific theory to affirm a good explanation of ilJnsory perceptual 
experiences. In cases of illusion then, the explanation is not inferred as directly as Devitt 
seems to imply. 
Assuming, however, that we can say what will count as the appropriate common-
sense objects, a more pressing problem threatens. We can reasonably ask of Devitt, what 
will count as a good explanation of our experiences of common-sense objects? If 
something is a good explanation for our experiences of common -sense objects, there must 
43Ibid., 74, my emphasis. 
44Ibid., 74-75. 
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be some reason why it is good and not bad, some criterion whereby we can affirm the 
goodness or badness of various explanations. Notice, this is different from the question 
of what is meant by the term 'good'. We can assume that the term ~good' means 
something like, 'theoretically or cognitively useful,' or any other notion of 'good' that 
Devitt might want to propose. The question is rather one concerning the reasons for 
thinking that some explanation is good, whatever Devitt might happen to mean by the 
term 'good'. Furthermore, we aren't asking for a general criterion for abduction, one 
that will do for any and all cases of abduction. The criterion we are seeking is one for 
this particular abduction; one that will enable us to say when we have a good explanation 
of our experiences of common-sense objects. 
The question then is this: in virtue of what is realism itself a good explanation? 
Or, asking the question posed earlier, on what criterion does realism count as a good 
explanation of our experiences of common-sense objects! The only reasons for thinking 
that realism is a good explanation of these experiences all malc:e assumptions about such 
things as the nature of physical entities, light waves and the irradiation of retinas, nerves 
and nerve impulses, etc. In other words, assuming the scientific views about how we 
form impressions of apparent common-sense objects, realism is a good explanation. It 
is good because it best satisfies the constraints put on good explanations by scientific 
views about we perceive common-sense objects. And those scientific views employ 
theories about light waves, physiology, nervous systems, etc. Thus, realism is a good 
explanation in virtue of various scientific theories about perception, YisuaJ imaging, etc., 
and all the other factors involved in what we take to be a correct aceou11t of our sensory 
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contact with the world. 
Devitt admits up front that the argument for realism "starts from folk theory and 
scientific theory. "45 This starting point is, specifically, an assumption about the entities 
posited by these theories: "These theories posit many observable physical entities. By and 
large we are confident of these posits. "46 What is assumed here is the entities posited by 
science. This is something quite different from the theories explaining the nature, 
behavior and interactions describing these entities. But it is just such theories that Devitt 
must assume in order to get the needed criterion, since mere :posits alone are insufficient 
for determining a criterion of goodness for realism. For it is these very posits that are 
in need of the explanation that realism purportedly supplies. What is problematic is that 
the theories he needs to assume that supply the criterion of goodness about which we are 
inquiring are theories that constitute, at least in part, a "naturalized epistemology." In 
other words, assuming at least a portion of naturalized epistemology as the criterion for 
goodness of explanation, realism is a good explanation of our experien~es of common-
sense objects. 
Naturalized epistemology, for Devitt, is the "'scientific explanation of our knowing 
science. "47 It is composed of "a descriptive part and a normative part. The descriptive 
part explains how, as a matter of fact, we fonn our opinions. The normative part 
45Ibid. ' 73. 
46Ibid. 
47Ibid.' 76. 
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explains what makes these opinions knowledge (in so far as they are). "48 The first part 
is "a psychological task .... It is simply descriptive of how people do infer and form 
beliefs. "49 The normative part addresses the question of how we "'should infer and form 
beliefs. "50 So far, this is Quine's program, as Devitt admits, but with the exception that 
"this normative part of the task seems to be a departure from Quine, who thinks that all 
epistemology is psychology. "51 
The naturalized view of how we do infer and form beliefs will employ scientific 
notions of how retinas are irradiated, how the retinal image is converted and transported 
through the optic nerve to the brain, etc. If realism is to count as a good explanation of 
our experiences of common-sense objects, it seems these sorts of theories must be 
assumed. For example, the mere existence of trees is not sufficient explanation of why 
some of my perceptions have the particular qualities they have of browness, leafiness, 
woodiness, etc. We require some theory of how tress contribute to my perceptions of 
them, one that takes into consideration such factors as the transmi~~ion of light waves 
and the irradiation of my retina, etc. Since these theories constitute a part of a naturalized 
epistemology, Devitt must already assume portions of naturalized epis1emology in order 
for realism to count as a good explanation of our experiences of common-sense objects. 
Devitt urges, however, in his Maxim 3, that we "'settle the reaJism issue before 
481bid. 
491bid., 77. 
S<Tuid. 
51Ibid. 
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any epistemic or semantic issue. "52 Maxim 3 does allow that realism has some minimal 
semantic and epistemic content, for the two cannot be entirely separated. What it urges 
is twofold: first, qua metaphysical thesis, the truth of realism ought to be decided on 
metaphysical rather than epistemic or semantic grounds, and second, we ought to decide 
the truth of realism without having to first settle any substantive semantic or epistemic 
questions. Devitt has in mind here the strategy of someone like Dummett, for example, 
who thinks that metaphysical problems generally can only be solved by employing a 
theory of meaning. The problem for Devitt is that, by appealing to the portions of 
naturalized epistemology just discussed in order to explain why realism is a good 
explanation of much of our common-sense experience, it looks as though he must 
abandon Maxim 3 in order to answer the question being posed, for surely the amount of 
naturalized epistemology that needs to be assumed is substantial. Suppose, however, that 
we abandon Maxim 3-will the argument then go through? 
If we make this move, and employ a naturalized epistemology as the needed 
criterion of goodness, then a further question can be raised: why should we use 
naturalized epistemology as the needed criterion, rather than, say, a non-naturalized 
epistemology? That is, we will want an argument for why we should accept a naturalized 
epistemology as the required criterion. And Devitt does provide just such an argument, 
even claiming at one point that the "positive argument for realism ••• requires that 
epistemology be naturalized. "53 Devitt's argument for naturalizing epistemology, 
52Ibid., 5. 
53lbid. ' 61. 
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takes science, and hence its posits pretty much for granted. And an obvious 
starting assumption is the aforementioned one that these posits exist objectively 
and independently of the mental. So it approaches epistemology from a Realist 
standpoint; it is in accord with Maxim 3.54 
We might of course reasonably wonder just which science is to be employed here. But 
let's just assume for the sake of argument that it is our current ~best science," however 
that is decided. The argument for naturalized epistemology now appears to assume 
realism at the outset. We see now that the specifics of the argument for naturalizing 
epistemology are irrelevant, since if Devitt must assume naturalized epistemology in 
order to argue for realism he is caught in a circle. Specifically, he seems to argue that, 
1) The argument for realism is correct, given a naturalized epistemology, and 
2) The argument for naturalized epistemology is correct, given realism. 
Clearly, this strategy will fail to convince, since no circular strategy will convince either 
the skeptic, or a theorist employing a different circle. Devitt might, however, make the 
following reply. Some scientific theories are indeed assumed as the criterion whereby 
realism is a good explanation of our experiences of apparent common-sense objects. A 
naturalized epistemology might make use of these same theories. lt does not follow, 
however, that since naturalized epistemology assumes realism that the argument for 
realism is thereby circular. It would only be circular if these theories are assumed by 
realism in their role as pan of a naturalized epistemology. Jf they are not serving such 
a role, then the argument is not circular. We can employ such theories in their non-
epistemic roles, and thereby avoid the charge of circularity. 
54Ibid., 76. 
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On the contrary, the theories in question are being employed in an epistemic way. 
What makes such scientific theories seem like plausible candidates for the needed 
criterion is the assumption that they do in fact describe our cognitive access to the 
external world, and such cognitive access is precisely that feature of these theories that 
is exploited by naturalized epistemology. Considering these theories on a purely 
ontological level, there is no reason why such theories would, or even could, serve as 
the needed criterion. For why should we think that, ontologically, an external object is 
anything at all like our experience of it? It seems quite possible that external objects 
could be quite different from how we perceive them, and that becau~ of the consistency 
of our experience, together with the lack of anything neutral to our exµerience with 
which we can compare it, we assume that it is the way we µerceive it. The reason why 
we assume that apparent blue cups resemble real blue cups is that we make some implicit 
assumptions about our cognitive access to real blue cups, e.g., assumptions about image-
forming processes. For this reason, it seems that the needed scientific theories are 
serving just this epistemic role. For if they are not serving thi I) epistemic role it is not 
at all clear how they could serve as the needed criterion. 
Devitt does seem to be aware of the circle created by the interdependence of 
realism and naturalized epistemology. He admits that naturalized epistemology 
"approaches epistemology from a Realist standpoint; it is in accord with Maxim 3. 
However, naturalism does not prevent a recomideration of realism. "55 The 
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reconsideration appeals to the "Neurath's boat" metaphor as the way out of the circle. 56 
Having rejected "foundationalist and Kantian arguments for anti-realism," Devitt claims 
that "if there is a good argument against realism, it must be from the perspective of 
epistemology naturalized. "57 If Devitt's intent here is to alleviate worries about a circle 
between realism and naturalized epistemology it isn't clear see how this requirement at 
the outset of his reconsideration of realism belays the worry of a threatening circle. Quite 
the contrary, it seems to reinstantiate it at the very outset. But, for the sake of argument, 
let's leave this point aside in order to look at how Devitt employ' s Neurath's boat as a 
way of sailing out of the circle. 
On a naturalized view, "science and common sense for the most part supply 
knowledge," and we cannot discard them altogether, "for they constitute the boat on 
which we must stay afloat. "58 We can, however, use "some parts of 1he boat to look 
critically at others. "59 So, "an anti-realist argument would show that the boat will float 
best without any realist planks. "60 But immediately the anti-realist faces a problem, for, 
"the whole boat is built of realist planks. " 51 And how do we know this~ Because, "We 
talk of stones, trees, and cats, not of sense data. Naturalized epistemology confirms that 
56Ibid., 79-80. 
57Ibid. 
58lbid. 
59Ibid. 
60Jbid. 
61Ibid. 
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these objects have the independence and objectivity that is definitive of common-sense 
realism. If anti-realism is to get started, our theory must l>e revised. ~152 Devitt then 
proceeds to argue that there are no good reasons for accepting a sense-datum theory, or 
any other alternative to realism about such objects. Consequently, realism "has no rivals 
that can be taken seriously. "63 
This Neurathian boat metaphor needs some cashing out in order to do the work 
Devitt wants it to do. The intent of the metaphor is to show how we can we save 
knowledge from an infinite regress of inferential chains of justification. On a 
foundationalist view of justification these regresses come to an end at some point. Having 
rejected foundationalism-"The foundationalist programme is hopeless"-the boat 
metaphor aims to show that we do not need foundations of this sort, thus avoiding the 
infinite regress problem.64 We can, instead, employ a coherentist strategy whereby we 
justify parts of our knowledge by appeal to other parts, the whole project being justified 
by all of its individual parts cohering with each other. 
We can, however, reasonably require of Devitt an answer to the following 
question: In virtue of what is it the case that coherence gives us justification of our 
scientific and common-sense beliefs? That is, in virtue of what is it true that our 
scientific and common-sense beliefs are justified in this way, and not some other? The 
aim of this question is not epistemic; it is not a question about how we can have good 
62Ibid.' 79-80. 
63Ibid. ' 80. 
64Ibid., 71. 
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reasons for using coherence rather than some other principle of justification. The 
question does not seek a causal explanation of why some people do use coherence rather 
than some other means of justification. Rather, the question asks what makes it true that 
we must use coherentist styles of justification. clj 
Devitt might reply here that scientific practice supports the use of coherence. That 
is, when we see how actual scientists theorize, we observe that they employ a criterion 
of coherence in decisions about what to accept as theoretically sound, what to reject as 
unsound, and what parts of existing theory to emend. Coherence as an epistemic principle 
is adopted on grounds that this is in fact the principle that is being used in practice by 
working scientists. 
This strategy will not work, however, since, as Moser points out, "we can grant 
this proposal now, if only for the sake of argument, and then ask: Jn virtue of what is 
it true-or the case-that actual scientific practice constrains epistemically warranted 
theory revision?" 66 This objection is not the same as the sort of objection that can be 
generated merely by asking "Why?" at each point in the argument. Afterall, there must 
be something in virtue of which it is true that actual scientific practice constrains theory 
revision. The question is not meaningless, and so cannot be dismissed on grounds that 
we don't understand it. The question could be ignored just on the more general grounds 
65This question is similar to one that Paul Moser asks regarding some of Quine's 
epistemic principles, e.g., the "maxim of minimum mutilation." Since Devitt is 
subscribing to a Quinean sort of naturalized epistemology, the question is particularly 
apt. See Paul Moser, "Analyticity and Epistemology," Dialec1ica 46 (1992): 14-15. 
66Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, 148. 
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that Devitt uses of rejecting skepticism outright; recall his claim tha1 scepticism "throws 
the baby out with the bath water. "67 But as we saw earlier, it is at least questionable as 
to whether the realist actually has a real baby. Furthermore, there is a possible answer 
to this question that will preclude any further why-style questions. As Moser suggests, 
it may just be analytically true for the naturalized epistemologist that coherence is 
epistemically justificatory. Analytic truths are not susceptible to why-style questions of 
the sort above, since for the person asserting such a truth it is jus1 the case that the 
analytic truth expresses what is meant by the concept in question. To question these sorts 
of claims would be like asking questioning a tau1ology, e.g., why is it true 1hat all apples 
are apples? The truth of these sorts of claims is just part of what is required in order to 
use the relevant terms of the language in the way that one uses 1hem in some particular 
language. Why-style questions here are not substan1ive, but rather inquisitive about the 
nature of the language itself. 
It seems doubtful, however, that Devitt will want to appeal to analyticity as 
justification of a principle so central to epistemic endeavors. Following Quine, he is 
willing only to "recognize the notion of analytici1Y in its obvious and useful but 
epistemologically insignificant applications. "(j8 Furthermore, although the appeal here is 
to analyticity, it still smacks of an a priori sort of solution, and, as we have already seen, 
Devitt will not stand for anything epistemological being decided a priori. m'> So although 
67Devitt, Realism and Truth, 75. 
68W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas in Retrospect," CallCldfan Jou.ma[ of Philosophy 
21 (1991): 271. 
69Devitt, Realism and Truth, 73. 
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there is what would appear to be a satisfactory answer to this question, it does not seem 
to be one that Devitt would very likely employ. It looks then as though Devitt's 
reconsideration is not helpful in extricating his position from a threatening circularity. 
Consequently, Devitt does not appear to have a viable strategy for avoiding the outcome 
of Moser's argument for agnosticism. The question facing us now is, given this version 
of agnosticism, is there any work left to do for philosophers'] 
Philosophical A gnosticism 
Metaphysical agnosticism shows that we can meaningfully discuss realist claims, 
but that we can no longer justify metaphysical knowledge claims with non-
questionbegging reasons. What we can meaningfully talk about exceeds what is justifiable 
with non-questionbegging reasons. Agnosticism does not claim that philosophical talk is 
devoid of sense. Its aim rather is "to curb the philosophical pretensions of realists and 
idealists aspiring to challenge or to defend against agnostics."'() 
Philosophical agnosticism does not spell the end of philosophy as we know it. 
Rudolf Carnap, for example, took his own work to be neutral with respect to various 
realist views. He claims that, for his own theories~ "the metaphysical components, 
concerned with whether the essence of the world is material or spiritual, are completely 
excluded from our consideration. "71 In chapter two develop a procedure will be 
70Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, 57. 
71Rudolf Carnap, "The Physical Language as the Universal Language of Science," 
trans. Max Black, in Readings in Twentieth-Century Philo~opny, ed. Wi!Jiam P. Alston 
and George Nakhnikian (Glencoe, IL: The Glencoe Free Press, 1963), 396. 
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developed for philosophical theorizing based on some work of Carnap's and Quine's that 
is agnostic about realism. This procedure can be used specifically to develop methods of 
doing ontology, although the resulting ontologies arrived at by such methods are non-
realist. 
This view will, no doubt, meet with the immediate objection that ontology is, by 
definition, realist. This is, of course, true, but it is only a problem if this is the only 
definition in circulation. The view that all ontology is, or at least ought to be, realist 
requires a defense stronger than the mere assertion that anything else doesn't deserve to 
be called ontology. In fact, it is factually false that all previous ontology is realist. There 
are at least two notions of ontology that are non-realist. One of them is empirical and the 
other is rationalist. Let's look briefly at each of them. 
Non-Realist. Empirical Ontoloi:Y 
Throughout his career Carnap consistently maintruns that the thesis of realism is 
a "pseudostatement, i.e., devoid of cognitive content. "72 On Carnap's view, metaphysical 
theses generally, e.g., idealism, phenomenalism, dualism, materialism, all lack cognitive 
content. Early on in his career we find him claiming that he and the other members of 
the Vienna Circle "are not a philosophical school and t'1at we put forward no 
philosophical theses whatsoever." 73 Consequently, the members of tlte Circle "pursue 
72Rudolf Carnap, "Replies and Expositions," in Th€ P'1ilo.sophy of Rudolf Carnap, 
ed. P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963), 868. 
73Carnap, "Physical Language," 393. 
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logical analysis, but no philosophy. "74 As late as his "Replies" in the Schilpp volume we 
find him remarking that he does "not know of any refutation or even a thorough critical 
discussion of my arguments. "75 The arguments referred to here are from his 
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. 76 
This position of treating metaphysical theses as lacking in cognitive content 
smacks of a verificationist theory of meaning. Since verificationism was one of the 
official doctrines of the Vienna Circle it would be quite natural to assume that it is what 
motivates Carnap's stance with respect to metaphysical theses. And we know from other 
of his works that Carnap did in fact embrace some version ofYerifLcationism, hence his 
attempts at patching it up when problems were discovered, e.g., 'le.stability and 
Meaning. 71 This would also explain the lack of critical discussion of his specific 
arguments in Pseudoproblems. Namely, given the critical discussion of verificationism, 
of which there has been plenty, the arguments in Pseudoproblems have been ignored. The 
arguments there are not, however, verificationist. 
Carnap tells the following story as an illustration of how we can settle an 
ontological dispute without being verificationist about meaning, and while remaining 
74Ibid.' 396. 
75Carnap "Replies," 870. 
76Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structl4re of the Worrd and P~elJdoproblems in 
Philosophy, 2d ed., trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1967). 
77Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," in Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: A:ppleto11-Century-Crofts, 
1953), 47-92. 
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neutral about both realism and idealism: 
Two geographers, a realist and an idealist, who are sent out in order to find out 
if a mountain that is supposed to be somewhere in Africa is only legendary or if 
it really exists, will come to the same (positive or negative) result. The two 
geographers will come to the same result not only about the existence of the 
mountain, but also about its other characteristics, namely position, shape, height, 
etc. In all empirical questions there is unanimity. Hence the choice of a 
philosophical viewpoint has no influence upon the content of natural science; (this 
does not mean that it could not have some practical influence upon the activity 
of the scientist). 78 
The point of the story to emphasize for present purposes is that some questions that can 
usefully be called ontological are answerable without appeal to 1ealism, or any other 
metaphysical position for that matter. Questions about the existence of some things can 
be meaningfully posed, answered and agreed on by persons holding outright contradictory 
philosophical positions. 
While one may take issue with othe1 points of the story, this point seems sound, 
with some limitations. Namely, we should restrict instances of agreement to possible 
cases rather than all cases. To say that in all cases there will be such agreement is 
perhaps too strong. This assumes that the realist and the idealist agree on the conditions 
for what counts as "empirically real." But whereas a realist might say that what is 
empirically real is so in virtue of its independence of our cognitive abilities, an idealist 
will surely object. This would lead them to possible cases in which they could dispute 
whether something is empirically real, even though they both perceive something that is 
presumably the object about which they disagree. Fm present purposes, there need only 
be possible agreement in order to show that at least some ontological questions can be 
78Rudolf Carnap, Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 3 33. 
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settled with no appeal to any metaphysical position. 
The realist might object that the question of whether there is or is not some 
particular sensory object is not a properly ontological question. Rather, this is at best a 
matter of what we might call "regional ontology." That is, these sorts of questions are 
merely a matter of deciding on particular cases rather than kinds of entities. Decisions 
about the former are decided by practitioners of the various disciplines, many of which 
are sciences, which take some particular kind of thing as their subject. Their 
"ontological" work is merely a matter of listing the various instances of the kind which 
they study. Only decisions about the latter are strictly ontological, and even here it is 
only questions of the most general kind that interest philosophers, for example, whether 
there are material or immaterial kinds of things. This latter sort of issue is the one that 
is strictly ontological in the philosophical sense. 
This objection is unconvincing. We can use the same example with the following 
modification. Consider two mathematicians, a realist and a nominalist, debating the issue 
of the existence of numbers. We can imagine the possibility of their both agreeing about 
the existence of numbers, while remaining committed to their particular metaphysical 
views. Here then would be a case in which they agree on an issue of the existence of 
some kind of entity, and yet disagree on their respective analyses of the nature of that 
kind, where these analyses are metaphysical positions. 
This illustrates the point that we can usefully distinguish between issues of 
ontology and various distinct, but related, metaphysical issues. One need not necessarily 
be committed to some particular metaphysical view in order to correct]~ say that one is 
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doing ontology in something like the traditional sense of that term. Although Carnap 
himself took the view that we cannot seriously be committed to any metaphysical view, 
since all of them lack significant semantic content, we need not follow him this far just 
to make use of the lesson of the above example. But while this example shows that 
ontology can be metaphysically neutral, there are cases of ontological views that are 
avowedly anti-realist. Let's look at some examples. 
Anti-Realist Ontologies 
Examples of anti-realist ontologies are actually quite easy to come by. Insofar as 
they can be considered to have any ontological views at all, pragmatists like James and 
Dewey seem not to have endorsed realism. Contemporary pragmatists such as Rorty, 
however, are ambivalent about ontology and metaphysics generally. It is no longer clear 
whether Rorty thinks there is anything useful at all to say about ontology that cannot be 
said by science. More clear-cut cases are easy to come by once we give up a 
commitment to empiricism. One need only adopt a rationalist stance, and anti-realist 
ontologies abound, in particular, the absolute idealist versions of philosophers such as 
Hegel, Green and Bradley. It is not hard at all to do ontology that is explicitly anti-realist 
once one gives up empiricism. 
The problem with this strategy, of course, i:s that it requires a defense of 
rationalism, the demise of which in the early part of this century, chiefly at the hands of 
Russell and Moore, is well known. More recent versions, :such as the views of Brand 
Blanshard, require a coherence theory of truth that i:s problematic for other reasons well 
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known in the literature. 79 
Although one might wish to construct an anti-realist, rationalist ontology, the 
burden of defending rationalism is heavy indeed. The point of these examples is only to 
show that an anti-realist ontology cannot be ruled out simply by definition. One might, 
however, attempt to defend a realist ontology that is rationalist. That is, we might get a 
defense of realism by means of rationalism, thus preserving realism, and consequently 
preserving a realist ontology. This sort of strategy would have the benefit of making 
realism necessarily true, rather than, as Devitt's view suggests, merely a good 
explanation of our ordinary sense experience. Let's look briefly at one such attempt at 
a rationalist realism. 
Rationalist Realism 
The 1960's and 70's, saw numerous attempts to run various Kantian-style 
transcendental arguments aiming to support various metaphysiclll views. The general aim 
of these arguments was to show that we can know what the world is like by means of our 
79Ralph Walker states the chief objection to such theories q_uite nicely: "The 
objection is that in the last resort no such theory can give an adequate ace.aunt of what 
it is for a proposition to be believed and hence to be a candidate for determining what 
the coherent system is. For it is essential that the coherent system be a system of beliefs, 
and not just a system of propositions in the abstract. There is no diffLculty jn generating 
plenty of rival alternative systems of propositions; and if this were not so, as perhaps 
Hegel thought, to drop the requirement that they be believed would be to render them 
indistinguishable from facts that obtain in their own right. It would be to abandon the 
coherence of truth in favour of the thesis that the world :is jn fact a rational system to 
which there are no coherently thinkable alternatives; and that is no longer a thesis about 
the nature of truth, but a thesis (and one without very much appeal) about the way the 
independent world is." [Ralph C. S. Walker, The Coherence Theory of Tm.th (New York: 
Routledge, 1989), 210.] 
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knowledge of the necessary conditions for its being the way jt appears, where such 
conditions are a function of our epistemic capacities. As an example of this approach I'll 
look briefly at some arguments of Ross Harrison. 
Harrison argues that a philosopher "wjth pure reason alone and independently of 
particular experiences or observations could properly claim to be discovering the nature 
of the world. "80 Harrison's basic strategy is to employ a transcendental argument. Such 
arguments, however, face many well-known objections, not the least of which is that they 
seem to be circular. 81 This point aside, it is perhaps instructive to look at a particular 
attempt to run such an argument in defense of realism. 
Harrison argues that in order to establish philosophy as "a separate and justifiable 
means of describing the world, independent of science and particular observations, then 
it must be the case that its results are immune from subsequent discoYeries based on 
science and observations. "82 In order to justify such claims the philosopher must have a 
priori knowledge that his claims are so immune. The only way to lcnow this is "if he 
8
°Ross Harrison, On What There Must Be (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1974), 32. 
81This is the thesis of Humphrey Palmer in his "The Transcendental Fallacy," 
Kant-Studien 74 (1983): 387-404. His argument js similar 10 Karl Ameriks' in his 
"Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a RegressiYe Argument," Karu-Studien 69 (1978): 
273-87. 
Barry Stroud, in his "Transcendental Arguments," JoumaJ of Philo.sophy 65 (1968): 
241-56, takes the view that transcendental arguments req11ire verificationism about 
meaning in order to defeat skeptical challenges. Hence, such argumen1:s will fail without 
a defence of verificationism. Stroud's thesis js further developed and defended by 
Anthony Brueckner in his, "Transcendental Arguments I,'' Noi.s J 1 (1983): 551-75 and 
"Transcendental Arguments II," Nous 18 (1984): 197-225. 
82Harrison, On What There Must Be, 9. 
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knows that they are necessarily so. "83 Thus, philosophical knowledge of the world is not 
just knowledge of how the world is, "but, rather, a study of how the world must be. "84 
Harrison's claim is not just that we can have conceiver-jndependent knowledge of what 
the world is like, but that we can have necessary knowledge de re. 
We might distinguish here between what I'll call "Weak Rationalism," and 
"Strong Rationalism," defined as follows: 
Weak Rationalism: We can have knowledge of what the world is Hke by means 
of pure reason alone. 
Strong Rationalism: We can have knowledge of what the world is necessarily like, 
or, what it must be like, by means of pure reason alone. 
Strong rationalism implies weak rationalism, but the reverse does not hold. So, if we 
know what the world is necessarily like, then we know what the world is like. Clearly, 
Harrison endorses strong rationalism. Consequently, he needs an account of necessity that 
is not merely logical, i.e., the sort of necessity that obtains between concepts in claims 
such as 'all apples are apples' but de re. It is relatively easy to get logical necessity 
among relations between concepts. Analytic statements and definjtions, for example, are 
one way of getting necessity. The problem with logical, or conceptual necessity, as 
Harrison points out, is that "from the relations between concepts no conclusions can be 
validly derived about existents, about how things actually are in the world. "115 
Kant's solution to this problem, as is well-known, is his notion of synthetic a 
831bid. , IO. 
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priori knowledge. The problems with this strategy are equally well-known.~ Harrison 
avoids this strategy, arguing that we might get the required necessity "by means of a 
hypothetical, showing that something is necessary if something else is to be the case or 
is to be achieved. "87 The style of such hypotheticals takes the form, 'jf the world is like 
X, then it is like Y', where Y is necessarily the case given X. For example, "jf there are 
circular things in the world then there are round things in it. "~8 
Harrison realizes that "no categorial conclusions about how the world actually is 
could be derived from this kind of hypothetical statement unless jt was known that the 
state of affairs described in the protasis of the hypothetical actuaJly obtained in the 
world. "89 Taking the above example, "it would have to be known ... that there actually 
were circular things in the world in order to make use of the hypothetical conclusion that 
there are round things in the world. "90 The problem is that we require some minimal 
knowledge of what the world is like before we can employ thjs hypotheticaJ method. His 
solution is that if the required knowledge is "extremely obvious or agreed, then we can 
show that these obvious or agreed facts involve certain other interesfing or important 
86 Two of the most familiar discussions are A. J. Ayer, Language. Truth and 
Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), chap. 4, !lnd Friederich 
Waismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (London: MaemiJlan, 1965), chap. 
3. 
87Harrison, 14. 
881bid. 
89Ibid. 
~bid. 
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things being true about the world. "91 What sort of "extremely obvious" facts does 
Harrison have in mind? 
The obvious fact he has in mind is "that there exists a world which can be thought 
about, or that there exists a world which can be comprehended. "9? This is a two-fold 
claim that Harrison is making. First, he is assuming what we earlier labelled weak 
realism: the view that there is something that exists conceiver-independently. Second, he 
is assuming that this world is understandable, that it is capable of being cognitively 
grasped by conceivers. Once we make this assumption, we find out "which things must 
be the case about a world if it is to be comprehensible and so find ... what the world is 
like," and in so doing we are "operating with pure reason alone. " 913 Harrison then 
proceeds to find out a good deal about what the world is necessarily like on the basis of 
the assumption that it is understandable. 
What are Harrison's reasons for making this two-fold assumption'] ln both cases 
he gives the same general reason. For the existence of a conceiver-independent world he 
claims that 
if nothing existed we could have no interest at all in the situation. The possibility 
that nothing exists, that is, can neither be considered nor referred to in any way 
unless it does not occur. So even though it is logically possible that nothing 
exists, it is justifiable to assume, purely a pTiori and independently of 
observation, that something does exist. For we could have no interest whatsoever 
in the situation in which this assumption does not hold.~ 
91Ibid. 
92lbid., 21. 
93lbid. 
94Ibid., 20. 
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And for the assumption of understandability he says, 
although it is logically possible that what exists is such that we could not judge 
or describe it, it would be impossible for us to consider or describe any situation 
for which this assumption did not apply. Again, we a.re either left with a situation 
in which we could have no possible interest, or else the assumption must be 
made. 95 
In both cases Harrison's point is that, failing these assumptions, we could not have any 
interest in the situation. But since we are in fact interested, there must actually be an 
understandable, conceiver-independent world. 
It is not at all clear what Harrison means by 'interest'. lt would be quite 
unconvincing if he just means something like personal preference, as when someone is 
interested, for example, in oriental sculpture. For it is just not true that all humans are 
necessarily interested in the same things. Furthermore, this sort of interest seems to be 
irrelevant to metaphysics. Why should we think that failure to be interested in this sort 
of way has any bearing at all on the issue of the existence of an intelligible world? 
Perhaps the notion of interest at work here is like having a stake in something, as, for 
example, when one is a shareholder in some business. In this case what is meant is that 
one has something at stake in what one is interested in such that one's own fortunes are 
at least in part contingent on the fortunes of what one has an interest in. But here again, 
there seems to be no relevant connection between this sort of interest and the possibility 
of an intelligible, conceiver-independent world. 
We could consider numerous other concepts of interest, but rather than examine 
them individually, perhaps we can say what seems to be required for a concept of interest 
95Ibid., 21. 
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that is relevant to metaphysical concerns. It seems that the relevant concept must be 
epistemic, rather than merely personal or even cognitive. For as we have seen, personal 
concepts of taste or fortune seem irrelevant. As for a merely cognitive concept, Harrison 
concedes that there is no problem in conceiving of the possibility of there not being an 
intelligible, conceiver-independent world: "We can, of course, consider what might 
actually be the case" and "it is logically possible that what exists is such that we could 
not judge or describe it. "96 Our interest then would seem to be epistemic in some way 
if it is to be relevant to metaphysics. 
But if interest is epistemic then Harrison's argument will be subject to the same 
sorts of objections levelled against realist positions generally by the agnostic. 
Specifically, such epistemic relations to conceiver-independent reality either beg questions 
against the sceptic, or more specifically in Harrison's case, they assume the very 
rationalism that is in need of defense. Failing answers to these objections, Harrison's 
strategy will fail to convince not only the skeptic, but also the non-rationalist. 
Furthermore, it seems to'. ill-advised generally to attempt to support realism with 
rationalism, given that the latter is in even stronger disfavor than the former, and for 
good reason. At the very least, if Harrison is right in his assumption that what needs 
defending is strong rationalism, and not just weak rationalism, this task alone at least 
shifts a sizable portion of the burden onto the realist. Moreover, the most thorough-going 
contemporary realists all seem to be strongly empiricist, probably because many of them 
aim to support some version of scientific realism as well as just realism generally. And 
96Ibid.' 20-21. 
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a rationalist defense of scientific realism might well nigh be impossible. 
Meta-Ontology 
We have seen that there are various non-realist ontologies, principally, rationalist 
versions of an idealistic stripe. This lead to a consideration of the possibility of a 
rationalist defense of realism. After some examinatfon of this strategy we concluded that 
such a defense is fraught with difficulties, and that, while it may be possible, the burden 
of argument is shifted back onto the realist. Since full-blown rationalism seems unreliable 
as a philosophical method generally, the issue now is whether there is available the 
possibility of a non-realist, non-rationalist method of doing ontology. 
There is such a possibility, and it is not entirely new. The strategy to be 
developed is inspired by some work of Carnap and Quine. Chapter two develops the 
basis for just such a strategy for doing ontology. Briefly, this will require two connected 
projects. First, a view about the nature of ontological commitment, i.e., what it is that 
certain of our expressions commit us to countenancing in our ontology. Second, an 
account of analyticity that can meet all of Quine's qualms. Chapter three develops the 
actual method using the basis developed in chapter two. Finally, chapter four defends a 
version of physicalist ontology using the method developed in chapter three. 
The aim of the next chapter is to say :something about the traditional ontological 
question-what is there? Following Quine, we can divide this question in two: ( 1) What, 
according to some statement, exists? and (2) Which statements ought we to believe? 
Question (I) is the issue of ontological commitment. This question asks what in particular 
some sentence commits us to in the way of existing entities. One way to answer this 
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question is to answer another one: (3) For some statement that says something exists, in 
virtue of what does it do so? Question (3) asks just about the linguistic mechanism 
whereby we make ontological claims. Knowledge of this mechanism will allow us to 
determine the ontological commitments of any statement that has such commitments. 
But merely knowing what some statement says there is is insufficient for an 
ontology. Granted that we are able to determine what any statement says there is, we will 
want to know which statements to believe; we want to know which statements we have 
reason to think are true. This is the aim of question (2). This is also the point at which 
we will part with Quine's solution and adopt a more Camapian approach. While, for 
Quine, question (1) is a matter of linguistics, question (2) is a matter of evidence, and 
Quine's answer to it is found in his naturalism, the view that we get our ontology from 
the natural sciences. Carnap, on the other hand, takes a linguistic approach to question 
(2), relying on his distinction between what he calls "external" and "'internal"' questions. 
Defense of this view requires an account of analytic truth, and so, we part ways with 
Quine and his naturalism. 
CHAPTER II 
ONTOLOGY, LANGUAGE AND ANALYTICITY 
Introduction 
When we ask about someone's ontology, we generally are understood to be asking 
what there is, or what sorts of things there are, according to that person. Exceptions to 
this understanding of ontology can be found. Heidegger and Sartre, for example, are 
concerned with "modes of being" rather than entities or kinds of entities. Their concern 
is with the manner or way in which things exist rather than with what kinds of things 
there are. Consider, for example, the difference between thinking of a hammer as a tool 
for hanging a picture, and as a physical object. Being a tool is a way of existing, whereas 
being a physical object is a kind of thing. We will be concerned with ontology in the 
sense of an inquiry into what there is. 
We might begin doing ontology by posing a single question: Wha1 is there? This 
question, however, is not very useful without some qualification, for it can be answered 
in a word- everything. But as Quine points out, "'everyone will accept this answer as 
true. "1 Such an answer fails to take into account differences between various views of 
what there is. The nominalist and the Platonic realist, for example, differ over the 
1W. V. Quine, "On What There Is," chap. in FromA U.gica/ PoinJ of View, 2d ed., 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 1. 
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existence of universals. Both, however, assert that their respective ontologies specify 
every kind of thing that exists. Indeed, any ontology that does not specify every kind of 
thing that exists can rightly be said to be incomplete. What we want is some way of 
formulating our ontologies such that our disagreements over what there is are made 
evident. 
Suppose then that Edgar and I differ in our respective ontological claims about 
what there is. Specifically, Edgar claims there is something which I claim does not exist. 
In order for us to engage in a meaningful dispute over the item(s) at issue there must be 
some way for both of us to state our differences. Ed.gar can state our differences by 
saying that there is something he claims exists, but which I do not. J, on the other hand, 
cannot say there is something Edgar claims exists, but which I claim does not, since, "in 
admitting that there are such things I should be contradicting my own rejection of 
them. "2 Hence, Edgar and I cannot even begin to settle our ontological dispute until we 
have some way of stating our differences which statement does not itself force one of us 
into a contradiction. It might of course tum out after some investigation that one of us 
does countenance a contradiction. What we require is some way of stating our differences 
where the statement itself does not form the contradiction. For without such a 
contradiction-free statement of our differences, there will be no way of telling precisely 
to what our alleged differences amount. 
The problem in such situations is that we seem bound to giYe some sort of being 
to things that do not exist, since otherwise we wouldn't be able to talk about them. Quine 
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calls this "Plato's beard. "3 Many philosophers have tried to solve this problem by giving 
such entities some sort of existence. Alexius Meinong's ontology is perhaps the most 
well-known, recent attempt at this strategy. On his view, everything we can speak of, 
or think about, has some sort of existence, including impossible objects such as round 
squares. The result of such a generous ontological method has come to be known as 
"Meinong's jungle." We can, however, avoid such densely populated ontologies by 
taking advantage of Russell's theory of descriptions. As we will see, it is via Russell that 
we get to Quine's theory of ontological commitment. 
Russell's Theory of Description 
Russell's theory of descriptions is first set out in his 1905 paper "()n Denoting. "4 
His aim is to give an analysis of "denoting phrases" such as, 'a man', 'any man' and 'the 
present King of France'. One of the problems with such phrases is that, on one analysis, 
we are lead into an overly abundant ontology. Meinong, for instance, holds that in order 
to preserve the meaningfulness of the statements in which such phrases occur, these 
phrases must be understood as names for some object. Russell shows, however, that the 
statements in which they occur can be made quite meaningful without our being 
committed to the existence of any entities so named. 
A phrase is distinguished as denoting, on Russell' s view, '"soJe1y i11 virtue of its 
form. "5 In other words, we reckon those phrases as denoting in virtue of some 
3Ibid., 2. 
4Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind n.s., 14 (1905): 479-93. 
5Ibid., 479. 
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grammatical or syntactic rule of the language in which they occur. Russell distinguishes 
between three sorts of denoting phrases: 
(1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., 'the present 
King of France'. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., 'the present 
King of England' denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; 
e.g., 'a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. r; 
Russell's analysis is simple and elegant in statement, but powerful in its 
application. He states the theory in a paragraph: 
I take the notion of the variable as fundamental; I use "'C (x)" to mean a 
proposition in which x is a constituent, where x, the variable, is essentially and 
wholly undetermined. Then we can consider the two notions "C (x) is always 
true" and "C (x) is sometime true". Then everything and nothing and something 
(which are the most primitive of denoting phrases) are to be in1erpreted as 
follows:-
C (everything) means "C (x) is always true"; 
C (nothing) means "'C (x) is false' is always true"; 
C (something) means "It is false that 'C (x) is false' is always true. "7 
The key to the analysis is treat the primitives 'every1hing', 'nothing' and 'something' as 
having no meaning in themselves. Rather, only those propositions, 01 sentences, in which 
they occur are said to be meaningful. So, for example, the sentence, ~1 talked to a 
woman', if true, is analyzed as, "'I talked to x, and xis an adult human female' is not 
always false". Thus, "the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate: that 
denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in 
whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. "8 
6Ibid., 479. 
8Ibid.' 480. 
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The virtue of the theory that we are particularly interested in is that we need not 
posit any entities named by denoting phrases in order to preserve the meaning of the 
sentences in which they occur. We are mistaken if we think that ~the author of Waverley 
was a poet' contains a denoting phrase, or name, which requires some actual entity so 
named in order to preserve the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs. 
We can apply the same analysis to statements of non-being as well. We can then 
resolve the dispute discussed above between Edgar's ontology and my own, in which his 
ontology contains something mine does not. Recall that the problem is that Edgar posits 
the existence of some entity that I do not recognize as existing. I, however, end up in a 
contradiction when I assert that the alleged entity does not exist, for just in virtue of 
speaking about it, I appear to be attributing some sort of being to a non-existent entity. 
But if Edgar says, 'Pegasus exists', I am not committed to postulating some sort of being 
to a non-existent, mythical horse-type creature in my assertion that it does not exist. 
Notice that in this case, we have a word, 'Pegasus', instead of a denoting phrase. What 
we must do first is substitute some phrase which gives us the meaning of 'Pegasus'. This 
substitution does not pose a problem, since, as Quine points ou1, 
If the notion of Pegasus had been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat 
translation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines, we 
could still have availed ourselves of the folJowing artificial and trivial-seeming 
device: we could have appealed to the ex hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible 
attribute of being Pegasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb 'is-Pegasus', or 
'pegasizes'. The noun 'Pegasus' itself could then be treated as derivative, and 
identified after all with a description: 'the thing that Ls-Pegasus', 'the thing that 
pegasizes. ' 9 
9Quine, "On What There Is," 7-8. 
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I then interpret the sentence 'Pegasus does not exist' by, first, substituting some 
description for 'Pegasus', say, 'Bellerophon's winged horse', and then analyzing this 
statement as '"It is false that some xis owned by Bellerophon, is a horse and is winged' 
is always true." In this way, I am no longer bound to predicate being of a non-existent 
entity, and I have some way of stating the differences between my ontology and Edgar's 
conflicting ontology without my lapsing into contradiction in the very statement of the 
difference between us. 
What we have thus far then is a way of stating difference between our ontological 
views that does not force us into an immediate contradiction. What we want now is some 
way of stating our ontologies in order to see where the conflicts may Jie. What we need 
is some way of making explicit what Quine calls our ontologicaJ commitments. 
Ontolo~ical Commitment 
Quine's doctrine of ontological commitment can first be found explicitly in his 
1939 essay "Designation and Existence. " 10 There are suggestions of this view as early 
as his dissertation, as evidenced by his use of the term 'ontology'-an odd choice of term 
in a strictly logical work, the main purpose of which was to modify some key portions 
of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. Note also the use of 'ontology' in 
his 1934 "Ontological remarks on the Propositional Cakulus. "u 
1
°W. V. Quine, "Designation and Existence," The Journar of Philosophy 36 
(1939): 708. It is here that we find the now famous aphorism: "'To be is to be the value 
of a variable. " 
11W. V. Quine, "Ontological Remarks on the Propositional Calculus," Mind 43 
(1932): 472-476. 
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We have already seen that denoting phrases, or names, are not indicators of what 
we take to exist. For we can substitute a description for any name, and then "Russell 
away" the description, so as to avoid commitment to any named entities. This treatment 
of descriptions depends on the notion of a variable, and it is here that we get the needed 
requirement for ontological commitment. Namely, 
To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of 
a variable. In terms of the categories of traditional grammar, this amounts 
roughly to saying that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun. 
Pronouns are the basic media of reference; nouns might better have been named 
propronouns. The variables of quantification, 'something', 'nothing', 
'everything', range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are 
convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged 
presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables 
range in order to render one of our affirmations true. •z 
Here we have a concise statement of Quine' s doctrine of ontological commitment. 
This doctrine can now be seen as an extension of Russell's theory of descriptions. The 
basic idea is that we can determine what there is for any s1atement by means of the 
variables over which the statement quantifies when we recast the statement into logical 
form. 
Quine is not implying that objects exist because we say they do. He is not 
endorsing linguistic idealism, the view that something exists in virtue of our saying that 
it exists. (Some such view may be what Goodman and the constructivjsts are up to, but 
it is not Quine's view.) As he has said on several occasions, "jt bas been objected that 
what there is is a question of fact and not of language. True enough. Saying or implying 
12Quine, "On What There Is," 13. 
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what there is, however, is a matter of language." 13 Hence, his oft-made statement that 
"to be is to be the value of a variable" is somewhat misleading. u Since this statement 
is merely an aphorism, however, it should not be taken as a precise statement of the 
doctrine. A clearer formulation would be, "what one takes there to be are what one 
admits as values of one's bound variables. " 15 
Two points need emphasis. First, the doctrine of ontological commitment is a bit 
of logical or grammatical analysis. Specifically, the aim of the doctrine is to establish the 
specific grammatical feature of a sentence in virtue of which we can tell what exists 
according to that sentence. One view for example, the view that Russell was arguing 
against in "On Denoting," claims that what a sentence says there is is a function of what 
the sentence names. On Quine's view, by contrast, it is a matter of what the sentence 
quantifies over when we translate the sentence into logical form. Second, there is no 
implicit belief on the part of the speaker as to the existence of anything just in virtue of 
ontological commitment. Belief in the existence of unicorns is not req_ uired by a speaker 
just in order to make a sentence in which the word 'unicorn' occurs meaningful. Quine 
is, afterall, a naturalist about what there is. On his view, as we will see later, we get our 
ontology from the natural sciences, and not just from ways of spealcing. 
13W. V. Quine, "Ontology and Ideology Revisited," 'The Joumai of Philosophy 
80 (1983): 499. See also, among others, his "On What There Is," and Pursuit of Truth, 
2d ed., (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 25-28. 
14W. V. Quine, "Designation and Existence," 708; See also. among others, his 
"A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem," chap. in Thf? Ways- of Paradox, 
Revised and enlarged edition, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UniveJSify Press, 1976), 199; 
Pursuit of Truth, 26. 
15Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 26. 
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Given its reliance on quantificational logic, ontological commitment is relative to 
a particular logical analysis of language. Given that there are other non-quantificational 
analyses of language, how do we explain the ontological commitments of such languages? 
For example, consider a language with a predicate-functor logic which employs 
predicates rather than variables. Does this relativization to q_uantificational logic make 
ontological commitment somewhat arbitrary? 
If quantificational logic expresses in symbolic form what we want the relevant 
portions of our natural language to express, then insofar as our language is sufficiently 
rich enough to enable us to express our beliefs about what there is, relativizing 
ontological commitment to quantificational logic is not a problem. As for languages 
employing a predicate-functor logic, Quine says, ontological commitment as the criterion 
for deciding what there is "is transferable to any alternative language, insofar as we are 
agreed on how to translate quantification into it. " 16 For a predicate-fonctor logic, "the 
equivalent principle is that what one takes to be are what one takes one's monadic 
predicates (complements included) to be true of. "17 The same strategy can be applied to 
ordinary English, where "what one takes there to be are what one takes one's relative 
pronouns to refer to. " 18 So, although the standard is relative to quantificatio11al logic, this 
does not appear to be a problem. 
We will, however, want to know, what the term ~exist' means in this context. We 
16Quine, "Ontology and Ideology Revisited," 499. 
17Ibid. 
181bid. 
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can, for example, imagine a realist maintaining that when he says something exists, he 
means that such a thing is objective and independent of anyone's cognitive grasp of it. 
Do we thereby get realism just in case we accept Quine's doctrine of ontological 
commitment? This seems a bit hasty, for surely the skeptic will want an argument for 
realism. Furthermore, ontological commitment is a logical doctrine, wherea:s realism is 
a metaphysical doctrine. 
In defining the term 'exist' we must keep in mind that the relevant context in 
which the term occurs is that of the existential quantifier '(3X)', which is, for Quine, "the 
distilled essence of existential talk. "19 Thus, the question of the meaning of 'exist' is just 
the question of the meaning of the existential quantifier. Or, put another way, we want 
to know just what is being imputed to a variable by the expression '(lt)', where this 
expression is understood by Quine "to mean precisely 'there is something~ :such that'. "20 
It should be clear now that realism as a metaphysical doctrine is not implied just 
in case we want to employ this notion of ontological commitment. For the realist will 
quantify over such things as head-colds, numbers and beliefs, even if he hold:s that such 
things do not actually exist in his realist way of existing. Thus, the concept of 'existence' 
that Quine is operating with is meant to be taken in "the broadest sense of 'being' that 
the user of the variables is to be seen as accepting. ,,zi The question, then, is somewhat 
19w. V. Quine, "Existence," in Physics, Logic and History, ed. Wolfgang 
Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck (New York: Plenum Press, 1970), 90. 
2
°Ibid.' 92. 
21Ibid., 91; See also his Word and Object (Cambridge, MA.: The M.I.T. Press, 
1960), 176; Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New Yorlc: Columbia University 
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misguided, since the relevant notion of existence is meant to cover any and all cases in 
which we say something like 'there are x's.' 
The existential quantifier then, understood as expressing in the broadest possible 
sense what we mean by saying 'there are x's' can be used to express what may actually 
be different senses of the word 'exist' as used in a natural language. We aren't required 
to give the term 'exist' a univocal meaning just in case we want to use the existential 
quantifier to formally express existence statements. We can, however, anticipate the 
following objection. Quine himself says that "Existence is absolute, and those who talk 
of existence can say so. "22 This seems to imply a realist notion of existence, whereby all 
uses of the locution 'there are x's' assert that x's exist objectively and independently. Is 
this an endorsement of realism on Quine' s part"? 
The problem with the objection is that it imputes to Quine much more than he is 
saying. He says "those who talk of existence can say so. "23 The ]JOint is that, insofar as 
we are free to use words in a way we see fit, we could use 'exhtence' to mean that the 
entities we countenance in our ontology exist absolutely, i.e., independently of whether 
we say they exist. In other words, we can allow the realist his notion of existence, while 
maintaining a different one ourselves. The point at issue is whetbe1 what exists for the 
speaker of one language can be said to exist regardless of an)' cultural, or culturally 
Press, 1969), 94, 97, 99-100, 108; "Ontology and Ideology Revisited,"' 499; Pursuit of 
Truth, 26-21. 
22
"Existence," 94-95. 
23Ibid., 92-93, my emphasis. 
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influenced, cognitive features of the speaker. Surely we would want to say that it could. 
For just because we take the view that what we say there is is determined by language-a 
trivial truth-it does not follow that the actual existence of the object spoken of is also 
a feature of the language. 
The feature of some entity such that it exists absolutely :is a feature of what Quine 
calls the "ideology" of a theory. As he puts it: "The ideology of a theory is a question 
of what the symbols mean; the ontology of a theory is a question of what the assertions 
say or imply that there is. "24 This is why the realist as well as the :idealist can both agree 
on the truth of the statement 'there is a dog in front of me' when uttered under 
appropriate conditions. Where they disagree is in their interpretation of the notion of 
'existence' as applied to the dog. The realist will say that it exists objectively and 
independently of his perceiving it; the idealist will say that its ex:istence is a function just 
of his mental activity. Both, however, will include something referred to by the term 
'dog' in their respective ontologies. Quine's point is that the operatLve issue in their 
respective uses of the term is in the ideology and not the ontology. 
If the doctrine of ontological commitment is clear, and well-defended, we have 
an answer to the question of what, according to some statement, exists. We can tum now 
to the issue of which statements we ought to believe. Two strategies for settling this issue 
will be considered: Quine's naturalistic strategy and Carnap's linguistic strategy. The 
strategy offered here will draw on elements of both, but will favor a Carnapian approach. 
24W. V. Quine, "Ontology and Ideology," Philosophical Studies 2 (1951): 14. 
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Ouine's Naturalized Ontology 
Quine's view of how we happen to come by our implicit ontologies is avowedly 
naturalistic. That is, his explanation employs the vocabulary of the natural sciences. One 
should not, however, infer from this that we ought to do ontology in this way. That is, 
we should not infer that, given Quine's story of how we do in fact come by our pre-
philosophical, or naive views about what there is, we thereby should construct our 
philosophical, or critical ontologies in the same way. This would amount to conflating 
a normative with a factual issue. The accounts we find in Word and Object, Ontological 
Relativity and Roots of Reference, among other places, begin with descriptions of how 
we acquire our implicit ontologies. So, these accounts of how we acquire our pre-
philosophical ontology of bodies, i.e. the medium-sized objects of everyday experience, 
should not be taken as accounts of how we ought to do ontology; these accounts are 
purely descriptive and by themselves provide no reasons why we ought to accept them 
as true. 
Quine's ontology is "naturalistic," in the same way as his epistemology. Briefly, 
this means that epistemology is construed as the scientific understanding of the human 
being as knower. On this naturalized view, epistemology becomes a branch of the natural 
sciences, along with philosophy generally. Roger Gibson has argued that naturalism is 
at the very center of Quine's philosophy, and that it constitutes "a key to unlocking a 
correct interpretation of Quine. "25 Although Gibson is correct here the claim needs some 
25Roger Gibson, "The Key to Interpreting Quine," The .Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 30 (1992): 17. 
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unpacking. Specifically, what we want is, first, an account of how Quine thinks we come 
by our pre-philosophical ontology, and second, reasons for thinking tllat a naturalistic 
strategy ought to be employed in constructing a philosophical ontology, i.e., one which 
we can defend with reasoned argument. If it turns out that our pre-philosophical ontology 
is one that can be defended on philosophical grounds, that is fine, so long as Quine does 
indeed defend it. Afterall, a description of something may actually be a correct 
description, but as philosophers engaged in doing ontology, we will fail to be persuaded 
of its correctness in the absence of good reasons for believing it is correct. 
Let's tum now to a brief account of Quine's approach to ontology. The defense 
of this ontology will rest, as Gibson claims, on naturalism. Unbke Gibson however, an 
account is given of why Quine embraces naturalism. One problem we will need to 
address is that of Quine's commitment to realism, for he has said that he is a realist 
about knowledge of the external world. We will need to see how his realism is related 
to his ontology. Briefly, the problem to be addressed is that of explaining how Quine can 
be a realist and yet embrace an ontology consisting of nothing mo1e than "pure sets. "26 
While Quine can perhaps consistently maintain a commitment to realism and an ontology 
of pure sets, his naturalism cannot be satisfactorily defended. Consequently, we must 
tum to a different strategy for constructing an ontology. The st1ategy employed will use 
some of Quine's methods, but is not committed to his naturalism. 
On Quine's view, epistemology is logically prior to ontology. That is, the 
26W. V. Quine, "Whither Physical Objects," in Essays in Memory of lmre 
Lakatos, ed. R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend and M. W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel, 1976), 501-502. 
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ontology of some theory is, at least partially, determined by our epistemology. 
Epistemology is naturalized, i.e., it is a branch of the natural sciences. Thus, the subject 
of epistemology is the human being considered in her role as knower or theorizer. The 
details of naturalized epistemology are well-known. Briefly, the story goes like this. We 
begin with observation sentences. These are sentences that .,;are directly and firmly 
associated with our stimulations. "27 Examples of such sentences are, 'it is snowing', and 
'there is a dog'. 28 In seeking to understand the world spoken of with these observation 
sentences we devise theories. In order to test these theories we devise special kinds of 
observation sentences that can serve as tests for these theories. Quine calls these special 
kind of observation sentences "observation categoricals." They take the form, 'whenever 
this, that'. So, for example, in testing a hypothesis about some chemical we might 
construct the observation categorical, 'whenever litholite heated to at least 100 degrees 
· centigrade, blue smoke'. Now recall that ontological commitment gives us the linguistic 
mechanism for determining what we are ontologically committed to. The referents of our 
bound variables give us the actual entities. But due to the indeterminacy of reference, 
27Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 3. 
28It is a matter of some debate as to what precisely such sentences are about: are 
they about sensations or external objects? This bears directly on the further question of 
what is to count as evidence. The most recent answer we get from Quine is that 
observation, as well as evidence, both drop out of the account in favor of observation 
sentences, where these are defined in terms of how we assent to their truth: "The 
sentence should command the subject's assent or dissent outright, on the occasion of a 
stimulation in the appropriate range, without further investigation and independently of 
what he may have been engaged in at the time. A further requirement isintersubjectivity: 
unlike a report of a feeling, the sentence must command the same verdict from all 
linguistically competent witnesses of the occasion." [Ibid.] 
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there will always be the possibility of equally correct, alternative interpretations of our 
referring terms. Since we have no direct epistemic contact with the referents themselves, 
hence the use of observations sentences, the nature of the referents themselves will be 
a matter of dispute as well. Focussing on the referents themselves we get a kind of 
indeterminacy as well-ontological relativity. Quine suggests that, at the furthest extreme, 
the referents of observation sentences can even be construed as nothing but pure sets. 
We end up with this view as a result of construing physical objects as the material 
content of portions of space-time. Current physics, however, has given up the concept 
of matter for field theories, and consequently we are left just with the space-time regions. 
But if we are willing to tolerate the ontology of set-theory, and this is advisable as a way 
of integrating all of mathematics, we can dispense with the space-time regions, "for, now 
that we have the full mathematical apparatus, we can invoke Cartesian coordinates and 
identify each space-time point with a mere quadruple of real numbers. Predicates that 
formerly attributed states to points or regions will now apply rather to quadruples of 
numbers, or to sets of quadruples. "29 Set theory itself does not even require any ground 
elements, for "since Fraenkel and von Neumann, a set theory without ground elements 
has even been pretty much in vogue. "30 And this just means that we end up with an 
ontology of pure sets. This is entirely consistent with science, thus showing that 
ontology, for Quine, is merely neutral with respect to science. As he puts it, 
Reference and ontology recede thus to the status of mere auxiliaries. True 
29Quine, "Whither Physical Objects," 501. 
3
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sentences, observational and theoretical, are the alpha and omega of the scientific 
enterprise. They are related by structure, and objects figure as mere nodes of the 
structure. What particular objects there may be is indifferent to the truth of 
observation sentences, indifferent to the support they lend to the theoretical 
sentences, indifferent to the success of the theory in its predictions. 31 
On this view, the correctness of ontology is not a function of whether it says what the 
external world is actually like; this would be a realist notion of ontology. Rather, 
correctness of an ontology is determined by considerations of the interpretation of true 
sentences. Such considerations will appeal to principles of parsimony. That is, when 
considering whether some ontology is a good ontology, we consider whether it is the 
simplest interpretation of our best scientific theory. Since more than one correct 
interpretation is possible, we will have several to choose from. The way to choose 
between competing ontologies is on the basis of our interpretive heuristics, and not on 
the basis of whether one ontology accurately states the wa.y things are. In a sense, they 
all state the way things are, insofar as they are all accurate interpretations of true 
sentences which themselves are true of the world. We can see then how to reconcile 
Quine's realism with his suggested ontology of pure sets. For if ontology is just a matter 
of interpreting our best science, being realist about ontology just means believing our 
best science. The issue now is, why should we be committed to the underlying naturalism 
on which this strategy rests? 
Quine's naturalism can usefully be construed as the endorsement of two theses: 
first, there is no "first philosophy"; second, science iden6fies what tllere is. One could, 
perhaps, be committed to the first thesis, yet be uncommitted to the second. One might, 
31Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 31. 
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for example, take the view that some revealed religion embodies a.11 knowledge of what 
there is, where this religion subsumes both philosophy and science. One could not, 
however, be committed to the second thesis without being committed to the first as well. 
It is principally his arguments for the first thesis that motivate Quine' s commitment to 
the second. I'm only going to be concerned with the first thesis, call this NFP, for 'no 
first philosophy', since, if the defense of NFP fails, then this at least leaves open the 
possibility of constructing a first philosophy. And if first philosophy is possible, then the 
second thesis, call it SIE, for 'science identifies everything' is false, for if there is first 
philosophy, then science does not identify everything. 
NFP is "a comment on the failure of traditional epistemologists to find a 
foundation outside of science upon which science-our best theory of the world-can be 
justified. "32 Gibson defends NFP by using Quine's strategy of distinguishing between the 
"doctrinal" and "conceptual" tasks of epistemology, the former being concerned with 
meaning and the latter with truth. 33 On the doctrinal side, Quine argues that both 
rationalist and empiricist attempts at finding such a foundation have all been 
unsuccessful. This should come as no surprise, since the chief motivation for the 
"linguistic turn" was the rejection of these sorts of projects. This takes us to the 
conceptual task. On Quine's reading, the conceptual task of defending NFP reached its 
zenith in Carnap's Aujbau project in which he attempted to "reduce the theoretical 
discourse of science to discourse consisting only of experiential terms, formal logic and 
32Gibson, "The Key to Interpreting Quine,"' 17. 
33Quine, Ontological Relativity, 69 ff. 
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set theory. "34 Quine takes issue with the way in which the reductions were made: 
"theoretical sentence by theoretical sentence. "35 On Quine's view, 
Holism is the reason Carnap's project fails: not every sentence of scientific 
theories has its own unique experiential evidence. It is only holistically, and not 
sentence by sentence, that scientific theories confront experience. Consequently, 
that reductionist project of the sort envisioned by Carnap cannot work. This 
Carnapian collapse forces traditional epistemologists to recognize that their 
conceptual goal of defining the notion of body in sensory terms must be 
abandoned. Thus read, the history of epistemology from Descartes to Carnap is 
a history of reluctant retreats, but in the final analysis, epistemologists must 
surrender first philosophy. 36 
So the rejection of the conceptual task rests on the commitment to holism. Having argued 
that both the doctrinal and conceptual tasks cannot be completed, NFP is now offered as 
an alternative. 
That a commitment to holism motivates abandonment of the conceptual task seems 
correct. But we can challenge holism itself, since commitment to holism requires 
commitment to two other theses of Quine's: one, the view that there is no theoretically 
useful analytic/synthetic distinction, and two, that verificationism is faJse. Holism, for 
Quine at least, is the view that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal 
of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.'137 This aspect of 
holism militates against verificationism. But, as Quine points out, "the two dogmas are, 
34Ibid., 18. 
35lbid. 
36Ibid. 
37W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," chap. in From a logical Point 
of View, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), U. 
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indeed, at root identical. "38 Consequently, another aspect of holism is that "it is 
nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a 
factual component in the truth of any individual statement. "l9 The reasons for rejecting 
verificationism are well-known, and so we won't rehearse them.40 We will take issue, 
however, with Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, for he rejects too 
easily a promising way of making the distinction. Later in this chapter an account of 
analyticity is offered that is immune to Quine's criticisms, and can serve a role in 
constructing a method of doing ontology. Briefly, the account rests on the view that what 
is crucial to analyticity is our ability to choose to hold some sentences as true, regardless 
of any alleged evidence to the contrary. With this account in hand, we have good reason 
to reject holism, and so can plausibly reject Quine's NFP. Having rejected NFP we have 
at least the possibility of first philosophy, and so we can also reject SIB. Since these two 
claims constitute Quine's naturalism, we have good reason for not embracing that view. 
The Collapse of Analyticity 
One of the theses of Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empfricism"' is that there is no 
epistemologically useful distinction between analytic and synthetlc sentences. Quine did 
not always hold this view; he came to it after some years of debate with Carnap. Early 
on, Quine held a roughly Carnapian view about the role of analyticity in philosophy. 
38Ibid. 
391bid., 42. 
40See, for example, Milton K. Munitz, Comemporary Analyiic P'1iJosophy (New 
York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), chap. 6. 
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Since "Two Dogmas" he has, at least by his own admission, remained committed to the 
rejection of analyticity, at least insofar as it has any philosophical value. 
The strategy of his attack on analyticity is two-pronged: first, he examines various 
accounts of analyticity and finds them lacking, and second, he proposes holism as a 
substitute that will do all of the work analyticity was employed for, and do it as well or 
better. Whether the second strategy is convincing will, to some degree, depend on 
whether one is convinced by the first. A problem with the first strategy is that of leaving 
some possible view unexamined. This aside, Quine has at leas.t put the ball back in the 
court of anyone who wants to preserve analyticity. Even this. much is a significant move 
since, prior to Quine's opening the debate, analyticity had become a dogma among 
empiricists, and philosophers generally, and as such went unq_uestioned. At the very 
least, Quine has shifted the burden onto anyone employing an analytic/synthetic 
distinction to first give some account of the distinction that meets Quine' s. strictures, and 
that is sufficient to the task for which it is constructed. 
Much of Quine's attack on analyticity is directed at Carnap, since it is Carnap 
who, perhaps more than any other philosopher of his day, employed an account of 
analyticity at the very foundations of his epistemology. A look at the debate between 
Quine and Carnap on this issue will prove useful as background, since the account of 
analyticity offered here employs elements of Carnap's own view. 
Analyticity: Quine versus Carnap 
The debate between Carnap and Quine began in their conversations at Harvard 
during the academic year 1940-41. As Quine notes, "you don't write when you can meet 
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and talk. "41 While this much of the debate is unknown to us, a significant amount of 
correspondence between the two has survived, as well as their published books and 
articles on the issue. 42 The correspondence is particularly useful in that it shows precisely 
what motivates, in many cases, much of their published work. No doubt, the most well-
known, and subsequently the most influential, of the papers on this issue is Quine's 
"Two Dogmas." Carnap's replies to this paper seem not to have had as much influence. 
There is a hint of an objection by Quine to accounts of analyticity as early as his 
"Truth by Convention." He says there, in the opening paragraph, 
but whereas the physical sciences are generally recognized as capable only of 
incomplete evolution in this direction, and as destined to retain always a non-
conventional kernel of doctrine, developments of the past few decades have led 
to a widespread conviction that logic and mathematics are purely analytic or 
conventional. It is less the purpose of the present inquiry to question the validity 
of this contrast than to question its sense. "43 
Quine intends in this paper to examine precisely what is going on when we say that logic 
and mathematics are purely conventional. He is not, at this point, abandoning the idea 
that they are conventional, and so in principle distinct from empirical science generally. 
His aim is only to call for clarification of the claim that logic and math are wholly 
conventional. As he says in the concluding paragraph, 
The more restricted thesis discussed in the first section, viz., that mathematics is 
a conventional transcription of logic, is far from trivial; . . . . But as to the larger 
41Quine, "Two Dogmas in Retrospect," 267. 
42See W. V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap, Dear Carnap. D~a, Van: The Quine-
Camap Correspondence, ed. Richard Creath (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990) for the exchange of letters between Carnap and Quine, as well as other valuable 
information. 
43Quine, "Truth by Convention," 77. 
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thesis that mathematics and logic proceed wholly from linguistic conventions, 
only further clarification can assure us that this asserts anything at all.'" 
As we will see, Quine comes to think that no such clarification could be given, and that 
we therefore ought to give up this claim. At this point, however, he is merely calling for 
clarification. 
Quine himself dates his rejection of analyticity to the year 1941 during his 
discussions with Carnap over the manuscript for Carnap's Introduction to Semantics. In 
his letter #97, dated January 5, 1943 we see some of the objections he raises later in 
"Two Dogmas. "45 The argument goes as follows. Suppose that we accept as given some 
logical notation together with a general notion of truth. We can then "'define logical 
truth, simply as truth which survives all uniform changes of component expressions other 
than the enumerated logical signs. "46 We then identify the set of all analytic statements 
as the set of all logical truths for the language in question. But suppose we take 
something like the language of science, i.e., the physical language. We will have 
sentences in this language such as, 
SJ 'No spinster is married.' 
that we will want to say are analytic, but that are not logical truths in our specified sense. 
We could perhaps say that SJ is just a definitional abbreviation of a logical truth, e.g., 
S2 'No woman not married is married.' 
44Ibid.' 106. 
45Letter numbers, e.g., letter #106, are from Creath' s enumeration in Quine, Dear 
Carnap. 
46Ibid.' 296. 
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With this move we get "to the root of the difficulty. "47 The problem is in our 
"assumption of a thoroughgoing constitution system, w:ith fixed primitives and fixed 
definitions of all other expressions, despite the fact that no such constitution system 
exists. "48 Consequently, whether SJ is analytic or synthetic will be a function of how 
'spinster' is defined for the language system in question. But, "little progress is made 
toward clarifying the term 'analytic' in any of its preexisting usage, if in the face of 
every statement which is not explicitly a logical truth (like 'No woman not married is 
married') we have to conclude, 'Whether this is analytic or not depends on what 
constitution system we adopt, and we aren't going in fact to adopt any'. "4!1 
By a "constitution system" Quine means any formal Language constructed for 
some particular purpose. This is precisely what Carnap does in his Syntax with his 
languages Ll and L2. 50 On Carnap's view, the language of science is a constitution 
system insofar as it can be constructed explicitly out of pre-existing terms we find in our 
natural languages. Such constructive system-building proceeds as a sort of conceptual 
experiment in that there is no need to actually adopt the language being built; we want 
only to see if such a language can be built. Quine's worry seems to be that it will be 
wholly arbitrary whether the statements in question, e.g., Sl and S2,. are analytic or 
synthetic, since it is merely a matter of choosing some construction system, where all 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid. 
49lbid., 297. 
5
°Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1925). 
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such systems can be constructed merely at will. 
The underlying worry for Quine is that "there is false security in the common 
appeal to definition. "s1 As used in logic, Quine restricts definitions to "indications of 
how to paraphrase a rich logical language into a meager logical language, proving that 
certain metalogical conclusions established more easily in application to the meager 
language apply equally to the richer, more convenient language. "d2 This procedure 
whereby we "paraphrase the whole into the part" can be used outside of logic as well, 
for instance, in showing that "certain philosophical consequences thought to follow from 
the whole are groundless, not being applicable to the part. "'j3 What is crucial here for the 
appeal to definition in the clarification of the notion of analyticity js that this use of 
definition "makes no use of the idea of linguistic revision or fiat, nor accords to 
definition any integral status within a language. "54 Quine is apparently skeptical here 
about how much philosophical work can be done by mere verbal stipulation of how we 
use our terms. He proposes instead that we might make some progress by avoiding the 
appeal to definition altogether, and appeal instead to "the reJation of synonymity or 
sameness of meaning. "ss Together with logical truth, "we could explain analyticity as 
follows: a statement is analytic if it can be turned into a Logical truth by putting 
51Ibid. 
52Ibid. 
53Ibid. 
S4Ibid. 
s5Ibid. 
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synonyms for synonyms. "56 
But even this strategy will not work, since, "the problem remains ... to explain this 
basic synonymy relation. "57 Quine thinks that synonymy, like designation, must be 
explained by use of empirical and behavioral criteria, and so would come under the 
heading of pragmatics. He does not, however, think that this cannot be done. At this 
point in their debate Quine is still willing to allow for the possibility that such an 
explanation could be given, even though he himself has "never succeeded in giving 
one. "58 
Carnap's reply to this first round of objections comes in his letter #100. He 
begins with some terminological clarification, showing that some of Quine' s objections 
rest on nothing more than verbal disagreement. The most jmportant of these 
terminological clarifications for present purposes are for the te1m~ 'analytic' and 
'designation'. Carnap takes Quine to use 'analytic' where he would use 'L-true'. For 
Carnap, L-terms are defined only for some constructed language system, and have no 
meaning whatsoever outside the narrow confines of the language in which they are 
defined. Carnap uses 'designate' to mean "the relation between an expression and its 
meaning," whereas Quine is using the term to signify the object referred to by some 
term. 59 Thus, for Carnap SJ "would be L-true in a suitable ~ystem even if 'spinster' and 
561bid. 
571bid.' 298. 
58lbid. 
59Ibid., 307. 
83 
'married' are primitive predicates. "60 Furthermore, the L-truth of Sl does not rest on a 
definition by linguistic fiat. Rather, "In this example the L-truth would be based ... on the 
semantical rules of designation: 'spinster' designates the property of being a non-married 
woman. "61 
This much will not, however, satisfy Quine. He will raise the same objection to 
semantical rules as he raises for definitions, namely, that they are merely arbitrary. But 
Carnap's view is that it is a mistake to think that we can "construct an exact and 
workable theory of concepts like 'true', 'analytic', 'meaning', 'synonymous', 
'compatible' etc. if we refer merely to the actually used language of sdence. "62 These 
concepts must instead be made more precise by replacing "the given language by a 
system of rules; in other words, we have to go from pragmatics and descriptive 
semantics to pure semantics. "63 Carnap agrees that it is left to pragmatics to define 
'synonymous'; "but this holds likewise for the other concepts mentioned: "true', etc. in 
a certain sense. "64 The crucial point for Carnap is that "the pragmatical definition cannot 
be taken as the basis for the semantical theory. If the concept •synonymous' is to be used 
at all in pure semantics, you have to state rules for it." 1>5 
oorbid., 30s. 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid. , 309. 
63Ibid. 
64Ibid. 
65Ibid. 
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It is this appeal to language systems constructed by rules that, in the end, will be 
the crucial issue. Carnap is willing to tolerate semantics and even modalities in his 
generally austere approach to philosophical problems. But he never gives up the view that 
philosophical problems can only by solved within some constructed language system, and 
that terms in such systems are made clear by means of rules for their use, and not by 
appeal to ordinary use in a natural language. He steadfastly rejects the vfow that we are 
required to give behavioral/empirical criteria for the use of terms in a language system, 
although, as we will see later, he thinks such criteria can be given. The jmportant point 
to keep in mind here is that such criteria are given for the explanation of a concept as 
used in a natural language and not as used in a constructed language system. Carnap 
maintains that "problems of explicating concepts of thjs kind fo1 natmal languages are 
of an entirely different nature. "66 
In his letter #106 Quine uses the concept 'sentence' by way of analogy to clarify 
his skepticism about Carnap's appeal to semantical rules as expbcative of analyticity. He 
considers the case of an empirical linguist studying an unknown language. When the 
linguist proceeds to study this language he has at least a working jdea "of sentence in 
general, say in the form of a relation; x (sound pattern) is a sentence fo1 y (person). "67 
He will then formulate by empirical means the set of sound patterns which constitute 
sentences for the speakers he is studying. Much of his specification of this set will 
66Rudolf Carnap, "Meaning Postulates," chap. in Meaning tuul N~cessity, 2d ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 223. 
67Quine, Dear Carnap, 337. 
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employ concepts the speakers themselves do not have. e.g. , declensions, participles, etc. 
Such concepts need have no analogues in any other languages, as for example the "der-
words used in German to denote articles such as 'dieser' , 'der', etc. The concept of a 
sentence, however, does have its analogues in other languages, and it is this concept that 
the linguist had in mind at the start to guide his research. "cs~ Quine's point here is that 
we can indeed specify by means of pure syntax for any language what will count as the 
sentences of the language. The concept of sentence itself. however, can only be gotten 
from pragmatic, and thus empirical, investigation. The same argument will hold for the 
concept of analyticity. Namely, 
It is only by having some general, pragmatically grounded, essentially 
behavioristic explanation of what it means in general to say that a given sound-
or script-pattern is analytic for a given individual. that we can understand what 
is intended when you tell us (via semantical rules, sa)1) "the following are to be 
analytic in my new language." Otherwise your specification of what is analytic 
for a given language dangles in midair, as the specification of the der-words 
would do in abstraction from the pragmatic notion of sentence.()!» 
It is for this reason that the appeal to the semantical rules of the language will not help. 
Recall that Carnap agrees with Quine that mere definition is not what is wanted here, but 
that instead we need semantical rules. Quine is now arguing that it wi11 not help any to 
say that analytic statements are true in virtue of the semantical rules of the language, any 
more than it would help to say "that a sentence is anything that is a sentence by virtue 
of the grammatical rules of a language. "70 In this respect, there j:s no difference between 
68lbid. 
69Ibid.' 338. 
7
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artificial and natural languages. Both, according to Quine, require an empirical, 
pragmatical foundation. 
This argument, or some form of it, has persisted in Quine' s thinking even to the 
present day. We can already see at this early stage in his development hints at his later 
doctrines of holism and indeterminacy as following from some form of this argument. 
But there is much that needs sorting out here, and it isn't clear that Quine ever really 
sorts it out sufficiently himself. For example, this claim that talk of analyticity "dangles 
in midair" without some pragmatical correlate is ambiguous. ls Quine saying that it is 
completely without any meaning at all, or, merely not understood by speakers of other 
languages? Carnap would claim that lacking meaning is not necessarily troublesome, 
since he would say that mathematics and logic Jack just this sort of meaning, i.e., 
empirically grounded meaning. It does not follow from this lack of empirically grounded 
meaning that such claims are cognitively useless. Quite the contrary; they are quite 
useful, especially in the empirical sciences. It is hard, if not impossible, for example, to 
imagine the empirical sciences as we have them today without mathematics. As for the 
alternative, the fact that speakers of other languages do not understand my concepts does 
not entail that they could not understand them. It shows only that they do not in fact 
possess those concepts. But why should that be a problem? Clearly there are any number 
of concepts that I do not, as a speaker of English, possess, that a speaker of, say, Inuit 
or Hindi might possess. But there does not seem to be anything preventing me from 
acquiring those concepts, or, at the very least, workable translations precise enough for 
whatever purposes I may have. 
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Quine's basic problem with the concept of analyticity is that nobody has given a 
sufficiently clear formulation of it, or rather, a formulation sufficiently clear so as to bear 
the weight of some ensuing theory, or portion of theory, that we might want to hang on 
the concept. In "Two Dogmas" he gives two distinct arguments against Carnap's strategy 
of explicating analyticity in terms of semantical rules. The scope of those arguments is, 
however, much broader, since, "the extension to other forms [of semantical rules] is not 
hard to see. "71 
Quine says that when we consider certain allegedly analytic sentences stated in 
our ordinary language, for example, the sentence 'everything green is extended,' we 
hesitate over whether they are indeed analytic. The hesitation is due. not to our 
misunderstanding of the terms 'green' and 'extended' as we ordinarily understand them, 
but rather to our misunderstanding of the term 'analytic'. Some have argued that such 
hesitation is due to the vagueness of ordinary language, and that we can clear up this sort 
of vagueness in an artificial language with semantical rules. This strategy, Quine says, 
"is a confusion. "72 
He has in mind here a particular "notion of analyticity about which we are 
worrying. "73 It is perhaps more accurate to call it a "schema" rather than a notion. A 
notion implies some semantic content, whereas a schema, as tilat term is used here, is 
a formal or necessary condition for something's counting as having semantic content. 
71Quine, "Two Dogmas," 36. 
72Ibid., 32. 
73Ibid., 33. 
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This is how, for example, Tarski's distinction between a concept or a definition and a 
schema. For example, Tarski's well-known "Schema-T"- S is true iff P-tells us 
nothing whatsoever about the semantic content of the term 'true'. What it does is give 
us a rule, or criterion, or necessary condition for judging the goodness of any semantic 
content we might give to the term 'true'. Quine's schema for analyticity, call this 
"Schema-A" is, "S is said to be analytic for a language L. "'7' Although he calls this a 
notion, we can avoid some immediate objections to Quine' s arguments against analyticity 
by characterizing it as a schema. Consider the objection that Quine himself employs a 
notion of analyticity, and hence, his objections are self-defeating. Such objections do not 
apply to a schema, since the only semantic content of the schema we need to understand 
is what we require in order to understand the logical relations between the terms of the 
schema. Namely, we don't need to understand the term 'analytic' in Schema-A; we need 
only understand what it means to say some sentence is said to have some feature we 
happen to call 'analyticity' for some language. The term 'anaJytic' here is only being 
mentioned and not used, hence, we are not required to define it just in order for it to be 
part of the schema. 
Quine's objection then is not merely that analyticity lacks sufficiently clear 
content. Rather, "the problem is to make sense of this relation generally, that is, for 
variables 'S' and 'L'" in Schema-A.75 Having set the problem up this way, it follows 
that, granted Schema-A, 
741bid. 
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the gravity of this problem is not perceptibly less for artificial languages than for 
natural ones. The problem of making sense of the idiom' Sis analytic for L', with 
variables 'S' and 'L', retains its stubbornness even if we limit the range of the 
variable 'L' to artificial languages. 76 
Quine's point here is that we face the problem of giving an analysis of analyticity in both 
natural and artificial languages. The move from a natural to an artificial language alone 
cannot help us achieve clearer understanding of analyticity. For even in an artificial 
language, we still must satisfy Schema-A. We can now clarify Quine 's rather vague 
claim that analyticity is too unclear to bear any theoretical weight. The specific claim is 
that we cannot, with sufficient clarity for theoretical purposes, satisfy Schema-A. 
Since we are considering here arguments directed against analyses of analyticity 
in terms of artificial languages, we need some general idea of what constitutes an 
artificial language. Broadly speaking, an artificial language is any language constructed 
according to explicitly formulated semantic rules. Quine' s arguments against solutions 
employing artificial languages are directed against the type of semantic rules used to 
explain analyticity. Since there are different ways of constructing semantic rules, there 
will be correspondingly different arguments for each such formula1ion. The first 
argument is directed against an artificial language, call it L 0 • in which the semantic rules 
specify explicitly all of the analytic statements in L 0 • On this formulation "tile rules tell 
us that such and such statements, and only those, are the analytic statements of Lt! ... n The 
argument is straightforward: the rules themselves con1ain the vecy term in need of 
76lbid. 
77Ibid. 
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explanation. So, even though we can identify the analytic sentences by means of the rule, 
we have no idea what analyticity itself is. These sorts of semantic rules fail to fulfill 
Schema-A, hence, they fail to explain analyticity. 
Quine's second argument is directed against a different sort of semantic rule, one 
"which says not that such and such statements are analytic but simply that such and such 
statements are included among the truths. "78 We can grant. at least for the sake of 
argument, an understanding of truth. These sorts of semantic rules do not specify all the 
truths of the language. They only specify a particular set of statements that will count as 
true. We can then explain analyticity thus: "a statement is analytic if it is (not merely 
true but) true according to the semantical rule. "79 
But while we now have a clear enough understanding of the term "analytic', he 
says, we are appealing for our explanation to the mysterious term 'semantLcal rule'. The 
problem now is that in an artificial language all the truths are true according to some 
rule. That is just part of what it means to be a statement of an artificial language. But 
we then get the result that all the truths of the language are analytic. The question then 
is, which of the truths count as semantic rules? Quine's answer is that ":semantical rules 
are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing on a page under the heading 
'Semantical Rules'; and this heading is itself then meaningless." 8() Appeal to this sort of 
semantic rule does not help any since, while we have an understanding of analyticity, we 
78Ibid., 34. 
79Ibid. 
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have no understanding of what it is for something to be a semantic rule. 
Although these arguments are directed specifically against analyticity, it is clear 
that Quine has a broader agenda, for he wants to abandon, not only analyticity, but the 
distinction between natural and artificial languages altogether. His analysis of the 
motivation behind drawing the analytic/synthetic distinction is useful here. An artificial 
language, on his view, is one conceived as being entirely a constructed system with no 
necessary reference to anything non-linguistic. Since we can in fact construct artificial 
languages, it seems almost absurd to suggest that we have no clear idea of analyticity, 
since the analytic truths are just the ones of the artificial language which are true solely 
on non-empirical grounds. Quine rejects this view, on grounds that 
Appeal to hypothetical languages of an artificially simple kind could 
conceivably be useful in clarifying analyticity, if the mental or behavioral or 
cultural factors relevant to analyticity-whatever they may be-were somehow 
sketched into the simplified model. But a model which takes analyticity merely 
as an irreducible character is unlikely to throw light on the problem of explicating 
analyticity. 81 
The explicit claim here is that no artificial language could ever be used to explain 
analyticity unless it incorporates the relevant features of whatever it is that makes our use 
of the notion meaningful in ordinary language. The implied claim is that there is no 
principled distinction between artificial languages and natural languages generally. 82 But 
if all analytic truths are truths in an artificial language, then without a distinction between 
81Ibid., 36. 
82Quine is apparently willing here to allow for mental as distinct from behavioral 
factors as relevant to meaning. He later requires only empirical/behavioral factors as 
relevant for the explication of analyticity, and rejects mental notions of meaning 
altogether. 
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artificial and natural languages, all truths are of the same sort. Thus, we get the sort of 
holism Quine endorses as a consequence of the rejection of analyticity (via the underlying 
skepticism about artificial languages), and not just as a consequence of the rejection of 
reductionism. Let's look now at Carnap's response to Quine. 
It is interesting to note that in his letter #145 Quine says that he had not 
accurately understood Carnap's position on several points, until they held a joint seminar 
at the University of Chicago on the issue of analyticity shortly after the publication of 
Quine's "Two Dogmas." He thinks that Carnap ought to explain their disagreement in 
a paper of his own. Carnap did write such a response, however it was not published until 
Richard Creath included it in his volume of their correspondence. 83 
In this response Carnap undercuts Quine' s objections to semantic rules by 
rejecting Quine's Schema-A. Specifically, he wonders whether Quine "is asking about 
the elucidation explicandum, 'analytic', or about an explicatum. ~8" ln other words, 
Carnap claims that Schema-A is ambiguous between whether :it pertains to 'analytic' as 
used in some ordinary way as a term of natural language, or whether it pertains to 
'analytic' as used precisely in some artificial language. If he is asking about the 
explicatum, i.e., the term 'analytic' as used precisely in an artificial language, this is 
given by the rules of the system. As we have seen, the rules specify how some term is 
understood for some particular system. Quine suggests that there be "one definition 
83See "Quine on Analyticity" in Quine, Dear Carnap, 427-432. 
84Ibid., 430. 
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applicable to all systems. "85 Such a request Carnap finds "manifestly unreasonable; it is 
certainly neither fulfilled nor fullfillable for semantic and syntactic concepts, as Quine 
knows. "86 The point here is that, given the very idea of an artificial language, namely, 
that the builder of the language is free to construct the language any way he sees fit, 
there could not, by definition, be a single explicatum for all such language systems. 
Carnap concludes that Schema-A must be referring to a single definition of the 
explicandum 'analytic', i.e., to the term 'analytic' as used in an ordinary way in natural 
language. If this is correct, then Carnap will readily concede that all expllcandums are 
vague and in need of clarification. But that is precisely why we must give an explication 
of the explicandum. 87 If the explicandum were sufficiently clear there would be no need 
of an explication and hence, no objection on Quine's part regarding the unclarity of the 
concept. Such explications are given by means of rules constructed just for such purposes 
within some artificial language. 
On Carnap's view, we get a precise definition of analyticity only within a 
constructed language system. But whereas Quine thinks the problem with analyticity is 
with analyticity itself, Carnap locates the problem in the vagueness of ordinary language. 
Taking Quine's example of 'everything green is extended', Carnap says "it seems 
completely clear to me, however, that the difficulty here lies in the une-larity of the word 
'green', namely, in an indecision over whether one should use the word. for something 
85lbid. 
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87For a good discussion of the notion of explication see Rudolf Camap, Logical 
Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, L950), chap. 1. 
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unextended, i.e., for a single space-time point. "88 The issue for Carnap is one of 
hesitation over how to use a term in ordinary language. The problem in this specific case 
is that we just don't apply color terms to single space-time points in our use of the term 
in ordinary language. By analogy, consider whether we would use the term 'mouse' to 
name an animal that looks for all appearances like what we usually call a mouse, but is 
as large as an elephant. The problem here is that we just don't ever stop to even consider 
such possibilities since we never encounter them in experience. This shows that the 
unclarity is in the meaning of the term as ordinarily used in a natural language. This sort 
of unclarity is irrelevant to the notion of analyticity as used in a constructed language 
system, for here such unclarity "cannot be tolerated." s9 
If in constructing such a language system the builder wants to introduce a 
predicate term 'g' and states that it will be used in the same way as the term 'green' in 
ordinary language, we must object, since the term 'green' as used in a natural language 
is unclear, as the above example shows. What is required is a postulate, a rule for the 
correct use of the term which states precisely how the term is to be u sec!, e.g., whether 
it is to apply to extended, unextended, or both sorts of entiJies. The key point is that the 
builder of the system is free to choose how the term is going to be em ployed . If he wants 
to accurately reflect the meaning of the term as ordinarily employed in the natural 
language, that will require some empirical investigation. But even this decision is a 
choice; he is not bound by any constraint whatsoever requiring him to reflect the 
88Quine, Dear Carnap, 428. 
89lbid. 
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meanings of terms as employed in a natural language. 
Decisions as to how terms are to be used in the language system are made explicit 
by laying down a postulate. In the case of the term 'g', if we decide that the term will 
not apply to unextended space-time points, we stipulate this as a postulate by stating it 
as a sentence, i.e., 'nothing green is unextended'. By so doing, the sentence 'everything 
green is extended' is analytic. In this way we decide whether the sentence 'everything 
green is extended' is analytic. But notice that this is decided only for the sentence 
considered as a sentence of a constructed language system. A 'I. for whether this sentence 
is analytic in a natural language, "one cannot even raise the que'l.6on of whether it is 
analytic. "90 At this point, Carnap thinks it is not possible to give an empirical definition 
of analyticity; he thinks differently later on. 
Although Carnap does not argue it in this paper, we can formulate a response 
here to Quine's objection that we do not know what meaning postulates are, except 
insofar as they appear on a page under the heading "meaning postulates. "91 Quine implies 
here that we must make a distinction between the pmtulates and the non-postulate 
sentences from among some set of pre-established sentence'!.. This is incorrect, since 
there are no such pre-existing sentences. Since it is up to the builder of the system to 
decide by a matter of choice as to what will count as a postulate, the postulates are 
distinguishable as those sentences stipulated by such a decision procedure. Someone 
wanting to learn the system will be able to distinguish the po:stulates as Quine says, 
9
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namely, by seeing them on the page under the heading .. meaning postulates." He is to 
understand here that these are the rules chosen by the author for how to use the various 
terms of the system. The learner can then construct new sentences in the language 
system, and will have some way of deciding whether the sentences are analytic. If, per 
chance, the learner of the system comes upon an ambiguity in the system, then a new 
postulate will need to be laid down so as to clear up the ambiguity. This new postulate 
will be laid down in the same way as the original postulates, namely, by a decision made 
as a free choice. As for Quine's complaint that "any finite ... selection of statements .. .is 
as much a set of postulates as any other, "92 this assumes that the postulates are already 
laid down, and that the task is one of piclcing them 011t. As we have seen, this is 
incorrect. 
Although the postulates of a system are stipulated by a matter of choice, 
according to how we intend to use some term, it can still be the case that by means of 
these rules we can intend to clarify some term from a natural language. Carnap claims 
that this is precisely what he is doing for 'analyticity'. As in the case of 'green', its use 
in a natural language is vague, and we clarify its use in our language system by 
stipulating a postulate. With 'analyticity' the case is slightly different. In this case Carnap 
does intend to capture "what philosophers have meant, intuitively but not e"actly, when 
they speak of 'analytic sentences' or, more specificaJiy, of ~sentences whose truth 
depends on their meanings alone and is thus independent of the contingency of facts'. "93 
92Ibid.' 35. 
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But in order to clarify this concept as used in a natural language in this way, a rule must 
be stipulated for how it is going to be used within the language system. This rule will 
not be arbitrary in the way the rule specifying the use of 'green' is. Since we do aim to 
clarify pre-existing use, we will hold ourselves to some strictures, although the strictures 
are somewhat vague. But their vagueness is precisely the reason why we must stipulate 
a rule. Furthermore, the lack of complete arbitrariness is self-imposed, since we intend 
to capture something like the ordinary notion of analyticity within our language system. 
The argument in Carnap's "Meaning Postulates" is basically the same as in this 
unpublished paper. One particular point, however, needs stressing. Carnap consistently 
maintains two theses: first, that the explication of analyticity is relevant to the language 
for which it is being employed, and second, that the .. problems of explicating concepts 
of this kind for natural languages are of an entirely different nature.''~ According to the 
first thesis, it is entirely possible that two persons each constructing their own artificial 
language will have different, and perhaps even incompatible, concepts of analyticity. The 
problems in giving an explication generally, however, are of the same sort for any 
artificial language. In other words, even though the resulting concepts of analyticity will 
vary, the problems faced in giving an explication of the concept of analyticity for some 
artificial language are the same for all artificial languages. 
The second thesis follows from Carnap's distinction between natural and artificial 
languages. As we have seen, Carnap is quite willing to grant that we can employ 
concepts from natural languages within an artificial language, so long a.s we clarify any 
94Carnap, "Meaning Postulates," 223. 
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ambiguities in the concept as it is used in the natural language. We do this by means of 
stipulating rules for the correct use of the concept. We cannot do this, however, for a 
natural language, since such rules are already in use, albeit perhaps implicitly. Here the 
task is empirical, and so, we face a different set of problems than we do in an artificial 
language. 
Given his distinction between natural and artificial languages and the concepts of 
analyticity employed by each, Carnap can successfully undercut Quine's specific 
arguments against the strategy of employing semantic rules for giving a clear analysis of 
analyticity. But the issue is not resolved this easily. As suggested earlier, Quine has 
bigger fish to fry. His aim is to undercut Carnap's distinction between natural and 
artificial languages altogether. Specifically, Quine is willing to grant that there are 
differences between language systems and natural languages, where the former are 
something like the artificial languages Carnap constructs in his Semantics. What he is not 
willing to grant is a principled distinction between natural languages and artificial 
languages. On Quine's view, all languages are meaningful in the same way, that way 
being empirically/behaviorally. The only differences between languages on Quine's view 
are in terminology and concepts, e.g., French has different terms and concepts than 
Carnap's Ll, however both are meaningful in precisely the ~ame way. On this view, an 
artificial language can be different from a natural language in numerous ways, however, 
the content of the artificial language must ultimately be cashed out 
empirically/behaviorally if the language is to have any meaning at all. 
From his letter #148 we know that Carnap had Quine's co11tributio11 to the Schilpp 
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volume by 1954, although the actual volume did not appear in print until 1964.95 His 
response in this letter is the same as we have already seen in their earlier exchanges. 
Namely, he wonders "which of your discussions are meant to refer to (a) natural 
languages, and which to (b) codified languages (i.e., language systems based on 
explicitly formulated rules). "96 Carnap is here still attempting to short-circuit Quine's 
argument by appeal to this distinction which Quine thinks "is a false dichotomy. "rn In 
his reply to Carnap's letter Quine is, perhaps for the first time, explicit in his rejection 
of the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" languages. He says, 
You ask whether I mean "(a) natural languages" or "(b) codified 
languages ... based on explicitly formulated rules. " Now here I suppose you mean 
codified languages to carry explicit "semantical rules" with them-i.e., outright 
specification of the so-called analytic sentences. If so, then (b) is not what I am 
talking about, as stressed in "two dogmas" (foot p. 35 and top p. 36, in From a 
Logical Point of View). But I do not mean to limit myself to (a) either. It is 
indifferent to my purpose whether the notation be traditional or artificial, so long 
as the artificiality is not made to exceed the scope of ''language" ordinarily so-
called, and beg the analyticity question itself. 
If you intend (b) to include thus a packaged formulation of analyticity, 
then your dichotomy into (a) and (b) is a false dichotomy, acceptance of which 
would precisely omit my point. The languages I am talking about comprise 
natural languages and any (used, or interpreted) artificial notations you like, e.g. 
that of my Mathematical Logic plus extra-logical predicates. They are not 
uninterpreted notations. Each predicate has its unique extension, and 
correspondingly for the logical signs (except in so far as extensions may fail to 
exist because of gaps in the universe of classes, as needed to avoid paradox). But 
they are not of kind (b) if, as I suspect, "languages" of kind (b) are conceived as 
embodying a complement of transformation rules-a read~-made stipulation of a 
95This delay in publication brought about a premature end. to the debate over 
analyticity between Quine and Carnap. See Creath's introduction to Quine, Dear Carnap 
for details on the publication delay. 
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boundary between analytic and synthetic. 9s 
It is clear here that analyticity is no longer the central issue for Quine. Rather, his view 
is that analyticity is merely symptomatic of a more widespread error. That error consists 
in thinking that we can meaningfully make a principled distinction between two kinds of 
languages, one of which we can use to explicate a notion of analyticity. Quine claims that 
this is an error, since we must first appeal to a notion of analyticity in order to 
distinguish between the two kinds of languages. We are thus, in effect, "tugging at our 
bootstraps. "99 
As we have seen, Carnap consistently maintains a distinction between natural and 
artificial languages such that "the problems of explicating concept~ of this kind [e.g., 
analyticity] for natural languages are of an entirely different nature." 100 While it is the 
case that the problems of explication are different, the account of analyticity is essentially 
the same for the two kinds of language. The problems referred to in the explication of 
analyticity for the two kinds of languages have to do with explication only. These 
problems are not unique to analyticity; they are problems that occur for any explication 
of a concept. Namely, there will always be problems of a particular kind when we 
attempt to explicate concepts in a natural language. The~e particular problems do not 
arise in explications of concepts in artificial languages. Strictly speaking, of course, there 
are no explications of concepts in natural languages. An explication is the clarification 
98Ibid., 437-438. 
99Quine, "Two Dogmas," 36. 
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of some concept that is too vague in its ordinary use in a natural language for our 
theoretical purposes. 
Let's look first at the account of analyticity we get in "Meaning Postulates," since 
this is the explication proper of analyticity. The account here is, of course, for an 
artificial language L. Consider a language containing "the customary connectives, 
individual variables with quantifiers, and as descriptive signs individual constants ('a', 
'b', etc.) and primitive descriptive predicates (among them 'B' , 'M', 'R', and 'Bl'." 101 
Assume also the customary truth-tables for the connectives. Since issues concerning the 
legitimacy of these notions are not at issue, Carnap assumes we can safely use them. In 
L we have not yet given rules of designation for any of the descriptive predicates, so the 
meanings of the predicates "are not incorporated into the system. "L()2 We define the L-
truth of a sentence in L as logical truth. 
Consider the following example sentence: 
S3 'B b :::) -Mb' 
Sentence S3 is analytic if it is L-true. But we do not know whether it is L-true unless we 
give a meaning postulate for S3. So we stipulate the following meaning postulate: 
Pl '(x)(Bx:::) -Mx)' 
Notice that in laying down Pl "we do not give rules of designation for ~B' and 'M'. " 103 
The point here is that we need not appeal to any troublesome notions of "'meaning" that 
1011bid. 
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Quine might find objectionable in order to give an explication of analyticity. The 
postulate Pl "states as much about the meaning of 'B' and 'M' as is essential for 
analyticity, viz., the incompatibility of the two properties."' 104 Sentence SJ is now L-true 
in virtue of postulate Pl. Thus, a sentence in L is analytic iff it is L-true according to 
a meaning postulate. 
Recall that Quine' s objection to the notion of meaning postulates, is that they do 
not seem to be distinguishable except insofar as they are labeled as such-but the label 
itself is then meaningless. But this objection is readily diffused. Postulates are 
distinguishable because we stipulate them as such: 
Suppose that the author of a system wishes the predicates 'B' and 'M' to 
designate the properties Bachelor and Married, respectively. How does he know 
that these properties are incompatible and that therefore he has to lay down 
postulate P1? This is not a matter of knowledge but of decision. His knowledge 
or belief that the English words 'bachelor' and 'married' are always or usually 
understood in such a way that they are incompatible may influence his decision 
if he has the intention to reflect in his system some of the meaning relations of 
English words. In this particular case, the influence would be relatively clear, but 
in other cases it would be much less so. 1()5 
On Carnap's view, meaning postulates are distinguished on the basis of choice. That is, 
we decide which sentences to make analytic by whether or not we intend the terms of the 
sentence to be understood in one way rather than another. This understanding need not 
extend to a stipulation of the meanings of the terms, if by that we understand that a rule 
of designation is required. Analyticity, for Carnap, signifies a purely fo~ical relation 
between terms, not a factual one. Designation rules "are not necessary for tile explication 
105Ibid., 225. 
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of analyticity, but only for that of factual (synthetic) truth. "1()() Semantics, for Carnap, is 
a pure, not an empirical discipline. This does not, however, prohibit us from giving an 
account of analyticity as it appears to be used in natural language:s. Recall that Quine 
insists that such an account is necessary if we are to make any sense at all of analyticity. 
Although meaning postulates themselves are decided by our choice, and they 
specify only logical relations, it does not follow that logical relations themselves are 
decided just by a matter of choice. The conventionality of meaning postulates is neutral 
on the issue of whether logical relations are conventional :in the same way. It may well 
be that our choice of how we specify meaning postulates presupposes Logic. The point 
at issue here, however, is just that the choice of meaning postulates is a choice from 
among established logical relations. We need not specify the logical relations themselves 
by convention; we need only choose from among :such relations as we already find them. 
While Carnap does give an account of analyticity as it is used :in natural 
languages, he maintains that this is not a general requirement of all semantic concepts: 
"I do not think that a semantical concept, in order to be fruitful, mmt necessarily possess 
a prior pragmatical counterpart. It is theoretically possible to demonstrate its fruitfulness 
through its application in the further development of language systems.. "1crr Furthermore, 
the account he gives is not, strictly speaking, either an explication, or a definition. His 
aim is "to give a practical vindication for the semantical intension concepts.; ways for 
106Ibid.' 224. 
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Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 1952), 235. 
104 
defining them, especially analyticity, I have shown in a previous paper [Postulates]. " 108 
Strictly speaking then, what we get here is not an account of analyticity as it is used in 
natural languages. Rather, what we have is a procedure whereby we can determine when 
some sentence is analytic for some speaker. In other words, what we get here is the 
criterion for analyticity in natural languages; we get the definftion in the explication of 
'analytic-for-£' where L is an artificial language. The concept i1self of analyticity 
employed in natural languages is entirely too vague for philosophical purposes, and 
perhaps the best we can do with it is to say that "a sentence is analytic if it is true by 
virtue of the in tensions of the expressions occurring in it. ., 100 
Carnap's criterion of analyticity is straightforward. Imagine two field-linguists 
investigating the language of some speaker, Karl. After some amount of investigation of 
Karl's use of the term 'pferd' one linguist makes the following entry in his dictionary of 
Karl's language: 
(1) Pferd, horse, 
while the other linguist writes: 
(2) Pferd, horse or unicorn. 
Since there are no unicorns, the extension of 'Pferd', is the same for both linguists, even 
though the intension is not. Since the extension is the s.ame, then, on Quine's 
extensionalist thesis, there is no empirical way to decide between (1) and (2). No 
response by Karl to any actual object could enable us to favor one rather than the other. 
108Ibid. 
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But just because no response to any actual object is insufficient for determining the 
intension, we are not limited in empirical investigation only to aciual objects. We must 
"take into account not only the actual cases, but also possible cases. "110 
The most direct way of doing this would be for the linguist to use, in the German 
questions directed to Karl, modal expressions corresponding to 'possible cases' 
or the like. To be sure, these expressions are usually rather ambiguous; but this 
difficulty can be overcome by giving suitable explanations and examples. I do not 
think that there is any objection of principle against the use of modal terms. On 
the other hand, I think that their use is not necessary. The linguist could simply 
describe for Karl cases, which he knows to be possible, and leave it open whether 
their is anything satisfying those descriptions or not. 111 
So, for example, the linguists might ask Karl if he would use the w01d 'pferd' to name 
something similar to a horse but with a single horn in the middle of the forehead. By 
such procedures, it seems quite plausible that we can determine the intension of some 
term, within the bounds of empirical investigation. With this means of determining 
intensions, we can employ the following criterion for analyticity: 
A sentence is analytic in L for X at t if its intension (or range or truth-condition) 
in L for X at t comprehends all possible cases. 112 
Although Carnap calls this a definition, this is, strictly speaking, inaccurate. It is rather 
a criterion for determining whether or not some sentence is analytic. Notice that on this 
criterion, analyticity is relativized to the speaker. If analyticity is 1elative to the speaker, 
then it is possible that, for two speakers of the same language~ some sentence may be 
analytic for one and synthetic for the other. Whether this is Carnap's Yiew is not clear. 
11
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His view seems to be that, in such a case, the speakers only appear to be speaking the 
same language, but in fact are speaking a different language just in virtue of this fact. 
If we distinguish one artificial language from another just on the basis of the meaning 
postulates, then different postulates result in different languages, even if they employ the 
same terms. This will need some further investigation, but suffice it to say at this point 
that analyticity is, on Carnap's view, relative to speaker's insofar as speakers are free 
to use terms as they see fit. 
Although this criterion of analyticity appears not to use any mysterious terms, and 
can be used empirically, it still relies on a speaker's "intending" to use words in one way 
rather than another. It is this intending that would seem to give the sentence its meaning, 
or at least the relevant portion of meaning, such that it is analytic and not synthetic. 
When push comes to shove, Quine will insist on a thoroughly bebavioral theory of 
meaning. He will thus argue that such intentions cannot contribute anything at all to the 
meaning of a sentence, for, on his view, "there is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond 
what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable circums1ances. ~u 3 
Talk of intentions implies that one is, perhaps implicitly, following some rule of 
correct use. That is, one speaks this way rather than some other way becau~ one takes 
oneself to be using the relevant terms in some particular way. This. implies that there are 
correct and incorrect ways of using terms. Insofar as meaning is a fonction of use, and 
even Quine thinks it is, then intentions serve the role of distinguislling conect use from 
113Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 38. 
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mere noise. 114 So the issue is whether we can preserve a notion of analyticity that 
employs a notion of intention that will meet Quine's objections. Recall that Quine's 
objections are based on his behavioristic theory of meaning. 
Recently Paul Moser has constructed an account of analyticity that meet's Quine's 
strictures. His account, like Carnap's, relativizes analyticity to the individual. It also 
provides for an empirical test of prospective analytic sentences. Let's look briefly at his 
account, since it provides a rigorous approach to the problem, and one that may be useful 
for philosophical purposes. 
Moser's Account of Analyticity 
Quine finds problems with the view that a sentence is analytic if it is true solely 
in virtue of the meaning of its constituent words. For one, he is leery of the appeal to 
some mysterious, i.e., mental, notion of meaning. The concept of meaning, it has been 
suggested, can be de-mystified by taking the view that meaning is use. This will, 
hopefully, allow us to explain meaning empirically by focus sing on tbe behavior of 
speakers. Even Quine is willing to grant that this idea can be useful in an analysis of 
meaning. 
The view that meaning is use, however, needs some clari fi~ation. Meaning is not 
merely use, since mere use does not seem to entail any notion of correctness. Some 
notion of correctness seems necessary for a concept of language use, if by clanguage' we 
understand something more than just verbal noise. Carnap uses the notion of intention 
114W. V. Quine, "Use and its Place in Meaning," chap. in 'fli~one.s and Things 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981): 43-54. 
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to supply the correctness requirement. His idea is that we choose to use words in some 
specific way, i.e., according to some rule (either implicit or explicit), thereby supplying 
the needed notion of correctness. For example, some speaker can intend to use 'swan' 
to signify only white birds of a certain shape, thereby establishing a correct way to use 
'swan'. 
With this notion of intention used to supply the needed notion of correctness, we 
can clarify our notion of meaning as use by distinguishing between use and "usage." The 
latter implies some pattern or custom of use, whereas the former implies no such pattern. 
Intentions can now be said to imply some usage rather than a mere use. With this 
distinction between use and usage, we formulate the task of giving an account of 
analyticity as that of specifying how some sentence can be true just i11 virtue of some 
commitment to a usage of the constituent words in the sentence. The commitment 
requirement can then be explained empirically/behaviorally, and should not be understood 
as entailing any mental action, e.g., intending. 
Working with the notion of usage, Paul Moser takes the view that analytic 
sentences are sentences true just in virtue of a speaker having "nonextraneous interpretive 
commitments regarding S's constituent terms" i.e., usage commitments 11~. He then 
defines analyticity as follows: "A sentence, S, is analytically true for a person, X, at time 
t if and only if at t X, when motivated just by her none:JC1raneous interpretive 
commitments regarding S's constituent terms, will reject all (potential) falsifiers of S. "116 
115Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, chap. 3. 
116Ibid.' 146. 
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He then proposes that we test for the analyticity of a sentence by seeing if the speaker 
"will reject all (potential) falsifiers of S. "117 If the speaker does reject all (possible) 
falsifiers, then we can conclude that the sentence is analytically true. Moser claims that 
his notion of analyticity should be, not only acceptable to Quine, but endorsed by him 
for certain epistemic purposes of his own. 
Notice that on Moser's account analyticity is relativized to the individual speaker. 
What he offers is an account of a sentence being analytic for a speaker, rather than an 
account of a sentence being analytic for a language. As Moser puts it, 
What is analytic, on Carnap's view, can vary from person to person, owing to the 
variability of intentions with respect to use. My intentions regarding use can make 
the truths of arithmetic, for example, analytic for me. Those truths need not be 
analytic, however, for someone lacking the relevant intentions about linguistic 
use. Quine does not give due recognition to such person-relativity of 
analyticity. 118 
That Quine does not consider the person-relativity of analyticity is correct. On his view, 
The notion of analyticity about which we are worrying is a pu1]>0rted relation 
between statements and languages: a statement S fa said to be analytic for a 
language L, and the problem is to make sense of this relation generally, that is, 
for variables 'S' and 'L. ' 119 
Recall that earlier we labelled this Schema-A for the notion of analyticity. By making 
analyticity person-relative it would appear that Moser has not given an account of 
analyticity in terms of Schema-A, and so has not met Quine' s reg11est for an account of 
analyticity, at least, analyticity as he understands it according to Schema-A. 
1171bid. 
118Ibid., 145. 
119Quine, "Two Dogmas," 33. 
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This is not necessarily a problem for Moser, however, given his thesis of 
"conceptual relativism," i.e., the view that "different people can, and sometimes do, 
have different operative constitutive standards for the correct use of such terms as 
'justification' and 'warrant', at least at a level of specificity." 120 The concept 'analyticity' 
can then vary in the same way, and historically this does seem to be the case-witness 
the various concepts of analyticity Quine examines in "Two Dogmas." Philosophers, 
however, as Moser points out, "often talk of the notion of justification, truth, meaning, 
explanation, obligation, and so on. " 121 Such talk is misguided on Moser~s view, for, 
"given conceptual relativism, we may diagnose such talk as laboring under a myth: the 
'myth of the definite article' wherein a notion of X suitable to one's co nctptual purposes 
is regarded as having the exclusive status of the notion of X." 112 Given conceptual 
relativism then, Moser can claim that his notion of analyticity need not meet Quine's 
Schema-A since he, Moser, is operating with a different concept of analyticity from 
Quine's. Moser's concept can be seen as yet another alternative that Quine has simply 
failed to recognize. What we need now from Moser is an explanation of how his notion 
of analyticity can be put to work for philosophical purposes. He does supply just such 
an argument, aiming to show that Quine would do well to adopt llis account of analyticity 
in order to answer certain questions he puts to Quine re,gardi11g the truth of certain of 
Quine's own heuristic principles. Notice, however, that such an argume11t requires that 
12
°Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, 8. 
121Ibid. 
122Ibid. 
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Quine do two things: one, that he give up the view that an account of analyticity should 
meet Schema-A, and two, that he accept a different account of analyticity. 
We won't consider the question of whether Quine should or should not adopt 
Moser's account of analyticity. Let's tum instead to the construction of an account of 
analyticity that meets Schema-A. This account will meet Quine's challenge head-on, and 
so won't require a separate argument for persuading Quine of the use of such an account. 
The fact that such an account can be constructed will alone be sufficient to meet his 
challenge. Having met Quine's challenge, we are then under no obligation to adopt his 
holism or his naturalism, and so will be free to construct an alternative strategy for doing 
ontology. Let's turn now to a new of account of analyticity. 
Analyticity Again 
As we have already seen, the basic idea that meani_ng is use is acceptable, even 
to Quine, although it is incomplete without a notion of correct use, or a notion of usage. 
The account to be offered makes use of some ideas of Carnap's, in particular, the notion 
of a "meaning postulate." Recall that Quine is skeptical about employing meaning 
postulates, and semantical rules generally, in an account of analyticity, claiming that 
"they are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing on a page under the 
heading 'Semantical Rules'; and this heading is itself then meaningless." 123 The account 
offered now will avoid the problem of appealing to une,.;J>Lained semantical rules by 
clarifying the notion of a semantical rule, or meaning po~tulate. 
123Quine, "Two Dogmas," 34. 
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Let's begin by distinguishing between two "orders" of language use. 1'11 use the 
term 'First-order use' for language use that has as its referent something non-linguistic. 
For example, the sentence, 
S4 'There is a swan.' 
is a use of language that is about something non-linguistic. Quine calls these "observation 
sentences." These sorts of sentences capture, grasp, or describe something non-linguistic, 
be it the speaker's sensory stimulus, or some extemal object. We can even allow, at this 
point, that such sentences have only what Quine cans "stimulus meaning. " 124 Nothing, 
however, hangs on this point, since the relevant feature of a First-order use of language 
is just that it is about something non-linguistic. 
Now suppose we wish to say something in our language about First-order use of 
language. The referent of sentences about First-order uses oflanguage will be linguistic. 
To speak about First-order use of language is to employ the strategy of wllat Quine has 
called "semantic ascent": "The strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discussion 
into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz., words) and on 
the main terms concerning them." 125 Let's call this a "Second-order use" of language, 
which is language use about language. One example of Second-order Language use would 
be, 
S5 'All swans are white.' 
S5 can be construed as a partial definition of what it is 10 be a swan . We ~an call S5 a 
124Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 3-4. 
125Quine, Word and Object, 270. 
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rule for the correct use of language. On this view S5 asserts that use of the word 'swan' 
entails use of the word 'white'. Notice, however, that S5 can also be construed as a 
First-order use of language. On this interpretation S5 would be the report of some 
speaker's observations regarding some swans. What is still needed is some test to 
determine which interpretation is appropriate. 
The distinction between orders of language use can be clarified by contrasting 
orders with levels. We can move up to an infinite number of leYels of abstraction by a 
simple iterative procedure. For example, we can talk about our talk about language. This 
would be to move up to a higher level of abstraction than talk about talk. The distinction 
between orders and levels recognizes that we can always move to a different level just 
by a mechanical procedure of iteration, whereas orders cut across leYels. There are only 
two possible orders of language use: language use about Language, and language use 
about something non-linguistic. The levels we can generate about the Latter, e.g., talk 
about talk about talk about talk, are all second-order uses of language since they are all 
talk about talk, even though they proceed to ever higher Levels of abstraction. Thus, talk 
of 'orders' is meant to draw a different distinction than talk of ~Levels.' 
Suppose then that S5 is understood as a second-order sentence, and is thus 
analytically true. Specifically, analytic sentences, on this view, are nothing but rules for 
correct use of words in first-order language use. So, a sentence is analytically true if it 
is a true, second-order sentence about a first-order use of lang11age. Second-order 
sentences themselves do not have any empirical content. That is, the' do not designate 
anything non-linguistic. Like Carnap's meaning postulates. they spocify only the logical 
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relations among the terms in the sentence. This is perhaps easier to see when we translate 
them into logical form. S5 then becomes, 
S6 D (x)(Sx :J Wx) 
This can be read as, "if something is said to be an S, then necessarily it is W." Where 
Carnap has spoken of meaning postulates, this has been replaced by talk off second-order 
uses of language. The latter is understood as clarifying the former. If the distinction 
between first and second-order use is clear enough, we can successfully reply to Quine's 
objection that the appeal to meaning postulates is just an appeal to yet another mysterious 
term. Specifically, a meaning postulate is just a rule for the correct use of some term in 
a second-order use of language. 
The key point here is that S5 specifies only the logical relations between the 
predicates 'swan' and 'white'. This should be clear when we look at the translation of 
S5 into S6. So far we have not given any rules of designation for 'S' and'W'. Rules of 
designation, as Carnap points out, "are not necessary for the e~plication of analyticity, 
but only for that of factual (synthetic) truth. "126 S5 states all that we need to know about 
the meanings of the predicates 'S' and 'W', namely, the logical relation of implication 
obtaining between the two properties. What we need now is some way of determining 
when any given sentence should be understood as a first-order or a :second-order use of 
language, since, as we have seen, it is possible to interpret a seaten~e in either way. 
The test proposed is behavioral; it is similar to the test Mrnser has devised for his 
126Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," chap. in Meaning and 
Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 224. 
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account of analyticity. 127 Given some sentence, S, we ask a speaker to consider whether 
he can imagine any circumstances under which he would ever assent to S being false. In 
other words, we ask whether there could be any situation he might imagine that would 
falsify S. Notice, the test is whether the sentence could be falsified. The test is not 
whether the speaker could imagine the sentence as having a different meaning. Let's 
consider briefly what it is for something to count as a falsifier. 
A necessary, though not sufficient, condition for something being a falsifier is that 
it must be something that the sentence could be about. That is, for/ to count as a falsifier 
of a sentence S,/must be something that S could be said to describe, name, refer to, be 
about, etc. A falsifier of S5, 'all swans are white', could be an instance of a black bird 
of a particular shape and size that someone uttering S5 would count as being a swan. In 
other words, the instance of a particular bird that the speaker would be willing to claim 
S5 could be about or could refer to would meet this necessary requirement for it to be 
a falsifier. If the speaker allows that something could be a falsifie1, then we can conclude 
that S5 is not being employed as a second-order sentence, since, in order to falsify S5 
we require the possibility of something that S5 could be about that would falsify it. 
Second-order uses of language cannot have falsifiers since what the;i are about is first-
order uses of language. The only possibility we can imagine of a second-order use of 
language being falsified requires imagining a situation in which the fint-order use is 
different. But this is not a case of imagining a falsifier; it is a case of imagining a change 
of meaning. What is perhaps occurring here is that the spealcer might be imagining a 
127Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, chap. 3. 
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different sentence. Thus, the sentence in question is not falsified, but changed to a 
different sentence due to a change of meaning. The reason we do not use a test of change 
of meaning is so that we can avoid appeals to the term 'meaning' that Quine finds 
problematic. The test for falsification is behavioral, whereas a tes.t for change of 
meaning, while it may be behavioral, is a test for something that is. itself suspect on 
Quine' s view. 
Notice that the proposed test is one directed to a speaker, and not just to the 
analysis of the sentence. Someone might object here that this. account of analyticity is 
indeed relativized to the speaker and so does not meet Quine' s Schema-A. The problem 
with this objection is that it assumes that both the account of analyticity ~ well as the 
test meet Schema-A. We need not make this assumption in order to comply with Schema-
A. The test is directed to a speaker because it is only speakers that are language-users. 
Recall that we do want to allow for different speakers employing different uses of the 
same term. The test applies to a speaker because of this apparent fact. Jf it were the case 
that all speakers of a language always used all of the terms in the language in the same 
way, there would be no need for directing the test at any particular speaker. We could 
merely analyze the sentence itself. Since this is not the case, however, -we direct the test 
at a speaker in order to account for different us.es of terms among various. speakers. It 
does not follow from this, however, that analyticity itself is relativized to the speaker. 
It is only the test for analyticity that is directed to the spealcer. We can still maintain that, 
given this test, what we are testing for is analyticity in lang\18ge L. as Schema-A 
stipulates. We simply take into consideration the apparent fact tha1, within language L, 
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there may be multiple uses for any particular term. Thus, testing the speaker does not 
imply that analyticity itself is speaker-relative. 
Since analytic sentences have only a logical sort of meaning, then insofar as 
logical sentences can be analyzed behaviorally, Quine must grant that analytic sentences 
of this sort can be analyzed behaviorally as well. Second-order use oflanguage probably 
does not occur until one is already fluent in first-order use of a language, but that is 
unproblematic. It would be overly stringent to require second-order uses oflanguage by 
a speaker in order for them to engage in first-order uses of language. We should adopt 
the general principle that first-order language use does not require second-order language 
use. Without this principle we would be unable to explain language use by young 
children and anyone learning a foreign language. 
Here, then, is a general definition of analyticity: 
A sentence, S, is analytically true for some language, L, if it js a rule for the 
correct use of words in a first-order use of language L, where i;uch rules are 
sentences in a second-order use of language L. 
If this account of analyticity is unobjectionable we now have an empirical account of 
analyticity, and a behavioral criterion for testing when some s.entence :is analytic, an 
account that accords with Quine's Schema-A. This account should meet aJl of Quine's 
qualms about analyticity and should be compatible with a fully behavioral account of 
meaning. 
What has not been given is an account of rules of de5ignatio11. Recall that on 
Carnap's view these sorts of rules are not neces5ary for an account of analyticity; they 
are needed only for factual (synthetic) truth. n is in establishing rule5 of ciesignation that 
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Carnap appeals to choice: 
Suppose that the author of a system wishes the predicates 'B' and 'M' to 
designate the properties Bachelor and Married, respectively. How does he know 
that these properties are incompatible and that therefore he has to lay down 
postulate P 1? This is not a matter of knowledge but of decision. 12i 
The idea here is that we establish rules for designation of terms by choice and decision 
according to our purposes. 
A more complete theory of meaning, or language use, would require an account 
of how we give rules of designation. Whether Carnap's suggestion that this is a matter 
of choice is the approach to take here is debatable. The notion of choice implies that we 
can, merely by an act of deciding, establish rules of designation. This sounds like an 
appeal to conventional stipulation, and here Quine would perha]Js object that, while 
convention may be used to establish new uses of terms, it canllot be appealed to in order 
to explain existing uses. 
Recall that the appeal to choice is used, not for analyticity, but for rules of 
designation. Quine's criticism is, therefore, not relevant to this aecount of analyticity. 
Presumably, we could construct an account whereby the rules of designation can be 
accounted for behaviorally. It isn't crucial to this account that we must res.art to choice 
in order to establish such rules. We can assume that the rules of designation can be 
specified to Quine's satisfaction. The important point for present p11rposes is that an 
account of analyticity does not require rules of designation. Such rules wiJI be needed in 
an account of synthetic or factual truth. As we will see, however, we do11•t need such 
128Carnap, "Meaning Postulates," 224. 
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an account since the method of ontology being offered doesn't make factual claims. 
Rather, in matters ontological, "to recognize something as a real thing or event means 
to succeed in incorporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position 
so that it fits together with the other things recognized as real, according to the rules of 
the framework. "129 
If this account of analyticity is satisfactory, the issue now is, what use can we 
make of it for a theory of ontology? This will be the primary topic of chapter three. 
129Camap, "Empiricism, Semantics and ()ntolo,gy," 206. 
CHAPTER III 
ONTOLOGY AND LANGUAGE 
Introduction 
Chapter two provided an account of analyticity that meets all of Quine's 
requirements. Recall, however, that Quine's most recent claim about analyticity is not 
so much that we cannot give a suitable account of it, b11t that there must be some 
philosophical task to which the account can be p11t to good use, one that will do at least 
as good a job as holism. I propose now to put this account to some use jn constructing 
a method for doing ontology. This method will be non-realist and employs some ideas 
of both Quine and Carnap, even though they have substantial disagreements about 
ontology. 
We saw in chapter one that Carnap rtjects realism, and metaphysical doctrines 
generally, while allowing for intelligible talk of ontological matters. Whether one is or 
is not persuaded by his reasons for rejecting metaphysics, hi~ resul fi11g views about 
ontology can be put to good use in developing a non-realist ontology. ln this chapter such 
a method is developed. The method itself is neutral on the issue of which particular 
ontology we should embrace, e.g., materialism)physicalism, duaJism, ideali ~m. etc. In 
chapter four a number of possible ontologies are considered, and tlte11 an argument for 
a version of physicalism is offered, albeit a physicalism that js somewhat different than 
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the doctrine discussed in much of the current literature. Briefly, the notion of physicalism 
developed here is based in part on the original understanding of the term as it was first 
coined by Otto Neurath, and adopted by Carnap. This concept of physicalism is a non-
metaphysical, semantic doctrine. 
Carnap's Ontological Method 
Carnap's ontological method is motivated chiefly by prob1ems arising from our 
talk of abstract entities. Specifically, the issue is whether empiricists, who "'are in general 
rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entitles like properties, classes, 
relations, numbers, propositions, etc." can "avoid any reference to abstract entities and 
to restrict themselves to what is sometimes called a nominalistic 1anguage, i.e., one not 
containing such references." 1 Given that we can meaningfu11y talk abo11t s ach things, and 
given that our best science would be impossible without at least some of them, e.g., 
numbers, the empiricist needs some way of reso1ving questions about their existence. 
Carnap's aim is to show that empiricists can meaningfuJly use terms referring to abstract 
objects without being committed to their existence in any troubling sense. 
On Carnap's view, whenever we wish to speak of, or theorize about, a new sort 
of entity, we need a "linguistic framework" within wllich we can talk about such 
entities. 2 Once the framework is in place, "we must distinguish two kinds of questions 
of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the 
1Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," 205. 
2Ibid., 206-7. 
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framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the 
existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions. "3 
Internal questions are answered according to the type of framework. So, for example, 
if the framework is factual, we use empirical methods, whereas if it is Logical, we use 
logical methods. External questions, on the other hand, are, as we shall see, problematic. 
We require an interpretation of these external questions, since they can be understood in 
more than one way. As will be shown, answers to external questions, understood 
correctly, are analytically true, given some linguistic framework. 
This notion of a "linguistic framework" needs clarification. Carnap mentions 
several such frameworks, among them the "thing language with its framework for things, 
the frameworks of numbers, propositions, thing properties, integers and rational 
numbers, real numbers and the spatio-temporal coordinate system for physics."~ He has 
also stated that he is "essentially in agreement with" Quine' s Yiew of our being 
ontologically committed to whatever objects are within the range of values of our 
variables. 5 Consequently, "the acceptance of a new kind of entities is rep1esented in the 
language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of eJ<pressions to be used 
according to a new set of rules. "6 Now we may already have in our lang\18ge names for 
the new kind of entity, e.g., "the thing language contains certainly words of the type of 
3Ibid., 206. 
4Ibid., 207-212. 
5Camap, Meaning and Necessity, 42. 
6Camap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," 2 L3. 
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'blue' and 'house' before the framework of properties is introduced. "7 This shows that 
the occurrence in our language of constants of the appropriate type is insufficient as an 
indicator of our acceptance of the existence of the kind of entity in question. What we 
need for that is: 
First, the introduction of a general term, a predicate of higher level, for the new 
kind of entities, permitting us to say of any particular entity that it belongs to this 
kind (e.g., 'Red is a property', 'Five is a numbtr'). Second, the introduction of 
variables of the new type. The new entities are values of these variable; the 
constants (and the closed compound expressions, if any) are substitutable for the 
variables. With the help of the variables, general sentences concerning the new 
entities can be formulated. 8 
On this view we adopt some type of predicate, and some variables for talking about 
individual objects of the new type. We then distinguish frameworks acc01ding to their 
ontological commitments in Quine's sense. Ontological commitment isdetermfoed by the 
values of the variables in any case of existential quantification. So. s.omethi ng is a distinct 
framework in virtue of the type of predicates it employs, where each instance of a 
variable of that type of predicate commits us to a different kind of entity. Frameworks 
are distinct if they do not share the same type of predicate. We can thus create a 
framework for a new sort of entity by introducing a new type of predicate. On this view, 
types of predicates correspond to kinds of entities. For example, there are material and 
numerical types of predicates just as there are material and numerical types of entities. 
Given some type of predicate, the particular instances are determined by what we take 
as the values of the variable. Alternatively, frameworks for what seem to be old and 
7Ibid. 
8Camap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," 213-14. 
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well-established entities, e.g., physical objects, minds, numbers, are not so much 
constructed new, but are now explicitly distinguished from each other in this particular 
way. 
Answering ontological questions thus presumes the use of the appropriate 
framework with which we construct possible answers to such questions. Internal 
questions, therefore, are questions about the range of values of the variables of the 
language in question. For example, given the thing language, it is an internal question 
whether there are unicorns. Namely, we want to know if unicorns are in the range of 
values of a variable in the thing language. Since the thing langnage is empirical, whether 
or not some entity exists will be determined by empirical criteria. Thus, in order to 
answer the question regarding the existence of unicorns, we must go out and look for 
unicorns, or at least evidence of unicorns. Notice, however, that failure to find unicorns, 
or even evidence of unicorns, does not imply that unicoms do not exist. Rather, it 
implies that they do not exist/or the thing lan8uage. 
It can thus happen that something we believe is a member of one framework turns 
out to be a member of another framework. The unicorn, for example, might originally 
be thought to be a member of the material object framework. On in vestigatio11, however, 
we may find that it is instead a member of the language of ideas or abstract objects. To 
our concept of unicorn we still attribute the quality of materiality. What has happened, 
however, is that, as such it cannot correctly be said to exist. That is, we cannot say that 
unicorns as material things exist. What we say instead is that unicorns exist only as the 
idea of some material thing of a particular kind. Jn other words, we attribute existence 
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to unicorns only insofar as we say that any idea as such exists. 
In answering an internal question about the existence of some entity affirmatively, 
we recognize it as a real thing. This sort of recognition of the reality of something just 
means that we succeed in incorporating it into the framework in whiclt we speak about 
the entity in question. Taking a physical object, or ~thing", for e~ample, "to recognize 
something as a real thing or event means to succeed in incorporating it into the system 
of things at a particular space-time position so that it fits together with the other things 
as real, according to the rules of the framework. "9 Notice that success at incorporation 
into the system is a criterion for our recognizing sometlting as real, and not a 
requirement for its being real. When Carnap says in the paragraph fo11owing the previous 
quotation, "to be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system" we 
could interpret this as an endorsement of a kind of Goodmanian constructiYism according 
to which something is real in virtue of speaking of it with certain of our words. 10 This 
constructivist view is clearly a metaphysical doctrine that Carnap would reject. 
Furthermore, verificationism notwithstanding, one can reasonably question whether it is 
even intelligible. 
This does, however, raise the issue of whether the concept of being real, i.e., the 
concept of existence, is the same or different for each framework. With respect to the 
thing language Carnap says, "this concept of reality occurring in these internal questions 
9Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," 207. 
1
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is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical concept. "11 What remains the ~me across 
frameworks is the criterion for being real, namely, that some entity is found to be a 
possible value of some variable of the framework. What it means to be real, however, 
may vary across frameworks. This requires that we give up the idea that there is a 
univocal concept of what it is to be real, to exist, for all the kinds of particulars that we 
might want to countenance in our ontology. Let's call this the analogy of existence thesis, 
orAE: 
The concept of existence is relative to the linguistic framework one uses in 
asserting the existence of any particular entity. 
Notice that AE allows for multiple concepts of existence, so jt does not fall prey to 
Moser's myth of the definite article. AE even allows for the possibility of different users 
of the same framework having different concepts of existence. It would be possible, for 
example, for two users of the thing language to have different concepts of existence for 
that framework, even if their concepts are only slightly different. The point of AE is that 
the concept of existence for any framework will vary just in virtue of its being the 
concept for that particular framework. 
Concepts of existence are not entirely distinct, for they do share some minimal 
amount of content. This minimal amount of content is whatever it is tllat we mean when 
we use the logical notation '3.X'. This is, admittedly, a vecy broad notion of existence, 
in that it can be used to express existence claims made in any frame-work Whatever this 
notation expresses, so long as it is not a realist notion of existence, we ca11 let it remain 
111bid. 
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sufficiently vague so that it can be used in just this way. It is this very broad notion that 
is common to all framework-relative concepts of existence. 
Recall that earlier we saw that Carnap agrees with Quine on the issue of 
ontological commitment. This logical notation is neutral on the question of what the 
concept of existence might mean. We can use the same logical mechanism for 
determining ontological commitment for all frameworks, so long as assertions in the 
framework can be formulated using the logic of quantification. The concept of existence 
itself, however, can vary across frameworks. The claim that the concept of existence is 
relative to the framework just amounts to the claim that what it is to be a member of one 
framework is different than what it is to be a member of another framework. Consider 
again the example of the unicorn. Whether unicorns exist is determined in part by the 
framework in which we posit their existence. In other words, the meaning of the concept 
of existence is relativized to the framework in which assertions of existence are made. 
Notice that AE does not relativize concepts of existence to indiYidual users of the 
concept. This is Moser's thesis of conceptual relativity. As we have already seen, 
conceptual relativity seems basically correct. Conceptual relatiYity is not, however, what 
is at issue in AE. We can grant that concepts of existence may yary for individuals, for 
example, in cases where some individuals do not embrace the view being endorsed here 
that the concept of existence is relative to a linguistic framework. AE asserts that 
concepts of existence are relative to the linguistic framework with which one is 
operating. Given that there can be more than one linguistic framework, some of which 
are not translatable or reducible to others, there wi11 be different co11cepts of existence 
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for each such distinct framework. 
This sort of conceptual relativity is not problematic. In fact, there are good 
reasons for taking such a view. Such a view does not exclude anything from our ontology 
that someone with a univocal notion of existence might want to include. Given that our 
ontological commitments are determined by a logical procedure that cuts across 
frameworks, we can be committed to the existence of anything over which we can 
quantify. Furthermore, it helps to explain the issue of how one can say that both material 
and abstract entities exist. On this view, we can be ontologically committed to both, but 
we can explain what it is for each of them to exist by taking the view that each exists in 
a different way. For example, for a material entity, to exist is to be located in space-
time, whereas for an abstract entity, to exist i:s to be a member of a particular logical 
system. To require that both exist in just the same way seems to be not only too strong, 
but just wrongheaded. Why should we think that both abstract and concrete entities must 
exist in just the same way when they are, by definition, fundamentaJly different kinds of 
things? Since we can be ontologically committed to both sorts of things without 
equivocation, this seems sufficient for our asserting the existence of both. 
As we have seen, internal questions ask about the exi:stence of some particular 
entity of the kind designated by the framework in question. As sach, internal questions 
are of interest more to scientists than to philosophers. These sorts of questions are what 
we can call questions of "regional" ontology. The more general qaestions about 
particular kinds of entities, e.g., whether there are abstract object:s, immaterial entities, 
etc., are the sorts of questions that traditionally interest philosopher~. These are not 
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internal questions since, presumably, they ask about the status of some _particular kind 
of entity. These sorts of questions are "conceived as propounded before the adoption of 
a given language. "12 These are external questions, and it is these sorts of questions that 
philosophers are traditionally interested in for purposes of ontology. 
External questions, on the other hand, are, according to Carnap, "'raised neither 
by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers." 13 Accordingly, 
answers to external questions vary according to particular well-known doctrines: 
"Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the 
controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. "u The reason the 
controversy cannot be solved, according to Carnap, is that the question :itseJf is confused. 
External questions ask about the existence of some kind of entities, and not just 
about whether some particular entity of a specific kind exists. Since in order to 1a.lk about 
any kind of entity at all we require a framework, external questions can be answered in 
one of two ways, depending on how the question is understood. On one view, the 
question, 'are there physical objects?', is a metaphysical question regarding the real 
existence of physical objects, in the metaphysical sense of 'real' as defined earlier. On 
this view the question is understood as asking whether there are physical objects with 
conceiver-independent existence. On another view, the question ~are there _physical 
objects?' is about whether there is some framework in _place for making claims about 
12W. V. Quine, "On Carnap's Views on Ontology,,., chap. in Wey.> of Paradox, 
revised and enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard. University Press, 1976), 207. 
13Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and OntoJogy," 207. 
14Ibid. 
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physical objects. On this view, the question is not metaphyskal, but merely practical. 
The problem with the metaphysical interpretation, on Carnap's view, is that 
statements about the reality of the thing world itself "cannot be formulated in the thing 
language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language"15 for "the alleged statement of 
the reality of the system of entities is a pseudo-statement without cognitive content. "16 
Whether or not Carnap is appealing to a verificationist criterion of meaning in labeling 
such questions mere pseudo-questions, having only an appearance of sense, is 
unimportant. I'm not going to take the position that external 'l_uestions construed in this 
way are, strictly speaking, meaningless. My view is that external 'l_uestions. construed 
metaphysically, are unverifiable given agnosticism about metaphysics generally. 
On another interpretation however, an external question is just the question of 
whether to accept the framework itself in which we talk about a certain entity. As Carnap 
puts it, "those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itse]f have perhaps 
in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest. but rather a 
practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our 
language." 17 The answer to this sort of question concerns a matter of choi~. Namely, 
the issue is whether one is going to talk a certain way using a certain language. 
On this view, the sentence, 'there are physical objects', is understood as a rule 
for the correct use of the expression 'physical object' in the phy ~iclll object language. 
15Ibid., 208. 
16lbid., 214. 
17lbid. 
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Whenever I say there are physical objects I employ some concept of existence. This 
concept is relative to the framework I use in order to talk about physical objects. So to 
ask if there are physical objects is, on this interpretation, to ask whether there is some 
framework with which we can make statements about this particular kind of entity, in this 
case, physical objects. When I assert that physical objects exist I am to be understood as 
saying nothing more than something about what constitutes correct use of the expression 
'physical object', given the framework. This should not be confused with what counts as 
correct use of the expression 'concept of physical object'. Talk of concepts takes place 
in a different framework than talk of physical objects, since, by definition, the concept 
of a physical objects is not itself a physical object. 
Acceptance of a framework with which we can make statements about some sort 
of entities does not need any theoretical justification. It needs no theoretical justification 
"because it does not imply any assertion of reality. "u Acceptance of a linguistic 
framework is not acceptance of any doctrine. It is nothing more than the acceptance of 
some way of speaking. This does not imply that we can give no Jeasons at all as to why 
we use one framework rather than another. We can indeed giYe such reasons, and they 
are of the sort that even Quine would countenance, namely, pragmatic reasons as to why 
one framework is to be preferred over another. The point is that, whether there is some 
particular kind of entity can only be answered in one of two ways. One way is by taking 
the view that kinds are "natural" in some metaphysical sense, and :so must be discovered. 
The other is that kinds are conventional, that they are matte1s of coJlceptual taxonomy. 
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Carnap and Quine, as well as myself, reject the first approach on general grounds of its 
being a metaphysical view. Thus, if there are no metaphysical means for justifying a 
framework, the issue comes down just to the question of whether or not to employ the 
concept of physical object-and that can only be decided on pragmatic grounds. As Quine 
puts it, "now Carnap has maintained that this is a question not of matters of fact but of 
but of choosing a convenient language form, a convenient conceptual scheme or 
framework for science. With this I agree, but only on the proviso that the same be 
conceded for scientific hypotheses generally." 19 
Acceptance of the entities referred to by some framework is the belief in the 
reality of that entity, where this belief amounts to including that entity in the system of 
entities "recognized as real, according to the rules of the framework. "20 Such acceptance 
will depend on the criteria we employ in affirming the truth of some statement about such 
entities. These criteria will vary according to whether the linguistic framework is factual, 
or logical. This is not to say that the entities themselves exist jmt in virtue of some 
feature of the framework, or the speaker. Rather, the point is tilat the truth of statements 
about the existence of some sort of entity is what is at issue in internal questions. Such 
questions are answered by means of the criteria that are appropriate for the type of 
framework. For example, for questions about physical objects, we use llr1 empirical 
19Quine, "Two Dogmas," 45. See also ~camap' s Views on Ontology," 211. 
Quine, of course, extends the pragmatic claim further on grmmds of his rejection of 
analyticity. Since an account of analyticity has already been constructed that meets his 
objections, we can resist this extension. 
2
°Ibid.' 207. 
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criterion, whereas for questions about abstract objects, we use a logical one. 
External questions construed metaphysically implicitly assume some concept of 
reality, and then proceed to ask whether the entities in question are real in this sense. 
The problem here is that there is already a concept of real for the entities in question, 
and it is specified by the framework within which we make statements about the entities. 
Thus, to ask if some entity is real, where a different concept of reality is employed, 
amounts to asking if the entity can be said to exist by employing some other framework 
with which to make such an assertion. But what is the point of such an endeavor? We 
already possess a framework within which assertions of existence can be made. Perhaps 
the metaphysical construal of the external question is whether we can make assertions of 
existence in no framework at all. This, of course, cannot be done, given the notion of 
a framework that is here being used. 
The only plausible interpretation of an external question is the one already put 
forth. It is the question of whether or not to adopt any particular framework. Given the 
agnostic position adopted about metaphysical assertions in chapter one, there does not 
seem to be any other plausible interpretation of such questions. We can see now why the 
answers to such questions are analytic. Namely, the statement 'there are ph)'sical objects' 
is analytically true given the physical object language. What is at issue is whether to 
adopt such a language. Carnap says that "we have to make the choice whether or not to 
accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question. "'2l The issue is, 
how do we choose? The argument of the next chapter wiJI be that, witll respect to 
21Ibid. 
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concrete particulars, i.e., non-abstract objects such as numbers and sets, the physical 
object language is to be preferred over several alternatives, such as an idealist language 
or a dualist language. Let's look now at some objections to this ontological method. 
Objections To The Carnapian Method of Ontolo~y 
One objection to this approach aims to show that it can be put to good use by the 
realist. If we disagree with Carnap that metaphysical questions lack sense, then we 
require a metaphysical framework within which such questions can at least be given some 
sense. This would require some variables that range over entities of every kind we think 
is real. We can then decide, perhaps even on pragmatic grounds, whether this framework 
is to be employed. At the very least, it cannot be rejected out of hand, since it seems to 
be required in order to give metaphysical questions the sense we 1equire them to have. 
There are two problems with this approach. First, the sense of 'exist' that the 
realist is operating with can be made sufficiently meaningful without the construction of 
a metaphysical framework. This is so because, for the realist, to exist, in this sense, is 
nothing more than to be framework-independent. All 'exist' meam he1e is, not in any 
framework at all. We don't need yet another framework within whic:h to give the concept 
'exist' meaning. It is meaningful enough as a sort of ••limit concept" discussed earlier. 
It gets its meaning negatively when contrasted with every other fJamewor k. So we do not 
seem to require yet another framework in order to giYe the realist his concept of 
existence. 
But suppose we grant the realist a metaphysical framework. He now faces another 
problem. Given a metaphysical framework which allows for meani11gfol tallcabout "real" 
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objects, we need some criterion whereby we can affirm the existence of particulars of 
this kind. Whereas for the physical object language the criterion will be observation, and 
for numbers it will be a non-empirical criterion, it must be a metaphysical criterion for 
the metaphysical framework. But as the argument for agnosticism shows, there is no such 
criterion available to us that doesn't beg questions against the skeptic. So even if we can 
construct such a framework, we can never affirm in a non-questionbegging way whether 
it contains anything. Such a framework would be of no use whatsoever, and so, can 
easily be put aside. Let's look next at some objections from Quine. 
Quine objects to the strategy of distinguishing between internal and external 
questions on grounds that "no more than the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
is needed in support of Carnap's doctrine that the statements commonly thought of as 
ontological [external] ... are analytic or contradictory given the lang11age. "22 Since Quine 
thinks there is no such theoretically useful distinction between analytic and synthetic, 
there is consequently no distinction between internal and external questions. But as we 
saw in the previous chapter, there is a theoretically useful account of analyticity that can 
be employed to make just this distinction. This being Quine 's basic point of contention, 
we can consider the distinction satisfactory, at least for Quine' s purposes. Quine does, 
however, have an ontological program of his own, one that :puts ontoJogicaJ questions 
"on a par with questions of natural science. "23 This strategy has come to be called the 
naturalizing of ontology. 
22Ibid., 210. 
23Quine, "On Carnap's Views on Ontology," 211. 
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Over the course of his long career, Quine has held various ontological views. At 
one time he was an eliminativist, from which we have the verb named after him 'to 
quine' meaning "to deny resolutely the existence or :importance of something real or 
significant. "24 The following quote illustrates this early view: 
If we repudiate mental entities as entities, there ceases to be an iron curtain 
between the private and the public; there remains only a :smoke screen, a matter 
of varying degrees of privacy of events in the physical world. Consciousness still 
retains a place, as a state of a physical object, if ... we construe consdousness as 
a faculty of responding to one's own responses. The 1esponses here are, or can 
be construed as, physical behavior. 25 
This eliminativist view is replaced a bit later by the view that we can dispense with a 
physicalist ontology altogether in favor of one of "pure sets. "'26 Most recently he has 
offered the view that "even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options. "27 This 
latter possibility, while apparently allowing for an ontology which includes immaterial 
phenomena (and not merely abstract phenomena such as sets), must be considered :in light 
of Quine's further suggestion that, 
Reference and ontology recede thus to the status of mere auxiliaries. True 
sentences, observational and theoretical, are the alpha and omega of the sdentific 
enterprise. They are related by structure, and objects figure as mere nodes of the 
structure. What particular objects there may be :i:s ind:iffe1e11t to the truth of 
observation sentences, indifferent to the support they Lend to the theoretical 
24Daniel Dennett, The Philosophical Lexicon, 8th ed. (American Philosophical 
Association, 1987), 15. 
25W. V. Quine, "On Mental Entities," chap. in Way~ of Paradox (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 227. 
26Quine, "Whither Physical Objects," 502. 
27Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 21. 
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sentences, indifferent to the success of the theory in its predictions. 28 
Is it possible to put these apparently conflicting claims together into a single coherent 
view? Perhaps what Quine is now suggesting is that we no longer need ontology since 
science-which tells us what there is on Quine's view-operates quite well with any 
number of ontologies. Ontology, on this view, no longer serves any theoretically useful 
role, and is thus irrelevant. This is a considerably stronger view than the thesis of 
ontological relativity, which says only that multiple ontologies are compatible with 
science. What are we to make of this deflationary view of ontology, especially coming 
from a philosopher who has been largely responsible for so much discussion on the topic 
for the last sixty years? 
This deflationary strategy is motivated chiefly by Quine's naturalism. Ontology 
becomes neutral only with respect to theories of science, since on the naturalistic view, 
there is no first philosophy, i.e., science comes first, and then-if at all-comes 
ontology. Letting ontology go "neutral" in this way may not be a problem, provided 
Quine can give some grounds as to what counts as science, some cri1eria whereby some 
belief counts as scientific. Afterall, at one point he claims that ~in point of 
epistemological footing the physical objects and the [Homerian] goos differ only in 
degree and not in kind. "29 Such loosening of the criteria for what co1111ts as science may 
cost more than Quine can pay: 
It would take some extraordinary evidence 10 enliven 1hem [telepathy and 
281bid.' 31. 
29Quine, "Two Dogmas," 44. 
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clairvoyance], but, if that were to happen, then empiricism itself-the crowning 
norm, we say, of naturalized epistemology-would go by the board. For 
remember that that norm, and naturalized epistemology itself, are integral to 
science, and science is fallible and corrigible.30 
If empiricism were to be abandoned, and with it naturalized epistemology, then Quine's 
own reason for deflating ontology would be undercut. That reason is that science, rather 
than a first philosophy, tells us what there is, and hence, ontology, as a merely 
philosophical pursuit, has only the task of interpreting what ~ience tells us. This is part 
of Quine's program of a naturalized epistemology. But if naturaliz:ecl epistemology goes 
by the board, then we can reasonably ask Quine why we should think that science tells 
us what there is? Moreover, if telepathy and clairvoyance can be tolerated by science, 
is there anything at all that science will not tolerate'?; are there any cri1eria that determine 
what is to count as science? 
Quine's reply is that "a sentence's claim to scientific status rests on what it 
contributes to a theory whose checkpoints are in prediction. " 31 This s.eems to provide 
such a weak criterion as to admit almost anything. Given Quine's holism, we can, if we 
wish, so modify other portions of science as to accommodate virtually any new 
hypothesis. He even confirms this when he says that, in the case in which we do admit 
what is now deemed non-scientific, "it might be well to modify the game itself, and take 
on as further checkpoints the predicting of telepathic and <iiYine input as well as of 
sensory input. "32 Quine seems to have so weakened the notion of scie11ce as to make it 
30Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 21. 
311bid.' 20. 
32Ibid., 21. 
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vacuous. Science, on this view, is merely whatever it is that people who call themselves 
scientists do. The question of why we should believe any of them is now pointless, since 
virtually anything one might choose to believe could quite easily be made a scientific 
belief. At this point there is no theoretically useful question of what coun1s as science, 
since there seems to be almost nothing that couldn '1 be made to count as science. 
Quine will perhaps balk, replying tha1 "it is idle to bulwark definition against 
implausible contingencies. "33 Calling this an idle exercise seems to be just a refusal to 
consider the consequences Quine himself takes to be very real possibilities. rt is starting 
to look now as if Quine does indeed hold his naturalism dogmatically. If naturalism is 
held merely dogmatically, then issues of principle are not so much settled as ignored. 
Not only then is it merely possible to intelligibly raise such issues, 1hey seem now to 
require answers. But before moving to a positive discussion of these issues, let's take a 
look at a different objection to the Camapian strategy for doing ontology from from 
Ernest Sosa. 
Sosa distinguishes between three possible s1ances. we can take 1owards realism. 34 
First, there is the absolutist view whereby "snowballs, hills, trees, pJanets, etc., are all 
331bid. 
34 In the article under discussion Sosa aJlies Putnam with Carnap. I am not going 
to be concerned with the alliance and whether it is justifiecL For my purposes the 
discussion of Carnap as endorsing conceptual relativism is my chief concern. Sosa 
maintains however that "the deepest, most richly suggestive, and most effective way of 
construing Putnam's Internal Realism is as a version of Ca.map's Concep1ua1Relativism" 
[Ernest Sosa, "Putnam's Pragmatic Realism," The Journar of P'1iJo.wphy 65 (1993): 
625]. Sosa agrees with the position in chapter one that Putnam's chief arguments for 
internal realism fail for various reasons. 
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constituted by the in-itself satisfaction of certain conditions by certain chunks of matter, 
and the like, and all this goes on independently of any thought or conceptualization on 
the part of anyone. "35 This is what we have been calling metaphysical real:ism. Second, 
there is the eliminativist view whereby "our ordinary talk is so much convenient 
abbreviation. "36 The chief proponents of this sort of v:iew are the Churchlands. Third, 
there is conceptual relativism, hereafter called CR, according to which "'we recognize 
potential constituted objects only relative to our implicit conceptual scheme with its 
criteria of existence and of perdurance. "37 This is the view Sosa ascribes to Carnap. 
Although Sosa is unhappy with all three views, it :is his discussion, and consequent 
rejection, of CR with which we will be primarily concerned. As will be shown, we can 
ease Sosa's qualms about CR, making its accep1ance not as p1oblematfo as he believes. 
Sosa's problem with CR is that it wants some spelling out in sufficient detail so 
as to keep it from being merely "trivially true." 38 Consider a world composed of three 
individuals xl, x2 and x3. Counting the objects in such a world is Jiable to produce 
different results, depending on the criterion we adopt for what wiJJ count as an 
individual. A "mereologist," for instance, might take the view that sue.Ji a wodd contains 
at least seven entities, namely, xl, x2, x3, x 1 + x2, x 1 + x3. x2 + x3 and xl + x2 + 
x3, whereas an anti-mereologist will answer that there are only th1ee o~ects in such a 
35Ibid.' 624. 
36Ibid. 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid., 615. 
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world. On Carnap's view, the answer to such a question will, as we have seen, always 
depend on the linguistic framework within which one is operating. Sosa, however, "is 
puzzled by the linguistic wrapping in which it [CR] is offered. "3~ Specifically, he has five 
problems with CR: 
1. None of the answers to the question of how many objects are in the imagined 
world "mentions any language or any piece of language." 
2. None of the answers "say that we shall or shall not or should or should not use 
any language or bit of language. " 
3. It isn't clear "how our decision actually to use or not to use any or all the 
[answers] can settle the question of whether what these sentences .say is true or 
false." 
4. "If the point is that these sentences do not realJy S'Q) anything, then how can 
then be incompatible in the first place so that a conflict 01 problem can arise that 
requires resolution?" 
5. It isn't clear "how we gain by replacing questions about atoms (or the like) 
with questions about sentences and our relations to some specific ones of these 
sentences. "40 
Let's look at the objections in order. 1 and 2 can be set1led together. We need not 
require the answer to a philosophical question to mention any bit of language or make 
any normative claims about how to use language. The claims about language are 
methodological claims, whereas the answers to philosophical questions are not. What the 
proponent of CR claims is that, given some possible answer, the way to arrive at it is to 
pay attention to the fact that the claim itself require interpretat:io11 relative to some 
conceptual framework. Recall the example William James uses of t11e dispute between 
39lbid. 
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several men watching a squirrel going round on the trunk of a tJee while one man goes 
round the tree. 41 The issue the men are considering is whether the man goes round the 
squirrel. James's solution is that "it depends on what you practically mean by 'going 
round' the squirrel. "42 Once this issue is dedded, the possible answers are clear: a) the 
man goes round the squirrel, or b) the man does not go round the squirrel. Notice that 
the answers to the question make no mention oflanguage, or of how to use language. But 
then, we shouldn't expect that they would, since the question itseJf wants a factual 
answer. 
Another sort of reply to Sosa's qualms. is to point out, as does Moser, that 
philosophers are often deluded by "the myth of the definite article. ".n Recall that this is 
the view that philosophers who speak of the concept of truth, meaning, justification, etc., 
are under the assumption that there is only one such concept. Here again, there is no 
mention of language or use of language in theiI respective elai ms about the concept in 
question. It is a methodological point that makes clear the conflls.ion tllat is implicit in 
such claims. We shouldn't expect to see mention made of language 01 normative 
suggestions made about how to use language in any particular philosophical answer to 
an ontological question, or many other sorts of questions for that matter. Sosa's first two 
problems can thus be resolved. 
41William James, "What Pragmatism Means.," in Conumpore4ry Appmaches to 
Philosophy, ed. Paul Moser and Dwayne Mulder (New York: MacMLIJan Publishing 
Company, 1994), 34. 
42Ibid., 35. 
43Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity, 8. 
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Problem three asks about how the decision to adopt one or another answers to the 
question of how many objects there are in the imagined. world can be useful in settling 
the issue of the truth of the answer. Such decisions can indeed settle :issues of truth if the 
sentence is analytically true given the conceptual framework. This is precisely how such 
questions are settled. As has been argued, some ontological claims are analytically true, 
given the language in which they are stated. The decision to employ some language 
commits the speaker to the analytic truth of some ontological claims, even though one 
may not be explicitly aware of such commitments. So Sosa's worry about the decision 
to adopt one or another particular answer to our question about the hypothetical world 
can be resolved. 
This reply to Sosa's third question supplies the answer to his fourth question. 
Namely, the claims do say something, so long as they are undentood. as analytically true 
given the framework in question. Consequently, they can and do conflict, given that the 
frameworks they are true in virtue of endorse different ontologies. The only sense in 
which such claims are nonsensical is when we try to construe them as answers to external 
questions to be answered prior to the acceptance of some framework. 
In order to respond to Sosa's fifth problem with CR we need to see what it is that 
he thinks CR actually amounts to such that we don't gain anything by adopting it. After 
considering several such accounts, and rejecting each of them, he arrives at the view that 
CR is either trivially true, or it leaves us unable to "allow the e)i(istence of such sorts at 
present unrecognized by our conceptual scheme. "44 The ~hief probJem with his 
44Sosa, "Putnam's Pragmatic Realism," 625. 
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conclusion is that it proceeds on unfounded rejections of each of the accounts he 
considers. Let's look at how he proceeds to his conclusion. 
The first account, call it CRJ, says that, 
In order to say anything you must adopt a language. So yoll mllst "adopt a 
meaning" even for so basic a term as 'object' . And you might have adopted 
another. Thus you might adopt Carnap-language (CL) or you might adopt Polish-
logician-language (PL). What you say, i.e., the utterances you make, the 
sentences you affirm, are not true or false absolutely, bllt are true or false only 
relative to a given language. Thus, if you say "There are tltree objects in this 
box" your utterance or sentence may be true understood as a statement of CL 
while it is false understood as a statement in PL. •5 
On this view, no claim is true independent of its meaning or the language in which it has 
its meaning, for we all must employ some language and might ltave just as easily 
employed another. So any particular claim could be true jn one language and false in 
another. Sosa concludes that this view is merely trivially true. 
There is, however, a problem with this construal. This view does not take into 
consideration the kinds of languages that have been conside1ed aboYe. e.g., material, 
ideal, mathematical, etc. These sorts of languages differ just in virtue of the kinds of 
entities over which they quantify. With these kinds of languages there may be sentences 
in one that are not so much false in another language as ]>Ointless. 011e commits a kind 
of category mistake if one asks of someone employing, sa.y, the p ltysical object language, 
whether there are prime numbers over 1000. If we say that it is jllst fa! se tltat there are 
primes over 1000 in the physical object language, this implies that there is some state of 
affairs designated by this language in virtue of which this claim is false. The problem 
45Ibid., 615. 
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here is that there is no such state of affairs. It is not merely false that there are no primes 
over 1000, rather, there are no such things as numbers in thi:s language. 
Given this correction, if all CRJ says is that a claim is only true relative to the 
language in which it is meaningful, then CR generally i:s trivially true. Let's consider 
Sosa's next construal of CR, call this CR2: 
When we say 'There are 3 objects here, not 8' we are really saying: 'The 
following is assertible as true in our CL: "There are 3 objects here, not 8". ' 46 
Sosa attributes this view to Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, in which he defends 
the following theses: 
i. Philosophy, when cognitive at all, amounts to the logical syn tax of scientific 
language. 
ii. But there can be alternative such languages and we are to choose between them 
on grounds of convenience. 
iii. A language is completely characterized by its formation and transformation 
rules. 47 
If we restrict ourselves just to discussion of this work, then these three theses are true, 
with some qualification. But it seems odd that Sosa appeals onl' to this early view of 
Carnap's in which he excluded the possibility of semantics from plli.losophy. Taking his 
later work in semantics into consideration, all three of the:ie these:; are fa.l se. It is not the 
case that philosophy is nothing but syntax, for one need only look to Meaning and 
Necessity to see this. This being the case, the languages from among which we are free 
to choose are not limited to syntactic constructions of :scientific languages, but can be 
46lbid., 616 
47Ibid. 
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widened to include semantic constructions as well. 
It is of course true that Carnap endorses a "principle of tolerance" in his Logical 
Syntax, according to which "it is possible to choose a certain form for the language of 
science as a whole, as well as for that of any branch of science, and to state exactly the 
characteristic differences between it and the other possible language-forms. "'n This would 
appear to be an endorsement of our freedom to choose among the various sorts of 
languages that we have been discussing above. e.g., material, mathematical, etc. This 
would, however, be wrong. This version of the principle of tolerance applies exclusively 
to "the task of the construction of a general syntax" of which there are various possible 
such systems. 49 Carnap gives a clearer statement of the principle as the view that 
"Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic. i.e .• !!is own form of language, as he 
wishes. "50 It is quite clear here that the sort of tolerance Ile has in view is for different 
formal-logical systems only. Furthermore, in the Syntax he takes the view that failure to 
pay sufficient attention to syntax by stating one's positions in the ·~materiaJ mode" leads 
only to confusion.51 This is clearly in conflict with his later views 011 011tology discussed 
above. There is no problem here with material modes of speaking, so Jong as one is clear 
on the relevant semantic issues. 
Thesis iii is also no longer true in Jig lit of Carnap's views about semantics. As 
48Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, xv. 
49Jb'd 1 ., xv. 
5
°.Ibid., 52, my emphasis. 
51Jbid., 298-301. 
147 
well as formation and transformation rules there are also semantic rules. sz These three 
theses can perhaps be used to explain CR2, but they are surely inadequate as an account 
of CR generally. For purposes of discussion, let's see what can be made of this view. 
Sosa interprets CR2 in terms of Quine's doctrine of "semantic ascent." That is, 
claims about what there is are construed as claims about what we can truly assert in some 
language. Quine characterizes the view as follows: 
The strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discui;si_on into a domain 
where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz., words) and on the main 
terms concerning them. Words, or their inscriptioni;, 11nlikepoints, miles, classes, 
and the rest, are tangible objects of the si_ze so popuJar in the marketplace, where 
men of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best. 53 
The strategy Quine endorses is just that of resolving disputes by taJking about concepts 
rather than what the concepts denote, for example, 'horses' rather than horses. Such a 
strategy is clearly of some benefit, as it can seIYe to help us locate more readily the 
nature of our dispute. Sosa, however, does not think we gain anything from using 
semantic ascent, since it, 
is limited to discourse about recondite entities of controYersial i;tatus. No relevant 
gain is to be expected from semantic ascent when the subject matter is the 
inventory of the marketplace itself. Tables and chairs rue no more controversial 
than words: in fact, they seem less so, by a good mMgin. No inte1nal realism, 
with its conceptual or linguistic relativity, can be plausibJy supported by the 
semantic ascent strategy offered by Quine. 54 
It is not clear as to what Sosa understands by the claim that tabJes and chairs are 
52Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 18-20. 
53W. V. Quine, "Carnap and Logical Truth , " chap . in Wcrys of Par~ ox, revised 
and enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UniYersit)' Press, 1976), 272. 
54Sosa, "Putnam's Pragmatic Realism," 617. 
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uncontroversial. On one view, this is the claim that the criteria for determining what 
counts as a chair are uncontroversial. But surely this is not so; one need only look at 
instances of furniture from other cultures present and past to see that what different 
people count as a chair can vary drastically. On another interpretation, this is a claim 
about the existence of chairs. This is a very controversial clrum, since it is precisely what 
divides realists and non-realists. It is precisely the existence of such mundane objects as 
chairs and tables that the realist is concerned about, and not merely the "recondite 
entities of controversial status" such as quarks, leptons. black-holes and neutron stars. 
These latter entities are of concern to a scientific realist perhaps., but one is not 
committed to scientific realism just in case one is committed to metaphysical realism. 
Using semantic ascent as a way of interpreting CR is not entirely useless. Recall 
that it was employed in the account of analyticity offered in chapter two. On Sosa's 
view, however, semantic ascent leads to a vicious regress of the following s.ort: 
When we way something of the form 'The following is assertible in our CL: ... ' 
can we rest with a literal interpretation that does not requfre ascent and 
relativization? If not, where does ascent stop? Are we then rea1ly saying 'The 
following is assertible in our CL: "The following is assertible in our CL: ... ". '55 
The strategy of semantic ascent need not lead to this sort of regress. By employing the 
account of analyticity developed earlier, and specifically the distinction drawn between 
levels and orders of language use, we can success.fully avoid this sort of regress. 
Specifically, we avoid the regress by allowing that some second-order ~entences are 
analytically true for the language in question, where analyticity can be tested for 
55Ibid. 
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behaviorally. With this behavioral test we do not require the ascent to yet another level 
of abstraction in order to clarify what we did in the lower level. Furthermore, there is 
no threat of a necessary regress just on grounds that the regress stops whenever we reach 
understanding. Since understanding may vary for individuals, the number of abstractions 
may vary, but there seems no reason to think it must always proceed indefinitely. 
So although semantic ascent may not be all that useful in e,;plaining CR, it can 
be used without falling into this sort of regress and without being "always trivially 
available, not just in philosophy but in science generally and even beyond. "56 Such a 
view of semantic ascent that is not trivially avfillable may not, however, be the view that 
Quine had in mind. Whether this is so is irrelevant for present purposes. We could drop 
the idea altogether insofar as it can be used for clarifying CR. Let's tum then to Sosa's 
third and final construal of CR, call it CRJ. 
On this view, we are best advised to remain agnostic about whether our scientific 
claims are metaphysically true, since we have no assurance for thinking that present 
science will not change. We should then settle only for what can and cannot be asserted 
given our present unfinished conceptual frameworks, keeping in mind that what is 
assertible in one framework may not be assertib1e in ano1her. All in all, "we have to 
learn to live with our relativism. "57 The positive argumen1 :for this view amounts to an 
argument against realism. This argument is: 
1. Realism (in general) is acceptable only :if scientific realism is ac<;eptable. 
561bid.' 616. 
57Ibid., 617. 
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2. Scientific realism is unacceptable. 
3. Therefore, realism is unacceptable.58 
Sosa, and rightly so it seems, is unconvinced by premise 1, although not for tile same 
reasons as given in chapter one where we found that these two Lcinds of reaJ.ism are 
distinct and need not presuppose each other. Since this argument fails, Sosa concludes 
that CR3 fails as well, and "there is hence reason to doubt the linguistic turn taken by 
Carnap. "59 This leaves us with CRJ, which is trivially true, '"and not something anyone 
would deny, not even the most hard-line metaphysical realist. "60 
One might agree with Sosa in his rejection of this argument against realism, but 
disagree that this implies the rejection of CR generally. Surprisingly enough, Sosa 
himself suggests an alternative strategy in a footnote: "'to mention only one attractive 
possibility, one might, with Bas van Fraassen, combine both agnosticism toward 
theoretical science and common-sense realism toward observable reality." &i He does not, 
however, pursue this strategy. Instead, taking the view that there are onl 'I tllree possible 
choices: eliminativism, absolutism and conceptual relativism, Sosa finds that he "cannot 
decide which of these is least disastrous. "62 What troubles Sosa, it seems~ is that he 
cannot accept the agnosticism about both metaphysical reality and the as yet unrecognized 
58Jbid., 618. 
59Jbid., 619. 
60Jbid. 
61Ibid., 618, note 12. 
62Ibid., 625. 
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posits of some future science. As it was argued in chapter one, agnosticism about 
metaphysics is the only position available that does beg any questions posed by the 
skeptic. Whether one can "live with it" seems to be a psychological question. As for the 
as yet unrecognized posits of a future science, there seems no reason wlly they could not 
be so recognized at some future date. Given our present conceptual scheme, something 
counts as real relative to that conceptual scheme. Even Sosa is aware of this when he 
says that "existence relative to a conceptual scheme is not equivalent to existence in 
virtue of that conceptual scheme. "63 The problem with as yet unrecognized entities is 
"not that there could be any such entities relative to 011r prerenJ conceptual 
scheme ... [since] by hypothesis it does not recognize them. " 64 The problem is that there 
seems to be the possibility of kinds of objects that exist now that are noi reJative to our 
present conceptual scheme, and this raises two questions: "what is it for there to be such 
objects? Is it just the in-itself satisfaction of constitutive forms by consti t11tiYe matters? "65 
Clearly such in-itself satisfaction will not do, since this is just metaphysical 
realism all over again. What then do we do? The problem here is that we can perfectly 
well allow for the possibility of such a class of objects, understood as the claim that there 
is always the possibility of some as yet unrecognized conceptual framework. :Recall that 
Carnap employs a principle of tolerance whereby it is tlle job of philosophers to both 
allow for the possibility of yet more and different linguistic frameworks, and to actually 
63Ibid.' 621. 
641bid., 623. 
65Jbid. 
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construct such frameworks. This amounts to the recognition that there may well be more 
kinds of entities in the world than we presently are even able to recognize. Something 
like this is what happens, for example, in the field of taxonomy when biologists create 
a new category for some kind of entity, be it a species or even a kingdom. At one time 
there were only two kingdoms: plants and animals. There are now five kingdoms. 
Moreover, new species are being discovered on a regular basis. AJI of this sort of thing 
is well within the bounds of a non-realist view, and does not reqnire anything 
metaphysical. 
Perhaps one reason why Sosa cannot liYe with the agnosticism of CR is that he 
cannot face going without some sort of metaphysical position, even if it is linguistic 
(whatever this might mean). He says that we have found no way of conceiving of 
Carnap's linguistic tum such that "it discloses an attractiye new direction in 
metaphysics. "66 But a new direction in metaplly sics is not the point; the direction in 
which Carnap is pointing is away from metaphysics. The agnosticism arriYed at has the 
result that one must just learn to do without metaphysical lmowJedge, unless one is 
willing to beg some important questions against the skeptic in order to justify such 
knowledge. 
One way of making agnosticism a bit more palatabJe is b~ taking Sosa's own 
suggestion to look at a van Fraassen-style alternative. Gary Merri]] has suggested just 
such an alternative that combines ideas of van Fraassen 's with those of Carnap. We can 
use some of his ideas to clarify the kind of conceptual relativism being urged, and 
66Ibid., 619. 
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perhaps assuage some of Sosa's doubts about agnosticism. 
Semantic and Epistemic Realism 
Merrill distinguishes between three kinds of realism as a way of sorting out the 
debate between realists and anti-realists. They are, metaphysical realism, or MR, 
semantic realism, or SR, and epistemic realism, or ER. Metaphysical realism is just the 
view that we have been calling 'realism'. This is the thesis that some things exist 
conceiver-independently. Metaphysical realism is the view that we rejected in chapter 
one. Semantic realism "is a view concerning how the theories of science are to be 
interpreted, or what we are to understand them as .saying." 61 This view contrasts with an 
instrumentalist view which holds that our theoretical claims are to understood only as 
explanatorily useful. On an instrumentalist view, theoretical terms are not to be 
understood as denoting terms, but serve merely as conceptual devjces. We can define SR 
then as follows: 
Semantic Realism: The theoretical terms of a theory are to be interpreted as 
denoting terms. 
Epistemic realism, or ER for short, "is a position concerning what the accepiance of a 
theory means, or what having evidence for a theory impJies about the relation of that 
theory to the world. "68 This view contrasts with the po~ition that "'acctprance of a theory 
does not require us to believe that the theory is tme, or that jt is an accurate description 
67Gary Merrill, "Three Forms of Realism," American PfiiJo.ropnfcaJ Quarterly 
17 (1980): 229. 
68Ibid. 
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of reality. "69 We can define ER then as follows: 
Epistemic Realism: Acceptance of a theory is to be understood as believing that 
the theory is true. 
The anti-realist need only oppose MR. He can freely embrace both SR and ER without 
having to beg any questions against the skeptic. As we will see, Carnap embraces both 
SR and ER, while van Fraassen embraces only the former. 
There is a sense in which it is not useful to use the terms 'semantic realism' and 
'epistemic realism' since what is really at issue for the rea!jst is metaphysical realism. 
We understood realism in chapter one as a metaphysical doctrine djstinct from epistemic 
issues on the one hand, as well as semantic construals of realism of the Dllmmettian sort. 
Recall, however, that Dummett takes himself to be talking abollt the metaphyskal notion 
of realism; he simply thinks that it needs a semantic construal. As for epistemic issues, 
Devitt's concern is to settle them after we settle the metaphysical issues. As we will see, 
semantic realism is not just Dummett all over again. and epistemic realism is not 
metaphysical knowledge. Let's look first at SR and see how it applies to conceptual 
relativism. 
Part of what it means to accept some language framework is that we use the 
theoretical terms of the language as denoting terms. Acceptance of the thing language, 
for example, means that we interpret the terms of the language, e.g., 'chair', ~book' and 
'bicycle', as denoting objects. This view is called seman be reaJi~m so as to distinguish 
it from instrumentalism. It treats the entities denoted by the language as jf they are real, 
69lbid. 
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insofar as the meaning of the term 'real' is relative to the framework under 
consideration. SR does not commit us to the metaphysical existence, i.e., ~real' in some 
framework independent sense, of the kinds of entities specified by the framework. It 
couldn't commit us to this sort of existence because it is merely a claim about how we 
are to understand the meanings of certain of our terms. SR is only a Yiew about how 
certain terms mean; it implies nothing about the existence of any entities, or about any 
of our epistemic attitudes toward any of the sentences of some framework. 
Epistemic realism, on the other hand, says something about our e]Jistemic attitude 
toward the claims made within some framework. Specifically, it says that to accept some 
claim, e.g., the claim made in the thing language that there are chairs, is to be in the 
epistemic attitude of believing that the term 'chair' denotes some object which exists in 
the sense of existing for the thing language. On this view, our epistemic attitude toward 
claims in some framework we accept is one of belief. Another way to pllt it is to say that 
we think claims made in some framework we accept are true. The alternative to ER is 
the view that acceptance does not require belief. Van Fraa:ssen, for example, takes the 
view that "the language of science should be literally construed, but its theories need not 
be true to be good. "70 On this view, the chief ta:sk of any theocy is merely th at of "saving 
the phenomena." This is considerably weaker than the requirement tlla.t the theory be 
true. 
One need not necessarily embrace ER just in case one accepts SR. A notable 
7
°Bas C. Van Fraassen, "To Save The Phenomena,"' Tn~ Jounuii l?f P'1iJosophy 73 
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example of a view which accepts SR and not ER is van Fraassen' s "Constructive 
Empiricism." Let's look as his view as a contrasting position in order to clarify the view 
defended here, namely, that we should embrace both SR and ER. 
On van Fraassen' s view, 
Not every philosophical position concerning science which insists on a 
literal construal of the language of science is a realist position. For this insistence 
relates not at all to our epistemic attitudes toward theories, nor to the aim we 
pursue in constructing theories, but only to the correct understanding of what a 
theory says .... After deciding that the language of science must be literally 
understood, we can still say that there is no need to believe good theories to be 
true, not to believe ipso facto that the entities they postulate are real. Science 
aims to give us theories which are empirically adeqitate,· and acceptance of a 
theory involves as belief only that it i.s empiricarly adequate. This is the statement 
of the anti-realist position I advocate; I shall call it constructive empiricism.71 
We see here that van Fraassen is quite willing to accept SR. This is evident from his 
claim that we must understand the language of science literally. He does not, however, 
think that we require ER. On his view, the correct epistemic attitude to have regarding 
theoretical claims is to resist believing that they are true and that what they posit exists, 
since "acceptance is not belief. "72 Here then is an e,;ample of a view in which we can 
be committed to semantic realism and uncommitted to epistemic reali~m. 73 
71Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific image (New York: O,;ford University Press, 
1980), 11-12. 
72Bas van Fraassen, "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science~" in Images of 
Science, ed. Paul M. Churchland and Clifford A. Hooker (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), 247. 
73 Compare this view with that of Nancy Cartwright who does cibelieve in theoretical 
entities. But not in theoretical laws," How The Laws of Phy.sics Lie (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 99. On her view we should make an exception for "the very 
special case of causal explanation" in which "'truth is essential to expla11atocy success," 
with the proviso that this applies only to .. the truth of Low-level causal principles and 
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Why does van Fraassen reject epistemic realism? Because on his view, 
"empiricism is correct, but could not live in the linguistic form the positivists gave it. "74 
Such linguistic forms include the doctrines of verificationism and reductionism, i.e., the 
dogmas, as Quine would say, of empiricism. Van Fraassen 's project consists of 
jettisoning the linguistic form of empiricism and, in particular "de-semantLcizing" some 
problematic portions, e.g., the concepts of truth and existence, and reconstruing 
empiricism as adequacy of explanation, i.e., truth, to the phenomenal world of 
perception, i.e., existence. Merrill suggests that "'van Fraassen takes the epistemic 
realist's use of 'exists' to be identical to that of the metaphysical realist, and hence for 
him the former position goes the way of the latter.'0 '.'i Notice that in van Fraassen's 
statement of his own position there is no mention at all of either truth or existence; 
constructive empiricism requires only empirical adequacy. On this view, 
we can distinguish between two epistemic attitudes we can talce up toward a 
theory. We can assert it to be true ... and call for belief; or we can simply assert 
its empirical adequacy, calling for acceptance as such. rn either case we stick our 
necks out: empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can Im.ow at any given 
time .... Nevertheless there is a difference: the assertion of truth, and the restraint 
to acceptance delivers us from metaphysics.70 
On van Fraassen's view, if a theory is said to be true, then by definition one who 
believes such a theory endorses realism. This implies that the.re is something that the 
concrete phenomenological laws" (Ibid, 10). It is only at the Le\'el of unobservables that 
the laws of physics "lie." 
74van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 3. 
75Merrill, "Three Forms of Realism," 232. 
76van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 68-9. 
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theory is about, and that the theory has stated precisely what this is. On his view, realism 
is the doctrine that "Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what 
the world is like,· and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. "77 
Notice that there are two components to epistemic realism on van Fraassen's view: the 
existence component, i.e., belief in the existence of the posits of some theory, and the 
truth component, i.e., the belief that the theory is true. Carnap, on the other hand, holds 
that both components can be maintained, without threat from the 1ealist, although, thus 
far, we have looked only at the existence component. 
Epistemic realism does not commit us to any metaphysical beliefs. Recall that for 
Devitt, "Realism does not strictly entail any doctrine of truth at all," and furthermore, 
having an explanatory notion of truth does not entail Realism.7~ We could say here that 
the problem with van Fraassen's view is that, contra Devitt, it does make realism 
semantic by construing it as a view about whether some theory is true. This is one of 
Devitt's criticisms: "it is a mistake to think that the view that truth is. the aim of science 
is distinctive to Realism. "79 This point aside, however, the problem that van Fraassen has 
with epistemic realism can be avoided. 
Recall that for Carnap, notions of existence can vary, relative to the framework 
in which we are operating. Given this conceptual relativity of e~istenc.e. we don't need 
to resist belief in the existence of the entities posited by the theory, since the belief is not 
77Ibid., 8. 
78Devitt, Realism & Truth, 41. 
79Ibid., 137. 
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a belief in some sort of pre-framework, i.e., metaphysical, existence. Recall that for the 
realist, the important question is whether some kind of entities really exist, where this 
notion of real is to be understood not just as the employment of some framework, but 
as some sort of framework-neutral notion of existence. On this view, ER is, as Merrill 
says, "a rather trivial position amounting to the claim that to have good reason to hold 
(or use) a theory is to have good reason to assert the laws and statements (including 
existence-claims) of the theory, and this is not to make any statements about the relation 
that the theory bears to reality or the world." sa If we have good reason for thinking that 
concepts of existence vary, as the view about the nature of linguistic frameworks already 
developed says they do, then this component is unproblematic. Let's look now at how 
we can deal with the truth component. 
The relevant problem with the truth component is not the problem of the relation 
between some statement that we take to be true and the external world that it is allegedly 
true of. This is a metaphysical problem, and one that we cannot possibly hope to solve. 81 
Rather, the problem is that of "defining precisely what is meant by nomic form, that is, 
the form of a possible basic law" where the notion of truth is tllen specified in terms of 
what it is for a basic law to be true. 82 
8
°Merrill, "Three Forms of Realism," 232. 
81Recall that for Carnap, we cannot solve these sorts of problems because they are 
ill-conceived and unintelligible. On my view, we grant their intelligibility, but are lead 
into an agnostic position regarding our ability to answer them effectively, i.e., without 
begging any questions against the skeptic. 
82Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, 00.. Martin Gardner (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), 212. 
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When scientists speak of basic laws of nature, "they mean something that holds 
in nature regardless of whether any human being is aware of it." 83 Thjs is quite different 
than, for example, Reichenbach's or the pragmatist's idea that a basic law is something 
that is only well-established or confirmed on numerous occasions. The issue is one of 
determining what we mean when we speak of something being a Jaw; "the problem is 
only concerned with the meaning that is intended when the concept is used in the 
discourse of scientists. "84 The reason some empiricists like Reichenbach and Neurath and 
the pragmatists shy away from talk of truth 
is explained by a failure to distinguish clearly between two different concepts: (1) 
the degree to which a law is established at a certain 6me and (2) the semantic 
concept of the truth of a law. Once this distinction is made and it is realized that, 
in semantics,a precise definition of truth can be provided, there is no longer any 
reason for hesitating to use the word 'truth' in defining a 'basic law of nature.' 85 
Carnap then goes on to define a basic law as "a statement that has nomic form and is 
also true. "86 
This definition need not imply anything about the nature of any correspondence 
between some statement and the conceiver-independent world that it is true of. Such talk 
would be, on Carnap's own view, nonsensical insofar as it is meant to "be understood in 
some framework-independent sense. The view is rather that "we may mea11fngfully speak 
of a law's being true (or false) without being committed either to the vjew that the 
83Ibid., 213. 
84Ibid. 
85Ibid., 214. 
86Ibid., 212. 
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theoretical terms of science denote actually existing entities or the view that evidence in 
support of a theory is evidence in support of the assertion that the entities it postulates 
really exist. "87 Epistemic realism, with respect to the truth component then, just comes 
down to the view that we can have good reasons for believing our theories, where these 
reasons do not require us to affirm some relation between the theory and the conceiver-
independent world. It is not as though we are required to explain why our theories work, 
where this leads to some metaphysical view. Devitt, for example, thin.ks that realism 
gives us the best explanation of our common-sense and even scientiJic beliefs. ER, on the 
other hand, is the view that no such explanation is available, (jf we wish not to beg 
questions against the skeptic), and that, furthermore, no such explanation is needed. 
This still leaves us with the problem of defining nomic fmm. Carnap himself 
gives only a sketch of a definition. Suppose, he says, someone presents us with a 
statement they take to be a candidate for 1awhood. We don't yet know whether it is 
indeed true or false due to insufficient confirmation. We can 1e11, however, just by 
inspecting the form of the statement that it is universal since it says that for some 
particular event occurring at any time or place, some other particular event will follow. 
We can thereby say, just in virtue of its form, "whether the s1a1ement would be called 
a genuine law if it were true. "88 So, instead of classifying statements into nomological 
and non-nomological statements, we classify them instead into statements having nomic 
form and statements that do not have nomic form. In this way, the tru1h of the statements 
87Merrill, "Three Forms of Realism," 232. 
88Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, 2J 0. 
162 
is irrelevant, and we can usefully separate the problem of defining nomic form from the 
problem of defining truth. 
Short of adopting some metaphysical beliefs, SR and ER are a:i good as it gets in 
the way of belief about our best theories. If this is correct, we can avoid the problems 
for conceptual relativism posed by Sosa, and we can usefully say that we believe our best 
theories without being committed to any metaphysical assertions. This position, of 
course, endorses a qualified agnosticism about metaphy:iics, but that is, as argued in 
chapter one, as it should be. Whether one can live with agnost:idsm is a psychological 
issue that is entirely person-relative. 
Having developed a general strategy for doing ontology , and for what it means 
to endorse ontological claims, let's turn next to a consideration of several possible 
ontologies. The result of considering these possible ontologies will be a defence of a 
physicalist ontology. 
CHAPTER IV 
PHYSICALIST ONTOLOGY 
Introduction 
Now that we have a methodology for doing ontology, we can begin doing 
ontology proper. As we saw in the previous chapter, the philosophical issue we are 
concerned with is not that of regional ontology, where this is understood as asking 
whether some particular object of a certain kind exists, e.g., whether tbe1e aJe black 
swans, or whether there are unicorns. These aJe what Carnap calls ._internal questions." 
Rather, our concern is with global issues of what kind of things there are in the most 
general sense, e.g., whether there are material things, or whether there are mental 
things. These are what Carnap calls "extemal questions."' Let's call this the issue of 
"basic kinds." 
On the method being presented here we require the construction of a linguistic 
framework. Given the principle of tolerance discussed in the previous chapter, there will 
always be the possibility of more than one such framework. So, for example, we can 
distinguish between the frameworks of dualism and physicalism, but we also must allow 
for the possibility of some new, as yet unknown, framework. Since the aim of this 
chapter is to defend a physicalist ontology, the task will be to construct and defend a 
linguistic framework for that ontology. 
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A problem immediately facing physicalism is the existence of abstract entities, for 
such entities are not usually thought to be physical. One might perhaps try to defend such 
a view, but it would require a highly unusual notion of what it is to be physical such that 
both chairs and numbers could be said to be physical entities. Among the more usual 
ways of dealing with abstract entities are nominalism, which simply rej«ts outright the 
existence of abstract entities, Platonism, (or realism), which says that they actually exist, 
and instrumentalism, which says that talk of such things has no truth value, but is merely 
explanatorily useful. All of these views are problematic. Hence, the vjew presented here 
aims to avoid the problems facing the traditional views whiJe allowing for the 
existence-understood in a very specific way-of abstract entities without creating 
problems for physicalism. 
Another problem for physicalism is the existence of mind. There are actually two 
intertwined problems here, one ontological and the other explanatory. The ontological 
problem has to do with the issue of what minds are, i.e., whether they are physical or 
some other kind of entity. The physicalism endorsed in thjs chapter is an ontological 
view. The explanatory problem is concerned with whether ph ysicaJism can adequately 
account for or explain mental phenomena. If, as some have argued, the explanation of 
mind is ontologically neutral, e.g., as functionalist accounts maintain, 01 if physicalism 
is non-reductive about mind, e.g., the view that the mental supervenes on the physical, 
then the second problem is not of immediate concem for the ph~~dcalist. (Jn this view 
we can be physicalist ontologically without physicaljsm being threatened just by an 
inability to account for mental phenomena. In any case, the taslc: of thjs chapter is the 
165 
more modest defense of physicalism just on the ontological issue. Whatever explanation 
of mind and mental phenomena we might embrace, if we endorse physicalism, that 
explanation must be at least neutral with respect to this ontological position. 
Basic Kinds 
What is ontology the study of? It is not the study of what exists if by this the aim 
is to give a list of everything that exists. Such lists can go on ad infinitum depending on 
what criteria we adopt for identifying individuals. Conside1, for example, the set of 
entities designated by the terms a, b and c. We could list the ontology of this set as 
consisting of three individuals, each one denoted by a single term. We could also list it 
as consisting of the set of entities denoted by a, b, c, a +h, a+c, b +c and a+b+c. 
Creating these sorts of lists of individuals has not, traditionally at least, been conceived 
of as a philosophical pursuit. These sorts of lists aie what we called in the previous 
chapter "regional ontologies." A regional ontology is a list of what there is for some 
specific subject. For instance, a regional ontology for particle physics might include such 
things as electrons, quarks, gluons, bosons, etc., while a regional 011tology fm chemistry 
is given in the periodic table of the elements. While 1egional ontology is not a 
philosophical pursuit, it does help illustrate the interesting philosophical problem of what 
we take as the criterion of individuality. We wm not, however, be con<:-erned with that 
particular problem. We can safely assume that physicalism will be con~dstent with more 
than one principle of individuation of entities. 
The primary concern here is with what kinas of things the1e are,, where 'kinds' 
is understood in the broadest possible sense of the term. We want to inquire as to 
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whether, for example, there are physical kinds of things, mental lcinds of things, 
numerical kinds of things, or some combination of kinds. Traditionally philosophers have 
distinguished, at the broadest level, between concrete and abstract kinds of things. 
Physical bodies and minds are instances of the former; numbers and centers of gravity 
are instances of the latter. We will be concerned primarily with the former, although a 
view about abstract entities is offered since it seems, at least initially, that physicalism 
of any kind cannot account for abstract objects. The problem here is that abstract objects 
do not seem to be physical, and yet, we cannot help but allow at least some abstract 
objects into our ontology, e.g., numbers. If this is correct, then physicalism cannot be 
true. 
In dealing just with concrete particulars we can distinguish between various 
possible kinds of things. Traditionally, these kinds include materialism, dualism, neutral 
monism and idealism. What exactly the relationship is between tile basic kind, or kinds 
in the case of dualism, and non-basic kinds, e.g., molecules and persons, goes beyond 
the task of this dissertation. Various possible solutions have been pro]>Osed, e.g., 
reductionism and supervenience, and the question of which of thes.e is p1eferable will 
be left for another time. It may be the case that there is rn01e than 011e way in which 
non-basic kinds are related to basic-kinds, depending on what particular no11-basic kind 
is being considered. It may, for example, turn out that reductionism will w01k: for things 
like molecules and trees, but supervenience may be needed f01 thoughts and beliefs. 
Regardless of how this relation is specified, this isn't any issue 011e t:hat only the 
physicalist must face, for the dualist also requires some explanatio11 of tllese same 
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phenomena. But let's tum now to a discussion of the problem of abstract entities. 
Abstract Entities 
There are various ways of dealing with abstracta. One approach might be to treat 
them as not really anything different in kind than physical objects. Some such view 
seems to be what Paul Churchland has in mind when he says, "the reality of equators, 
centers of gravity, and rotational axes I am happy to grant. They are all places or loci 
of some sort that are decisively specifiable by reference to the shape or behavior of the 
relevant concrete object. "1 On this view, the way to deal with abstracta is to concretize 
them, or tum them into concrete particulars. But in so doing they are no longer abstracta. 
Churchland does not embrace abstract entities as abstract, but only insofar as they can 
be redescribed as concreta. One might do this for such things as centers of gravity, but 
this seems not to help at all for things such as numbers, sets and other mathematical or 
geometrical entities. One wonders, moreover, if physical objects, on his view are only 
concrete as described. Afterall, if abstract entities are abstract only as described, then it 
seems rather ad hoc to treat concrete entities differently. The question then arises as to 
why we should describe abstract entities concretely rather than concrete entities 
abstractly. 
Another approach is to treat abstract entities as fictions. On this view, abstract 
entities are quite useful for theoretical purposes, however, they are not real-they are 
fictions. This is the view that Dennett, for example, endorses: abstracta "are not idle 
1Paul Churchland, ANeurocomputational Perspective (Cambridge, MA..: TheM.I.T. 
Press, 1989), 126. 
168 
fantasies but hardworking theorist's fictions. "2 On this approach the existence of abstracta 
is simply denied outright. Insofar as we can usefully say that there are abstracta we 
should understand this to mean nothing more than that there are, for example, certain 
characters in a book of fiction, albeit characters that do some theoretical work. A 
problem with this approach is that it does not explain what it is to be a fiction. When, 
for example, Charles Dickens made up certain fictional characters, we could just as well 
say that nothing at all was made up in any interesting sense. Rather, a certain bunch of 
meaningful sentences were written which expressed certain ideas Dickens had at the time. 
This may do for characters in a book, but it will hardly do for things such as centers of 
gravity and numbers. These are not just fictions in the way that some character in a story 
is a fiction. Moreover, saying that they are hard-working theorist' ~fictions does not help. 
This serves only to shift the emphasis onto the theorizer 1ather than the objects 
themselves. This view seems to say that abstracta are just a function of what the theorist 
needs in order to make his theory work. But the theorist will now be free to create 
abstracta almost at will, even if only to make his favorite theory work. But surely centers 
of gravity, for instance, are not merely made-up items that serve some theoretical need. 
Although the term 'center of gravity' is made up by theorists, nobody seriously disputes 
the existence of centers of gravity. 
The most widespread approach for dealing with abstract e:ntities is some version 
of nominalism. This is the view that there just are no abstract object~; there are only 
2Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brow11 Cllld. Company, 
1991), 96, 366. 
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words used abstractly which stand for nothing at all. Quine, for example, proposed such 
a view at one time, claiming straightforwardly that he and Goodman "do not believe in 
abstract entities. "3 He has since given up this view, for nominalism is a difficult position 
to hold, and perhaps it is true that, as van Fraassen put it "one can be a nominalist only 
in the way Saint Paul held one could only be a Christian, namely, in tile sense of trying 
to be one. "4 The proposal adopted here eschews attempts to dispense with abstract 
entities and simply embraces them, although with some qualification. 
There are a number of problems with abstract entities, but the one we are 
concerned with is the ontological problem: do abstract entities exist? Tile way to answer 
this question is by employing the strategy developed in the previous chapters. Roughly, 
the view is that we are free to speak about abstract entities and to use them in our 
theories without threatening physicalism, and without fear of talking nonsense, so long 
as we resist the view that belief in such things is a metaphysical belief. Talk of abstract 
entities such as numbers is quite meaningful, given the framework of numbers. Asking 
the external question about the real existence of numbers is construed as asking about 
whether or not to accept the framework of numbers. Let's look at tilis view in some 
detail. 
Consider the statement: 
(1) My cat is in my chair. 
3W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman, "Steps Toward A Constructive 
Nominalism," The Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1947): 105. 
4van Fraassen, "Empiricism in Philosophy of Science," 303. 
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Nobody objects to their being something designated by the terms 'cat' and 'chair,' even 
if it is only, as the phenomenalist will assert, cat-like and chair-like appearances. When 
uttering (1) we take ourselves to be referring only to concrete particulars. But consider 
the statement: 
(2) There are prime numbers. 
We can translate this as: 
(3) (3x) (Nx · Px) 
Suppose now that someone troubled by the existence of numbers asks us whether in 
virtue of uttering (2) we are now committed to the existence of numbers. How do we 
reply? 
Our reply is to show that we understand such questions as asking whether we 
should accept or reject the system of numbers of which (2) is a sentence. On this view, 
accepting the existence of numbers is nothing but the decision to use the number-
language framework. As Carnap puts is, "this acceptance is not jn need of a theoretical 
justification (except with respect to expediency and fruitfulness), because it does not 
imply a belief or assertion .... It is rather the practical dedsion to accept certain 
frameworks. "5 
The realist about numbers, however, does not mean to ask merely whether we 
choose to use the language of numbers. The pressing philosopbjcal question for the 
realist is whether or not there actually are numbers. Likewjse, the nominabst does not 
doubt the existence of the language of numbers, but rather, tbe e,;.isience of numbers 
5Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," 2J g. 
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themselves. The realist thinks it is true that numbers exist, whereas the nominalist denies 
this. Both aim to determine the truth value of such claims prior to acceptance of the use 
of the language in question, since, on these approaches, the truth, or falsLty, of whether 
there are numbers, is taken as support for their respective views. As Carnap puts it, both 
parties 
treat the question of existence as a theoretical question .... Their doubts refer 
rather to the system of entities itself; hence they mean the external question. They 
believe that only after making sure that there really is a system of entities of the 
kind in question are we justified in accepting the framework by incorporating the 
linguistic forms into our language. 6 
On this view the issue is one of whether we can be justified in ma.king such assertions, 
and so, justified in believing in the existence of such entities. This whole approach is, 
however, misguided. The issue is not one of justification, but of choice~ and these sorts 
of choices are not theoretical, but practical. We are thus not committed to the existence 
of abstract entities in any troublesome sort of way. What we are committed 10 is certain 
ways of speaking, and believing that certain claims are true, gill~n the lc:m.guage in which 
they are made. 
Questions of justification are relevant only insofar as we are miling internal 
assertions: "Whoever makes an internal assertion is certainly obJiged to justify it by 
providing evidence, empirical evidence in the case of electrons, logical proof in the case 
of the prime numbers. "7 Such justification is no1 at issue jn 'L ues1io:ns about the 
acceptance of the kinds of entities themselves. This is a matter merely of acceptance of 
6Ibid., 219. 
71bid.' 218. 
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the language in which assertions about such entities are made. On this view, we can 
preserve the meaningfulness of statements about abstract objects, and we can even be 
committed to the existence of such entities, when understood in the correct way. We 
need not deny them altogether or translate talk about them into talk about some other 
allegedly less troublesome kind of entity. We can preserve the eidstence of abstract 
entities as abstract, and make full use of them in our theories, so long as acceptance of 
them is understood in the correct way. 
As we will see later, this same approach will be used in defending physicalism 
about concrete particulars. The reasons why commitment to numbers and sets can be 
tolerated by the physicalist is that the two need not be seen as conflicting. What sort of 
ontology of concrete particulars one accepts does not imply any particular view about the 
issue of abstract entities. One could be a neutral monist, and yet be a nominalist about 
numbers. On the view presented here, one can be committed to the existence of 
abstracta, in the sense specified, regardless of one's ontological view about concrete 
particulars. Thus, one can be a physicalist, and allow for the existence of numbers and 
sets, and disallow the existence of minds, (unless one thjnks minds are abstract 
entities-a view that nobody I am aware of holds). Let's turn now to the issue of basic 
kinds of concrete particulars. 
Possible Ontologies 
The ontological issue we will be concemed with is that of specifying the basic 
kind(s) of concrete particulars in the broadest sense of the term. From the method 
already developed in the previous chapters, this amounts to spedfying some kind of 
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language in which claims about such entities can be made. There are, traditionally, four 
possibilities: 
Substance Dualism: There are two fundamental and equally basic kinds of things: 
material, e.g., tables, chairs and the objects of ordinary experience, and 
immaterial, i.e., minds. 
Idealism: The only thing that exists is mind and its contents. 
Neutral Monism: There is one neutral kind that can manifest properties of both 
mind and matter. 
Physicalism: Everything is physical in the sense specified by the physical 
sciences. 
I have called the first view substance dualism so as to distinguish this position from 
property dualism. The former view is about basic kinds, the Jatte1 is not a view about 
basic kinds. Properties are not fundamental in the sense that they do not exist except as 
properties of something. I take it that the ontological issue for the dualist is that, 
whatever minds are, they are not physical. 
Idealism is the view of Berkeley. On this view there is no external world in the 
realist's sense; there is only mind and its contents. Although Be1kele'1 relies on the 
existence of a transcendent God, one need not require that expansion of our ontology in 
order to be an idealist, although as we will see, something very like God seems to be 
required. Neutral monism is the view first espoused by Spinoza. On this monistic view 
there is only one kind, but it is manifested only as either mind or lJooy. A more recent 
version of this view has been defended by Cornman. 
Lastly, there is physicalism. This is the view that will be defended. On this view 
there is only one basic kind, and that is the kind that we call ma.tier. The properties of 
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matter are given by the physical sciences, and the science of physics in particular. 
Minds, on this view, if they exist at all, are either physical entities, or some non-basic 
kind. 
There may be some other possibility that is has not been considered. Afterall, 
given the principle of tolerance, we want to allow for the possibility of the construction 
of other linguistic frameworks with which we make ontological claims about basic kinds. 
But if some alternative view is non-monistic, positing two or more basic kinds that are 
different than those of classical dualism, then such a view wiJI fall prey to the same sorts 
of problems that face dualism. If the view is monistic, and not neutral, then I simply fail 
to conceive of how such a view can be made intemgib1e, since J take it that, by 
definition, idealism and physicalism are mutually exclusive and comprehensive. 
Keep in mind also that, strictly speaking, talk about entities or kinds of entities 
always presumes that some framework for such talk has been specified. The issue of the 
existence of minds as a basic kind is not an issue to be settled by going out and looking 
for evidence of their existence. Talk about minds, as well as material objects, should be 
understood as talk about particulars. Talk about the existence of minds or material objects 
as basic kinds is only meaningful given the appropriate framewo1k. It should be clear 
from the context when claims are being made about language and when claims are being 
made about objects. In general, claims about objects are meaningful and licit only when 
they are about particular objects, whereas claims about language aie generally directed 
towards talk about the linguistic framework for some basic Tal"ld of object. Let's look now 
at the possible ontological views in the order they are listed above. 
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Substance Dualism 
Dualism has fallen on hard times. In philosophy of mind dualist accounts of the 
nature of mind are rare. Most of the effort of dualists is spen1 arguing that physicalism 
is false, and so, by inference, that dualism is a1 least plausible. On the view presented 
here, the task of defending dualism first requires the construction of a linguistic 
framework with which we can accomplish two tasks: one, we need 10 be able to make 
ontological claims about immaterial minds, and two, we need to be able to say how it 
is, given this framework, minds and bodies could interact. GiYen the method of doing 
ontology developed in the previous chapter, the first task is mandatory. The second task, 
however, may appear to be too strong. Afteral1, the physica1ism to be defended is neutral 
on such explanatory issues as how physicalism can account for the mental. If we do not 
require explanatory adequacy for physicalism, why should we 1equire it for dualism? 
For the dualist, part of what the term 'mind' means. is that non-physical entity that 
interacts with the physical body. If there is some non-physical entity that doesn't interact 
with the body in the appropriate manner, then the dualist just wo11ldn't call it a mind. So 
the dualist must have a framework that at least allows for the possibility of mental-
physical interaction. Hence, the issue of interaction for ihe dualist is. not merely 
explanatory, but part of the very idea of dualism. We can thus 1easo11ably require the 
dualist to provide a framework that is capable of providi11g for the possibility of 
interaction. This does not seem an overly strong 1eguirement for d aalism, eyen though 
it appears to be stronger than what is required of the ph ysicalist. 
What we require then is the construction of a language with whk.b we can make 
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statements about the kinds of entities dualism embraces. Carnap suggests such a 
possibility, calling it the dualistic language: "This language consists of two 
interconnected parts: a reistic language for speaking about material things, and a 
mentalistic language for speaking about a second, autonomous, lcind of basic entities, 
namely minds. A mind is usually assumed to be connected with a certain thing, the body 
of a human being or a higher animal. "8 The idea here is that there is some one language 
called the dualistic language, composed of two parts, both equally basic, each part being 
itself a language, or perhaps a sub-language, of the more general dualLst language. We 
distinguish between the two by their different predicate terms. 
The primary reason for adopting the dualist language is as a way of speaking 
about minds. Since minds are quite clearly associated with bodies, we require some way 
of accounting for their possible interaction. And of course, this is the 11ul> of the problem 
for the dualist, for how can something immaterial possibly inte1act with something 
material in any way that will satisfy our notions of how we operate psychologically? 
Traditionally, one of the strongest arguments against i11teractionism is that it violates the 
principle of the conservation of energy. The argument is, 1oughly, tha1 if [ will to move 
my arm by means of a mental act of willing, then we would ex:pect some e11ergy to flow 
from mind to body causing my arm to move. This energy ought to be measurable, but 
we do not find any such increase in energy in the body. Conversely, if J s1ep on a nail 
and a mental experience of pain occurs, there ought to be some d~rease in bodily energy 
as a result of its transmission to the mind. But again, no such decrease js detected. Thus, 
8Carnap, "Replies and Expositions," 869. 
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any evidence for the existence of mind would seem to requfre a violation of the principle 
of the conservation of energy. 
It is well known that C. D. Broad has argued that the interac6on problem does 
not violate the principle of the conservation of energy.9 In his famous pendulum example 
he argues that no such violation occurs even in wholly physical systems: 
Take the case of a weight swinging at the end of a string hung from a fixed point. 
The total energy of the weight is the same at all positions in i_ts course. It is thus 
a conservative system. But at every moment the direction and velocity of the 
weight's motions are different, and the proportion between its kinetic and its 
potential energy is constantly changing. These changes a1e cau:sed by the pull of 
the string, which acts in a different direction at each different moment. The string 
makes no difference to the total energy of the weight~ but it makes all the 
difference in the world to the particular way in which the energy is distributed 
between the potential and the kinetic forms. This is evident when we remember 
that the weight would begin to move in an utterly different cours.e if at any 
moment the string were cut. 
Here, then, we have a clear case even in tile physical realm where a 
system is conservative but is continually acted on by something which affects its 
movement and the distribution of its total energy. Why should not the mind act 
on the body in this way?10 
The example is clear enough, but it fails to settle the issue. On this view, mental 
events affect brain events, not by starting or stopping them, but by changing their course. 
This will suffice so long as we consider all mind-affecting-brain activity as. occurring in 
a continuous manner, i.e., such that the plane of the pend11Lum Jemain:s the same. But 
surely there are just these sorts of changes, as for example when I am interrupted by a 
loud noise when in the middle of thinking through some philosopllical problem (brain 
9C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1925), 95-97. 
1
°Ibid.' 97. 
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affecting mind), or when I stop my hand from reaching for a pencil (mind affecting 
brain). These sorts of changes require a change in the plane of the pendulum. But, "to 
change the plane of the pendulum would require the introduction of force on the 
pendulum, which raises the conservation of energy problem all over again!" 11 So even 
if Broad's pendulum example is roughly correct, it requires the brain-mind system to 
remain in a steady, continuous state. But this is entirely too simple a model, and seems 
plainly wrong, since it is incapable of explaining so much of what any such model ought 
to be able to explain. 
This particular objection to interactionism is one of the traditional ways of 
attacking dualism. But recall that on the present view, dualism does not require this sort 
of defence. First, it requires the construction of some linguistic framework within which 
specific claims about minds can be made and tested. This is not an immediate problem, 
since all we need to do is employ the language specified earlier, namely, the dualist 
framework of physical objects and minds. The second task, however, is that of showing 
how it is possible for minds and bodies to interact, since it is part of what it is for 
something to be a mind on the dualist account such that it can inte1act in some way with 
a body. 
The interaction problem then is that of showing how it is possible for there to be 
the required sort of interaction between the two distinct comJ>Onents of the dualist 
11Frank Dilley, "Mind-Brain Interaction and Psr:' 111,e Sourfl~rn Journal of 
Philosophy 26 (1988): 474. Compare this objection with a similar one by James 
Cornman, Keith Lehrer and George Pappas, Pflilo.sophical ProbTerns ami Arguments: An 
Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 19&2)~ 158. 
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framework. What is required is some way of stating claims which bridge these two 
sublanguages. There are, however, two problems with such bridging statements. First, 
they must be able to be stated without the positing of any new kind of entity in virtue of 
which interaction takes place. Second, they must be stronger than mere generalizations, 
for generalizations are compatible with non-dualist views such as epiphenomenalism, and 
so fail to support dualism. The kind of relations that seem to be required are lawlike 
relations. But, as will be argued using some ideas from Davidson, 1here are no law like 
relations possible between the physical and the mental. 12 So until the dualist can offer 
some account as to how to formulate the relations between the physical and the mental 
such that they do not run afoul of either of these problems, we cal> take it that the burden 
has been shifted onto the dualist to come up with the needed account. 
Notice that the problem of interaction as understood in this way is not a 
metaphysical problem in the traditional sense. It is not the problem of explaining how 
minds and bodies can interact. Rather, the problem has to do with the relation between 
the two sublanguages of the dualist framework. Since both systems aim to assert the 
existence of some equally basic ontological kind, neither of which is reducible to the 
other, there must be possible some account of how the two are re]ated. One such method 
would be the introduction of some framework for another kind of thing in vfrtue of which 
these two are related. Another approach would be to show how it is possible to make 
certain kinds of statements called "laws" that have the role of icjoining together" 
12Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," chap. in Es.say~ on Actions an.d Events 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 207-27. 
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statements about two distinct kinds of entities. The idea here is to show how any kind 
of relation that can plausibly be called lawlike can be stated between the frameworks of 
minds and bodies such that one framework is not reducible to the other. 
It would be simple to state the relation between mind and body if we could appeal 
to a framework for something like psychic energy. This would require us to add psychic 
energy to our ontology. We could do this in one of several ways. First, we could just 
include it as what minds do. This would just broaden the scope of the mind framework 
so as to include mental energy along with minds. The problem with this strategy is that 
it merely begs the question of how the mental interacts with the physical. The dualist 
needs to say something about how interaction could occur; merely stipuJatin,g that minds, 
by definition, interact with bodies will not settle the issue. 
Another way of pursuing this strategy would be to devise some third framework 
for some new kind of thing in virtue of which interaction occurs. Again, we might call 
it psychic energy, but on this view it will require its own framework. This move just 
multiplies rather than decreases the problem of interaction. For now there are three 
frameworks, rather than two, that need to be interconnected. It looks then as though any 
solution to the interaction problem must be one in which no third ldnd of entity is 
introduced. Let's tum now to the second problem. 
The second problem concerns the lawlike nature of bridging sentences. The view 
defended here is that there cannot be such laws. The argument for this position draws 
from Davidson's argument for "anomalous monism," which is a version of the identity 
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theory, i.e., the view that "mental events are identical with physical events. "13 We will 
not, however, be concerned with this aspect of the argument. Rather, our concern will 
be just with the defence of the claim that there cannot be strict psychophysical laws. This 
thesis alone "is not quite the principle of the anomalism of the mental" although "on 
reasonable assumptions entails it. "14 The argument, as construed here, is aimed only at 
the ontological claim of dualism, namely, that minds, or mental events, constitute a basic 
kind that is ontologically on a par with bodies. One of the advantages of Davidson's 
position is that it "rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, that 
mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations. "15 rn other words, 
anomalous monism is nonreductive about the mental. 
What is at issue here is the possibility of laws of a certain kind. These laws can 
be understood as sentences having the function of getting other sentences about two 
distinct kinds of things, i.e., minds and bodies, into some kind of relation ship such that 
we can say the interaction of the entities designated by the sentences is governed by a 
law. Merely saying that they are related will not make it so, thus, the mere statement 
'minds interact with bodies' is not what we are after, since, while it may seem to have 
the form of a lawlike statement, we want to be able to say somethjng about just what it 
is for such a statement to be a law. For it is not immediately obvjous from this sentence 
that it is any different in kind than saying 'mice eat cheese'. Thus, I am going to be 
13Ibid. ' 209. 
14Ibid.' 207. 
15Ibid.' 214. 
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concerned just with the formal properties of such laws, with the properties of such 
statements such that they can usefully be said to be laws and not mere generalizations. 
As we will see, there does not seem to be any theoretically useful sense in which we can 
make the claim that there are lawlike relations between the mental and the physical 
without the result of one framework being reducible to the other. In this very strict sense 
Davidson's argument, as construed here, is not metaphysical, but rather logical or 
semantic. It is concerned only with the a priori conditions on the possibility of lawlike 
relations between sentences about different and equally basic kinds of things. 
Let's call the thesis to be argued for Psychophysicar Anomalism, or PA, and we 
can define it as follows: 
"Psychophysical Anomalism: There are no psychophysical laws, that is, laws 
connecting mental and physical phenomena. In fact, there cannot be such laws. "16 
In line with our linguistic project, however, we perhaps ought to restate PA such that it 
avoids talk of mental and physical phenomena: 
Psychophysical Anomalism: There are no psychophysical Jaws, that is, laws 
connecting statements about minds and bodies. In fact, there canooi be such laws. 
It is on the basis of PA that Davidson argues for the more general thesis, A.nomalism of 
the Mental, or AM, defined as follows: 
Anomalism of the Mental: "There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of 
which mental events can be predicted and explained. "t 7 
16This expression is not Davidson's, but comes rather from faegwon Kim's 
"Psychophysical Laws" Actions and Events: Perspectives on tFi~ Pkfln~ophy of Donald 
Davidson, ed. Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (New York: BasiLBlackweJl, 1985), 
368-86. 
17Davidson, "Mental Events," 208. 
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We need argue only for the more limited thesis of PA, since the upshot of the argument 
is that, failing such laws, the dualist can state only generalizations about the relations 
between the mental and the physical. But such generalizations are compatible with non-
dualist positions. So, in the absence of any such view as to how to bring the mental into 
relation to the physical, we have a sufficient reason for rejec6ng dualism. 
Davidson's arguments for anomalous monism, and its component theses such as 
PA, have been widely discussed, and, as one author has noted, sound "'almost too good 
to be true. "18 As Kim as noted however, "there is little agreement as to e"actly how they 
are supposed to work." 19 We will, in general, follow Kim's strategy for reconstructing 
Davidson's argument, although a few changes are made so as to handle some objections 
to the argument that Kim does not consider. 
On Davidson's view, "an event is physical if it is describable in a purely physical 
vocabulary, mental if describable in mental terms" where "'the distinguishing feature of 
the mental is not that it is private, subjective, or immaterial, but ihat it exhibits what 
Brentano called intentionality. "20 Two points need to be made here. First, some have 
objected to Davidson's claim that events are only what ihey are in virtue of a 
description. 21 If this were so, then presumably both mental as well as physical events are 
such just in virtue of a description. But then we wonder, what 21e they really'? 
18Norman Melchert, "What's Wrong With Anomalous. Monismi," The Journal 
of Philosophy 83 (1986): 265. 
19Kim, "Psychophysical Laws," 370. 
2
°Davidson, "Mental Events," 210-11. 
21See for example Anthony Skillen, "Mind and Matter," Mind 93~1984): 514-26. 
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The view that some event of type Pis an event of that type just in virtue of a 
description employing only P-type vocabulary can usefully be construed as the view that 
has been defended already that we require some sort of framework within which we can 
make ontological claims. As Norman Melchert puts. is, 
What, then, is an intention or a thought? It is whatever we correctly call 
an intention or a thought. But what is. it really'! Here is the anomalous monist's 
response to that question: if by 'really' you mean "apart from all descriptions," 
there is not and cannot be any answer; but if you mean, What is the really correct 
description of it? you must specify the regulative and constitutive principles for 
some system of description, and then it will really be what that system describes 
it to be. So a certain event is really a thought (relative to the intentional principles 
of description), and it is really a brain process (relative to physical principles). 22 
This interpretation fits nicely with some of Davidson's other views, for example, when 
he argues against the idea of an uninterpreted reality distinct from all conceptual 
schemes.23 By employing the idea of linguistic frameworks we can, perhaps, make some 
sense of Davidson's views, and make the arguments he gives for them, less opaque. It 
isn't, however, my explicit aim to interpret Davidson. Hence, wllile it may be plausible 
and even preferable to read some of Davidson's views as Carnapian, we won't be 
concerned with defending this claim. 
Second, descriptions of mental events, unlike descriptions of physical events, are 
descriptions that are intentional. For example, 'believing that Chicago is in rtlinois', or 
'hoping that it will rain tomorrow', are examples of such descriptions. These are quite 
22Melchert, "What's Wrong?," 271. 
23See, for example, Donald Davidson, "'On The Very [de.a. of a Conceptual 
Scheme," chap. in Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (New York:: Odo rd University 
Press, 1984). 
185 
unlike descriptions of physical states, such as 'being triangular', or 'being located four 
feet underground', which do not seem to be about anything at all. Bu1 while this feature 
of the mental framework is widely recognized as one of its chief characteristics, it is not 
the only characteristic feature of the mental. There is, for example, another widely held 
view that one of the characteristic features of the mental that distinguishes it from the 
physical is that of the subjective feel of mental states, i.e., that there is something it is 
like to be, say, a human being or, to use Thomas Nagel's famous example, a bat.24 The 
problem is that it is questionable as to whether the characterization of mental states as 
intentional is broad enough to account for the subjective feel of mental states. 
The idea that what characterizes the mental as mental is the :subjoctive feel of 
mental states will not do for our purposes, nor for Davidson's either. The problem with 
it is that it seems incapable of serving as a characteristic of the mental framework. It is, 
rather, an appeal to some actual feature of what some believe to be a qualit'1 of the mind 
itself. Intentionality, on the other hand, can be adequately captured for our purposes by 
a certain linguistic feature of our descriptions of certain mental :s1ates, namely, that they 
make essential reference to other states. Furthermore, it is precisely intentional states, 
rather than subjective feels, that the dualist wants to say s1and in lawlike relations to 
physical states. Or rather, the dualist is concerned with how statements about intentional 
states can stand in lawlike relations to statements about non-intentional :s1a1es. It is, for 
example, 'believing that x' and other such statements tha1 em body propositional attitudes 
24Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be A Barr," P"Mla.wpkicai Re\!iew 83 
(1974): 435-50. 
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that the dualist will claim stand in law like relations to statements like 'sitting at the desk'. 
So even if intentionality is not a sufficient characterization of the mental, it is precisely 
that feature of the mental that is required if there is even to be the possibility of 
psychophysical laws. 
The general strategy of the argument for PA is to list various features that 
characterize the mental but not the physical, as well as the reverse~ and then claiming 
that no laws can hold between the two domains, or frameworks. But why should we 
think this on purely a priori grounds? As Kim puts it, '"the substance of the argument 
must show why, given just these differences, there can be no correlation laws. "25 
Consider, for example, some domain of objects 0 (or framework of kind of 
objects 0) where these objects are medium-sized material bodies, and two sets of 
properties, R and S where these are colors and shapes respectivel)'. Suppose now that 
each individual in 0 has only one color in R and one shape in S. Jn this situation we 
would not expect to find true generalizations of the form: 
(A) Every object in 0 with color t has shape u. 
Nor would we expect to find true generalizations of the form: 
(B) Every object in 0 with shape u has color t. 
We may however, contrary to what we might justifiably expect, find that: 
(C) Every blue object in 0 is rectangular. 
If we found that (C) were true, we would not consider this evidence of some sort of 
lawlike connection. Rather, we would account for (C) as a mere eoindcienee. Suppose 
25Kim, "Psychophysical Laws," 372. 
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now we take the domain to be the set of all persons, and R and S to be, respectively, the 
set of mental properties and the set of physical properties. The point of Davidson's 
argument is that, even if we should happen to find a true generalization of the form: 
(D) All persons with mental property k have physical property J, 
we would not consider this a law for the same reasons. A law is. distinguished from a 
mere generalization such that laws "are general statements that support counterfactual and 
subjunctive claims, and are supported by their instances. ,,zi; The sentence (C) above does 
not meet either of these criteria. First, it cannot back the counterfactual that 'if apples 
were blue, they would be rectangular'. Second, the only way of confirming (C) is by a 
complete examination of every object in the domain, since there is no accumulation of 
confirmation as individuals are examined. 
Keep in mind that the point of the argument is that there can be no psychophysical 
laws. The central strategy of this argument hinges on the cJairn that lawhood is 
independent of the de facto truth of any generalization. For whether some generalization 
like (C) or (D) is true is irrelevant for determining whether it is JawJilce. Lawhood can 
be determined just on a priori grounds, and does noi require firuli1tg 014t whether any 
proposed law is in/act true or false. (Recall that this is Carnap's vfow about the nature 
of nomic form.) Psychophysical generalizations are thus en breJy po s.si ble, although, as 
we will see later, they are of no use to the dualist. The general form of the aigurnent for 
PA then is as follows: 
The mental system has a certain essential characteristic X and the physical system 
26Davidson, "Mental Events," 217. 
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a certain essential characteristic Y, where X and Y are mutually incompatible. 
Laws linking the two systems, if they exist, would 'transmit' thei>e characteristics 
from one system to the other, leading to incoherence. Therefore, there can be no 
laws connecting the mental with the physical so long as the two systems are to 
retain their distinctive identities. 27 
If there were such psychophysical laws, this would result in the loss of the mental 
characterized as intentional. As Davidson puts it, "to allow the possibility of such laws 
would amount to changing the subject. By changing the subject] mean here: deciding not 
to accept the criterion of the mental in terms of the vocabulary of tile propositional 
attitudes. "28 This is precisely the sort of criteria that we would expect on the view that 
the argument is one in which we are considering linguistic frameworks and not mental 
states per se. 
The essential feature of the mental framework, characterized as intentional, that 
cannot be transmitted to the physical framework is that of rationaii1y. That is, "either the 
set of intentional states we attribute to a person satisfies certain mini mai standards of 
rationality and coherence, or else there is no ground for at1rib11ti11g such a i>ystem to an 
agent; in fact, to consider an organism an agenl is an expression of 011r willingness to 
consider it a rational psychological system. " 29 (Notice that, altho11gh Davidson seems to 
be talking about the ascription of qualities to age11ts, we should understand this as the 
ascription of features to some framework.) By contrast, 1he essential feature that 
characterizes the physical is just the absence of rationali1y. So for any S)'S1em we would 
27Kim, "Psychophysical Laws," 375. 
28Davidson, "Mental Events," 216. 
29Kim, "Psychophysical Laws," 376-77. 
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be willing to describe as being rational, then, necessarily, we would call that system 
mental. Thus, we do not call mountain ranges or oceans rational agents or mental 
systems, whereas we do call human beings, and perhaps certain other animal species 
rational agents or mental systems. 
Again, notice that talk of what is essential should be understood as talk of how 
we characterize some predicate, and whether or not we would include some particular 
as having that feature. Just as we have, for the dualist language, explicitly constructed 
two sublanguages with definite characteristics, distinguished by their predicate terms, talk 
of essential features is not to be understood as talk of metaphysical essences. 
Furthermore, whether some particular is or is not an instance of some framework, i.e., 
has the characteristic that defines that framework, is an internal question that is to be 
settled by the criteria appropriate to the framework. 
What we need to do now is show how we can formulate true generalizations, but 
not laws, about some mental system. Consider the followi_ng argument. Let p be the 
statement 'Evanston is within 10 miles of Chicago' and q be the ~ta.tement 'Evanston is 
within 20 miles of Chicago'. On a minimal standard of rationality, whenever we attribute 
the belief that p to some person, we must also attribute the (standing) belief that q. So 
consider the following counterfactual: 
(1) If S were to believe p, S would also believe q. 
Now suppose that for statements about physical states B1 and B::i lawlike relations hold 
specified as follows: 
(2) Necessarily, a person believes p iff he is in state Br. 
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(3) Necessarily, a person believes q iff he is in state Bz. 
Now we can assume, roughly, that (1), (2) and (3) together yield: 
(4) If S were in state B1 , he would also be in state 82 • 
Notice that (4) is a purely physical counterfactual which describes "a dependency relation 
between two physical states; it might state a Lawful dependency relation between two 
neurophysiological states involving discharges of large groups of neurons, or something 
of the sort. "30 What accounts for this dependency? 
There are three possibilities: (a) the dependency is a basic law, not in need of 
explanation. This is implausible, for it seems unlikely that basic laws of physics operate 
directly at the level of something as complex as neural correlates of beliefs. (b) (4) is 
explained by appeal to more fundamental physical laws. Using tllis strategy, those same 
laws would provide us with a physical explanation, via (2), (3) and (4), of the 
psychological dependency relation in (1). But this implies that rationality is not what 
actually grounds that relation, and so the concept of behef is no longer intentional but 
physical. Such a concept of belief would no Longer be a mental concept. (c) the 
dependency relation in (4) has no physical explanation, but can be explained 
psychologically in terms of (1) via (2) and (3). "But this i~ absurd: to ground a purely 
physical dependency in considerations of rationality of belief would have to be taken as 
an intolerable intrusion on the closedness and comprehensiveness of phy~ical theory. 
Thus, none of the possibilities makes sense. ,,Jt Therefore, -we mmt reject the 
3
°Ibid.' 380. 
31Ibid., 381. 
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interpretation of (2) and (3) as stating laws. This does, however, leave open the 
possibility of true generalizations about relations between believing and being in certain 
physical states. So, if the argument is good, there cannot be any psychophysical laws, 
but there can be psychophysical generalizations. If this is right, then the dualist cannot 
tolerate a lawlike connection between the mental and the physical. But this leaves dualism 
unable to account for a sufficiently strong interaction, i.e., one that is not compatible 
with non-dualist views such as epiphenomenalism. Short of an account of interaction 
then, we have sufficient grounds for rejecting dualism. 
Before moving on, however, let's look at some well-known objections to 
Davidson's argument as formulated by Patrick Suppes. 32 He raise~ the objection that it 
is common in physics, as well as psychology, to study systems that are neither closed nor 
comprehensive, contrary to what Davidson, and Kim, suggest.33 Suppes is making an 
empirical point, namely, that when we observe what physicists and psychologists do we 
see that they both study systems that are neither closed nor comprehensive. Jf he is just 
making an empirical generalization, then it has no immediate bearing on the argument 
as we have construed it. But let's suppose that it is part of the physical an.d psychological 
frameworks such that they are neither closed nor comprehensive. Suppes' s example of 
an open system is quantum mechanics, in which "it might be said that there may well be 
32Patrick Suppes, "Davidson's Views on Psychology as a Sc;ience, ~ Essays on 
Davidson, ed. Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintilcka (New Y01k: Odord University 
Press, 1985): 183-94. 
33Ibid., 184. 
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closed systems in physics but we shall never be able to observe them. "34 
Davidson's view is that "there couldn't be a closed system of the mental, 
observed or unobserved, because of the endless ways in which the mental interacts with 
the physical. "35 His point here is that it seems to be just part of what it means for 
something to be a mental system such that it cannot in principle be closed in anything at 
all like the way a physical system could in principle be closed. For it js at least a debated 
topic as to whether the openness of quantum mechanics is ontological or epistemic, i.e., 
whether the openness is part of the system itself, or merely an aspect of our interaction 
with it. Until that issue is settled, we can reasonably maintain a principled distinction 
between physical and mental systems on the basis of how, if at all, they could be closed. 
As for the comprehensiveness, or lack thereof, of physical systems, this objection can 
be avoided just by allowing for the lack of comprehensiveness, or hobsm, of the mental 
as well. The argument for PA need not require that the mental be comprehensive in some 
way that the physical is not. 
Suppes other objection is that "much of modern physical theocy is intensional in 
expression. "36 For example, although we have no concept of beJief in physics, we do use 
a concept of probability that is similar, and if we construe probability subjectively, it will 
apply equally to psychology as well as physics. Furthermore, "the more important point 
is that in the standard accounts of physical experiments the use of intensional language 
34Ibid., 185. 
35Donald Davidson "Replies to Essays X-XII," in Essays on Davidson, ed. Bruce 
Vermazen and Merrill B Hintikka (new York: Oxford University Press, 1985): 249. 
36Suppes, "Davidson's Views," 186. 
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is widespread and, in my view, uneliminable. "37 Thus, intensionality is not a 
characteristic just of the mental, contrary to what Davidson claims. 
Once again, let's take the objection as a claim about the nature of the physical 
framework. In this case it seems unproblematic for it is sentences that are intensional and 
not objects. But there is a problem with construing probability as something like belief 
by construing probability subjectively. It makes perfectly good sense to say 'x holds p 
to be as probable as q' so long as xis some individual. The problem is that it makes no 
sense to say this of some claim in physics, for "whose name is to be put for 'x'? Is there 
a separate physics for each physicist?"38 Davidson's point here is that there is still some 
relation operative in the mental realm, namely, x's holding that p, that has no meaningful 
correlate in the physical realm. Surely we do not want to say that physics is about 
nothing more than what every individual physicist believes. Such beliefs are just the 
reports of physicists, and not statements of physics itself. 
Suppes's second point, however, is that these reports themseJves are necessarily 
intensional. If this is the case, then it will be true of all the sciences. But then, it will be 
true of psychology as well, namely, that the reports of experime11 t.s and findings in 
psychology will be intensional. But this objection misses the point. What makes 
psychology unique is that it, unlike the other sciences, is concemed with the study of 
those mental states themselves, and is unconcerned with whether tile mental states of the 
scientist intrude on the study. 
37Ibid., 187. 
38Davidson, "Replies to Essays X-XII," 249. 
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Now if the argument for PA is good, and the replies to Suppes's objections are 
sufficient, this leaves the dualist in a predicament. If there are no laws holding between 
the mental and the physical, then it is hard to see how any interaction can be said to 
occur that is not compatible with epiphenomenalism. But a dualism that cannot establish 
lawlike connections between the mental and the physical is not fit for the name. So unless 
the dualist can show us how to establish such laws, we have a good reason for rejecting 
the ontological framework of dualism. Let's turn now to the next candidate 
ontology-idealism. 
Idealism 
Idealism is the view that all that exists are minds and mental content. It is, as we 
saw in chapter one, the view that is usually contrasted with iealism, since it requires that 
nothing exists independently of the mental. The construction of a langllage for idealism 
seems relatively unproblematic. Let's grant fo1 now that such a language can be 
constructed, although later the issue will be raised concerning the Yecy :intelligibility of 
such a framework. Unlike dualism however, for which there seem to be at Least prima 
facie grounds for its acceptance, namely, that the use of a mental framework is required 
for accounting for ontological commitment to minds, idealism faces some immediate 
counter-examples that seem to require for their explanation an implausible expansion of 
its ontology. 
Let's take as the definition of idealism the claim, fo11owing Berkeley, that to be 
is to be perceived or conceived. The key claim here is tllat nothing can be said to exist 
independently of the mind of the conceiver. Now as Berkeley pointed out, nothing in our 
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sensory experience conflicts with this view, and in some sense, everything seems to 
accord with it. Berkeley was, afterall, (somewhat paradoxically) an empiricist. What 
idealism does need to account for, however, are things that seem to haye their existence 
independently of any possible human conceiver. Consider, for example, dinosaurs, the 
solar system, etc. The existence of these sorts of things is about as well confirmed as the 
existence of anything at all. And given Berkeley's empiricism, the means of confirming 
the existence of these items, i.e., the way of answering these internal questions, is by 
means of evidence. But in this case, idealism seems incapable of saying llow these sorts 
of things could exist, since they seem to do so prior to the existence of any conceivers. 
How then do we account for the existence of things that are temporally prior to 
conceivers? Furthermore, how do we account for the existence of things that nobody has 
ever conceived of! For example, there are, by all accounts, hundreds of species of 
insects that have never been observed by any human. What is it that maintains such 
entities in existence? 
Notice that there is not intended any appeal to traditional sorts of objections to 
idealism here, for the objection is not metaphysical or epistemic. Rather, the point of the 
objection is, given our acceptance of the existence of these particular entities, how does 
the idealist framework allow us to account for them'? For we uSllalLy talce it that we do 
in fact think there are dinosaurs and a solar system. The issue of these sorts of things is 
well attested to, and their existence is not a philosophical issue, since these are matters 
that are internal to some framework. The question is, how does the idealist framework 
fare as an answer to the external question of why we should aceept it as giYing us the 
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basic kind of concrete particular? 
As we know, for Berkeley, "God is always about in the quad. "'39 In other words, 
the apparent counter-examples to the claim that to be is to be perceived are handled by 
invoking God as the perceiver who is always perceiving. Thus, in 01der to preserve 
idealism the ontology must be expanded so as to include God. But rather than require an 
argument for God's existence, which is the traditional way of posing the problem, the 
problem of God is here construed differently. The issue of whetller some µarticular kind 
of entity exists is a matter of deciding whether or not to adopt some linguistic framework 
with which claims about that entity are made. In the case of idealism, let's grant that we 
have a suitable idealist framework. The problem of God here :is not the traditional one 
of giving arguments for God's existence. The problem rather is this: c.an we so expand 
39From a limerick by Ronald Knox as quoted by Bertrand RnsselL, A History of 
Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 648. The quote is from the 
second of a pair of limericks that make for a nice statement of the sort of objoction I am 
posing, and Berkeley's answer: 
There was a young man who said, "God 
Must find it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree 
Continues to be 
When there's no one about in the Quad" 
To which the reply is: 
Dear Sir: 
Your astonishment's odd: 
I am always about in the Quad. 
And that's why the tree 
Will continue to be, 
Since observed by 
Yours faithfully, 
God. 
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the idealist framework so as to include within it an entity that is sufficiently like the God 
that seems required by Berkeley's version of idealism? 
Given the linguistic framework of idealism, there are problems with the attempt 
to incorporate God into this framework. To say that God exists requires that we include 
God within the idealist framework. The nature of a frarnew01k is such that all the 
particulars countenanced by that framework are of the same kind. Recall that the way in 
which frameworks are distinguished from each other is by the lcind of predicates we 
employ for describing the particular objects in the framework. This implies that all the 
particulars of some framework are of the same kind. If we include God as a particular 
in the idealist framework, this implies that God is of the same lcind as human beings. 
This seems highly implausible since, on one very traditional view about the nature of 
God, the act of creation by God is nothing over and above some "cognitive" action. On 
this view, God brought human beings into existence by an act of thought. But this is, 
according to the idealist, the way that everything other than conceivers is brought into 
existence. Insofar then as anything is brought into existence, either by God, or by human 
conceivers, it is done in the same way. This makes human conceivers functionally 
equivalent to God in this respect. But this cannot be correct. 
It seems to be only by a kind of analogy that we can say that human beings are 
functionally equivalent to God in the relevant respect. For it malc:es no Jiteral sense to say 
that God "perceives" in anything at all like the way that we do. Fo1 another, God brings 
things into existence and maintains them in existence just by some cognitive act. Human 
beings, on the other hand, do not bring things into existence and maintain them so in this 
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way. When, for example, I am perceiving a blue flower, I do not literally create the 
flower. Rather, I now "take over" as it were for God, who was maintaining it in 
existence all along independent of my act of perception. Moreover, when I am finished 
perceiving it, God will "take over" for me and maintain the flower in existence. It looks 
as though God's powers of perception are unique to God, and are really very different 
from ours. It looks then as though we are better off excluding God from the same 
framework in which we include ourselves. In order to preserve this theistic version of 
idealism we need two frameworks: one for ourselves, and another for God. The former 
contains many individuals of the same kind; the latter contains only one individual. 
But this two-framework version of idealism also faces problems. The problem is 
that it seems implausible to think that both frameworks are fundamental in the relevant 
way, i.e., both are basic kinds of concrete particulars. Given a not implausible concept 
of God, it seems more likely that God is what is basic, and that human beings are 
contingent on God in some way. This would give us an idealist monism, but what we 
have now is the view that what is ontologically basic is God. Moreover, not only is God 
ontologically basic, God is the only instance of what :is ontologically basic. This view is 
not without problems. 
Recall that we distinguished earlier between concrete partieulars and abstract 
entities. The chief concern now is that of constructing an ontolog~ for concrete 
particulars, having already made some remarks about how to deal with abstract entities. 
What we have now with this view that God is ontologically basjc is that God is the only 
concrete particular. But this raises a problem. How do we distingui s Ii between what we 
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commonly call concrete particulars, e.g., dogs, trees and chairs, and abstract entities, 
e.g., numbers and centers of gravity? The appeal to God as the only concrete particular 
leaves us unable to draw this distinction between these ordinary objects. But it is this 
very distinction between just these sorts of objects that motivates, at least in part, the 
ontological endeavor. We seem then to have come to a position that, while having some 
internal coherence, does almost none of the work that we want an ontology to do. The 
view that God is the only concrete particular simply fails to do any of the work that we 
want to do with an ontology of concrete particulars. There are, of course, other forms 
of idealism, most notably the versions of absolute idealism proposed by Hegel, Bradley, 
McTaggart. But perhaps the chief problem for idealism of any sort is that it requires that 
we posit some relation between cognizers and reality other than an epistemic relation as 
constitutive of the idealist framework. I take it that this is what Goodman, for instance, 
is after when he says: 
we do not make stars as we make bricks; not all making is: a matter of moulding 
mud. The worldmaking mainly in question here is making not wi_th hands but with 
minds, or rather with languages or other symbol systems. Yet when I say that 
worlds are made, I mean it literally; what l mean should be clear from what I 
have already said. "40 
The problem with this sort of view, as we saw in chapter one, is that, stripped of the 
metaphors in which it is expressed, it simply fails to make snfficient sense so as to 
capable of our determining whether or not it conld meaningfully be predicated of some 
particular. We understand what it means to say that we are at Least wea!dy epistemically 
related to reality, i.e., we can form beliefs about what we take to be reality, even if they 
4
°Nelson Goodman, "On Starmaking," Synlhese 45 (1980): 213. 
200 
are false. 41 What is questionable is whether we have any other intelligible notion of a 
relation to reality such that we construct or create it in some sense. lt is incumbent on 
the idealist to spell out that relation in some minimal detail sufficient to say that we have 
an intelligible framework. Short of such an account, I find idealism unacceptable as an 
ontology of concrete particulars, if only for the reason that it can't be formulated 
sufficiently well so as to be able to decide whether to accept it. Let's look now at another 
possible ontology. 
Neutral Monism 
The classic statement of this view comes from Spinoza. Hi:; view is called "the 
double aspect theory". It is primarily a reaction to Cartesian dualism. (Jn Spinoza's view 
mind and body are actually one thing, but we distinguish them by conceiving of them 
under the categories of thought and extension, where these are .. modes"' of a single 
substance. This single substance, which Spinoza calls "God," has various attributes. 
These attributes are "that which the intellect perceive:; of substance, a:; constituting its 
essence. "42 The attributes of substance are distinct, but are not thems.elves either entities 
or different substances: 
It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, 111 fact, conceived as 
41Contrast this weak relation to a strong one according to which we can have 
knowledge of reality. We may or may not have such a strong relatio11 depending on the 
extent to which one finds skepticism problematic. I take it that the weak relation is 
unproblematic, even for the skeptic. The point is, it is mereJy epistemic, and not, say, 
constructive, or creative. 
42Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (New York: Joseph Simon PabJisber, 1981), Part I prop. 
X, proof. 
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distinct-that is, one without the help of the other-yet we cannot, therefore, 
conclude that they constitute two entities or two different substances.. For it is the 
nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch 
as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none 
could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of 
substance. "43 
Thus, we get the dual-aspect view that a single, neutral substance manifests the 
two properties of mind and matter. 
Spinoza seems to be arguing that since we can conceive of some one substance 
as mind and as body we can thereby think of both mind and body as identical, in some 
sense, but also different. This is clearly false. Taking mind and body as properties of 
some third thing, it does not follow that just in virtue of their being properties of one 
thing that they are thereby identical in any sense at all. For example, a basketball can be 
both blue and round, but it does not follow that blue and round are thereby identical just 
in virtue of their being properties of the one basketball. 
We might emend this view to say that they are only distinct .,;as conceived." In 
other words, mind and body as properties of some one substance are only distinguished 
by means of a description. On this view, substance is thought of always as being in some 
particular way given a certain description. The problem with this emendation is that if 
the properties of mind and body are only distinct as described, then we are left with no 
idea at all as to the nature of this neutral substance. If mind is conceived just as one 
particular description of substance, and body as another such description, the idea of this 
substance itself is utterly mysterious. What we want to know is, what is substance itself 
431bid. 
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like such that it is amenable to being described in two such fundamentally different ways? 
Since what we are after here is the construction of some linguistic framework 
within which we can make statements about what there is, we need at least some minimal 
idea of what this substance is such that it can be thought of as both mind and body, in 
some sense, and neither, in another sense. As we saw in the case of dualism, it is not 
difficult to construct a single language in which there are two kinds of predicates, such 
that we have two sublanguages distinguished according to which predicate terms apply 
to the particulars. In this case, once again, we have a :physical and a mental language. 
The problem is, these are, for the neutral monist, not what is ontologically basic. What 
is ontologically basic is that neutral language of which the two sublanguages are 
sublanguages of. But we have no idea at all as to what the predicate terms could :possibly 
be of such a language, and hence, no way of conceiving of it as a distinct linguistic 
framework. 
We could, perhaps, take an Aristotelian view that what we are after here is 
something like a substrate thought of as that of which we p1edica1e the various properties 
of some particular substance. The problem with this view, at least for our purposes, is 
that there is no meaningful sense in which the substrate can be :;aid to e'dst~ for it is only 
individual substances about which we can say that they exist; the substrate cannot even 
be meaningfully said to be an individual. 
More recently, James Cornman has defended a Spinoz:istic view which he calls 
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"the neutral identity theory. "44 On Cornman's view, there are a class of entities that "are 
neither purely physical nor purely mental. They are some third sort of neutral entity, 
because they have psychological properties which nothing purely physical has, and they 
have physical properties which nothing purely mental has. "45 Cornman' s view has clear 
similarities to Spinoza, but there are also some clear differences that make this view 
unacceptable for our purposes. 
Cornman is aiming to give an account of mind and not an account of what there 
is generally, i.e., an account of basic kinds. The entities with which he is concerned are 
the typical sorts of mental entities like beliefs and pains. Such entities are entirely 
unproblematic, on the view defended here, since we can be committed to the existence 
of all sorts of different kinds of entities, abstract entities included, given what it means 
to be ontologically committed to something. Cornman is not p1oposing the view that 
everything is in some sense a neutral sort of entity, whereas this is precisely what 
Spinoza is claiming, as well as the sort of view that I am seeking. On Cornman' s view, 
For each existing mental phenomenon m: (a) m is identical wi1h some physical 
phenomena (presumably, a brain entity), and (b) m has both certain psychological 
properties and the physical properties of the physical phenomenon with which it 
is identical. 46 
This view aims to avoid various strategies for giving a theory of mind, e.g. , substance 
dualism, epiphenomenalism, reductive materialism and elim:ina.tivis.m. As such, it is 
44James Cornman, "A Nonreductive Thesis about Mind and Body,"' in Reality in 
Focus, ed. Paul Moser (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990): 208-21. 
45lbid., 216. 
46Ibid.' 216. 
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entirely compatible with non-reductive materialism, and so is entirely compatible with 
a physicalist ontology since these entities are, by definition, identical to some physical 
entity. As Cornman puts it, 
It agrees that there are purely material things, but also denies that there are purely 
mental things or entities. One might then say that neutral things, things that are 
neither purely mental nor purely material, do not make up another distinct kind 
of thing, over and above material things. Instead, neutral things such as pain and 
sensations of other sorts, are indefinite as to type. That is. why we say that they 
are neutral entities. Hence, one might say, the neutral identity theory is really a 
version of monism; the only distinct kinds. of entities it allows for are material 
entities. 47 
As an explanatory strategy for a theory of mind this view has much in its. favor. And 
supposing that we could construct the appropriate linguistic framework for getting the 
kinds of entities the view requires into our ontology, Cornman' s neutral identity theory 
may well do the job. The problem is that this view is a theory of mind. Our concern is 
not, however, with theories of mind in particular, but with ontology generally. We can 
take it that Cornman's view poses no challenge to a materialist ontology, insofar as that 
ontology is non-reductive and non-eliminativist, since Cornman himself says that his is 
a materialist view. Let's tum then to physicalism. 
Physicalism 
We have considered several possible ontologies for concrete particulais and found 
all of them wanting for various reasons. And although many, if not most, philosophers 
consider themselves materialists in some sense, we still need to say something about just 
what physicalism amounts to, since it has been argued recently "that physicalism lacks 
47Comman, Philosophical Problems, 197. 
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a clear and credible definition, and that in no non-vacuous interpretation is it true. "48 
Historically, 'physicalism' is the name given to a group of views adopted by the 
Vienna Circle. The earliest statement of the position is from Neurath: "In a sense unified 
science is physics in its largest aspect, a tissue of laws expressing space-time 
linkages-let us call it: Physicalism. "49 The term was intended by Neurath, and others 
of the Vienna Circle who subscribed to the view, to stand for a number of inter-related 
views, among them, the thesis of the unity of science and the rejection of the possibility 
of metaphysics as traditionally conceived. It was not intended to be allied with the 
philosophical view of materialism, i.e., the view that everything that e,;:ists is material. 
As a metaphysical view, materialism was rejected by the Vienna Circle, for they were 
opposed to metaphysics generally. Taken as a presupposition of the empirical sciences, 
namely, that the empirical sciences presume the existence of matter, materialism is more 
palatable. For the Vienna Circle, there is no knowledge outside of the sciences; certainly 
there is nothing that deserves to be called "philosophical,., knowledge. Hence, 
physicalism is the view that all possible knowledge is given by the science of physics, 
or is theoretically reducible to physics. Consequently, there is at least the theoretical 
possibility of a unity of the sciences, understood as the view that all knowledge is capable 
of being expressed in the language of the empirical sciences. 
The unity of science thesis says that the divisions among the empirical sciences 
48Tim Crane and D. H. Mellor, "There is No Question of Ph:Y~icalism," Mind 99 
(1990): 394. 
490tto Neurath, "Physicalism," Monist 41 ( 1931): 620. 
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are made "merely for the practical reason of division of labor, but are fundamentally 
merely parts of one comprehensive unified science. " 50 This thesis was intended as a 
reaction to the view, prevalent at the time, among German _philosophers, that "there is 
a fundamental difference between the natural sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften 
(literally "spiritual sciences," understood as the sciences of mind, culture, and history, 
thus roughly corresponding to the social sciences and the humanities). "51 But whereas 
Neurath took a "naturalistic" view whereby the thesis was construed as saying "that 
everything that occurs is a part of nature, i.e., of the physical world" Carnap maintained 
the semantic position "that the total language encompassing all knowledge can be 
constructed on a physicalistic basis. "52 
The rejection of any possible metaphysics as a lcind of knowledge distinct from 
science follows from the unity of science thesis together with a theory of meaning, one 
consequence of which is that only science can make meaningfol statements. That theory 
of meaning rests on the principle of verification. This is the principle that only those 
claims are meaningful which can in some way be empirically verified, or at least 
conceived of as having possible empirical verifying conditions. Science consists then of 
just these sorts of claims, together with claims with no meaning whatsoeve1, i.e., analytic 
and tautologous truths. The criterion for what counts as a science is then a semantic 
criterion, as opposed to, say, an epistemic one, which is what we get from a philosopher 
5
°Rudolf Carnap, "Autobiography," in The Philosophy of Ru.do If Carnap, ed. Paul 
Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963), 52. 
51Ibid.' 52. 
52Ibid., 52. 
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like Kant. 
By contrast with the position of the Vienna Circle, what passes for physicalism 
today is a diverse range of views. One such view is the ontological one that everything 
is physical, a view that may or may not be allied wjth materialism, but is opposed to 
dualism and idealism. Another view is that all explanation is physical explanation, e.g., 
eliminativism. This view is ontologically materialist, as well as eJCplanatorily reductivist. 
Another view is expressed by some sort of supervenience of the mental on the physical. 
And yet another view is that of naturalism, a view propounded by Qujne, that maintains, 
first, that there is no "first philosophy," or metaphysks, and second, that consequently 
our ontology-understood in a suitably non-metaphysical s.ense (although Quine does 
appear to be a realist)-is just whatever our best sdence says. there is. Some of these 
views are semantic doctrines; some of them a.re empirical; some of them are 
metaphysical. Some physicalists support their view by appeal to realism; some do not. 
The notion of physicalism presented here is an ontological vjew, where ontology 
is understood as the study of basic kinds in the sense previously specified. We have seen 
that ontology, as a metaphysical pursuit, is unable to as.sert any claims that do not beg 
crucial questions against the skeptic. It has already been argued that ~kepticism ought to 
be taken seriously, and so cannot be ignored if we are 10 be critical about our 
philosophical views. Hence, the method of ontology we have adopted is modelled on 
some non-metaphysical ideas of Carnap and Quine. In particular, we haYe avoided any 
appeals to the doctrine of realism. Using Carnap's idea of a linguistic framework, the 
adoption of any ontology presumes the choice of some linguistic framework within which 
208 
claims about the entity one wishes to admit are expressed. For physicalism this 
framework will be that of the language of physics. Physicalism can now be understood 
as the adoption of the following four claims: 
1) The Framework Thesis: Physicalism adopts the linguistic framework of physics 
as expressing the ontology of what is basic, i.e., as expressing the nature of the 
ontologically basic kind. 
2) Semantic Realism: Physicalism adopts the view that the theoretical terms of the 
physical language framework are to be construed as denoting terms. 
3) Epistemic Realism: Physicalism adopts the view that theoretical claims made 
in the physical language framework are to be believed as true. 
4) The Ontological Unity Thesis: Frameworks for all non-basic kinds of entities 
are compatible with the physical language framework. 
All of these claims taken together constitute a version of physicalism. The view is indeed 
physicalist in something like the usual sense in that it endorses the view that the most 
basic kind of entity that exists in physical, although this endorsement is qualified in that 
it is not a metaphysical existence claim. It is also physicalist in the sense proposed by 
Neurath and Carnap in that it endorses a kind of unity thesis. albeit a unity limited to 
ontological matters only. In order then to distinguish this version of physicalism from 
these other notions, let's call it Logical Physicalism, or LP, so as to emphasize the 
formal as well as the non-metaphysical aspects of the view. This aJso serves to signify 
the influence of some aspects of logical positivism generaJly, and Carnap in particular. 
Let's look at each of these claims individually in some detaiL The Framework 
Thesis, or FT, is the view that, from among the possible Jang uage framewmks we can 
construct and employ with which we can say what basic kind.Cs) of concrete particulars 
exist, the language of physical objects is to be adopted. As we have seen earlier in this 
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chapter, dualism, idealism and neutral monism have all been considered and rejected for 
various internal reasons. That is, we find that all of these frameworks face problems that 
are internal to the interpretation or construction of the framework: itself. Physicalism does 
not face this difficulty since it is just the formalization of the language of physics, itself 
a developed (and still developing) science. This allows for the possibility that the 
language of physics may in the future change, but this is as it should be, for there is no 
a priori reason why we must construct frameworks in some a priori manner. We can, and 
should, let the construction of frameworks be informed by empirical matters. Following 
Carnap's principle of tolerance, it is part of the task of philosophers to construct such 
frameworks. There seems to be no reason why they should not allow themselves to be 
influenced in this task by empirical considerations, for surely the construction of a 
language framework can be informed by current science. 53 Furthermore, there is no 
reason why we cannot allow it to change over time. Given that we have relativized our 
analytic claims to the acceptance of a rule for how to use some term of the framework, 
there seems no reason why new terms cannot at some future date be changed, while rules 
for their use remain analytic. Surely it is a historical truth that terms do indeed change 
meaning, for whatever reasons, over time. To prohibit this seems overly strong and 
unnecessary. 
53See Michael Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism."' The Journal 
Of Philosophy 88 (1991): 505-19. Friedman argues that, for Ca.map and the other 
positivists, "the central problem of philosophy is not to provide an epistemological 
foundation for the special sciences (they already have all the fou11dabon they need), but 
rather to redefine its own task in the light of the recent revolutionary sc:ientific advances 
that have made all previous philosophies untenable. " 
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Although FT is the acceptance of the language of physics as that language that 
best expresses what is ontologically most basic, FT is not the assertion of any belief. As 
Carnap puts it, 
The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an 
assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, 
conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgements of this kind 
supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of 
entities. 54 
FT does not say that the physicalist framework is true; frameworks themselves, unlike 
theories (unless one is an instrumentalist) are not the sorts of things that have truth 
values. FT is not the view that asserts metaphysical realism about the world of physical 
things. As we saw previously, this is an external issue that can only meaningfully be 
construed as the issue of whether to accept or reject the physical language framework. 
Again, as Carnap puts it 
To accept the thing world [or any other world constituted by a framework] means 
nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept 
rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting, or re:j ecting them. The 
acceptance of the thing language leads, on the basis of observations made, also 
to the acceptance, belief, and assertion of statements. But the thesis of the reality 
of the thing world cannot be among these statements, because it cannot be 
formulated in the thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language.55 
Hence, FT does not imply the belief in the existence of the thing world itself, although 
it does allow for belief in the existence of individual physical entities, where the notion 
of existence is relative to the framework in which assertions of existence are formulated. 
What this shows is that FT implies no metaphysical belief. And this is precisely as it 
54Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," 2 L4. 
55Ibid., 208. 
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should be, since we have already seen that metaphysics, if it aims to beg no questions 
against the skeptic, is not possible. Hence, any attempt to argue for the existence of the 
world of physical objects implies a refutation of skepticism-and that, as we have seen, 
does not appear to be possible. Thus, FT makes no metaphysical claim; i1 merely asserts 
that the language of physics is to be accepted as that language that expresses what is 
ontologically basic. Thus, FT makes no assertion of the truth of physicalism; it states 
merely that the language framework adopted by LP is that of the science of physics. It 
makes no judgement about the truth value of physics itself. Let's look now at semantic 
realism. 
Recall from chapter three that semantic realism with respect to a linguistic 
framework is the view that the theoretical terms of that framework are to be understood 
as denoting terms. With respect to the physical language then, this is the view that the 
theoretical terms of the language are to be interpreted as denoting terms, and not merely 
as being instrumentally useful. We interpret our theoretical terms as if there are real 
entities being denoted, insofar as the meaning of1erm 'real' is understood relative to the 
physical language framework, and not in some metaphysical sense of real that is 
independent of any framework whatsoever. Semantic realism does not imply that any 
entities exist, for it is only a view about how we are to interpret certain portions of our 
terminology. It claims that we are to understand theoretica1 terms as denoting terms 
rather than as instrumentally useful terms. This does not impl~ an.y assertion of existence, 
for in order to say whether some entity does exist requires mucll more than just being 
able to form some grammatically correct sentence. This re.quires the use of whatever 
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criteria are relevant for affirming some answer to an internal question. In this case, it 
requires empirical evidence. But having already defended semantic realism earlier, we 
now merely apply it to the physical language framework. It thus needs no further 
defense. Let's look next at epistemic realism. 
Epistemic realism has also been defended in chapter three, and so needs only 
application and not further defense. Recall that this is the view that we take the epistemic 
attitude of believing that our theoretical claims are true rather than merely instrumental. 
As applied to the physical language framework, this implies that we believe the existence 
claims of physics when they have the evidence that is needed for any such claim as 
specified by the evidential criteria for physics. As Merrill put& i1, epistemic realism is 
"a rather trivial position amounting to the claim that to have good reason to hold (or use) 
a theory is to have good reason to assert the laws and statemen1s (including existence-
claims) of the theory, and this is not to make any statements about tlle relation that the 
theory bears to reality or the world. "56 Thus semantic realism says, with regard to LP, 
that to have good reasons to assert the existence of any particular physical entity is to 
have a good reason to embrace the language framework of physics. 
This constitutes a kind of reason we have for saying why we ought to choose the 
physicalist framework. Namely, that given the physicalist framework, we can make 
existence claims which we can justifiably believe, i.e., we can answer internal questions. 
This provisional acceptance of the framework allows us to justify particular existence 
claims, which then serve as reasons for a firmer adoption of the framework itself. This 
56Merrill, "Three Forms of Realism," 232. 
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strategy may seem circular, for it appears to say that we justify e:xistence claims only by 
means of the criteria of justification specified by that framework, which framework is 
then believed on the basis of this justification. This looks, at best, like a coherentist 
strategy reminiscent of Neurath's boat metaphor. But the objection is misplaced. 
Epistemic realism does not claim that the framework itself is to be believed as 
true. Rather, the framework is first provisionally adopted only for theoretical purposes. 
That is, we ask ourselves what sort of ontology we get by adopting some particular 
framework. We then provisionally, experimentally, adopt the framework in order to see 
what we can do with it. This first provisional adoption implies nothing at all by way of 
any truth claims; the adoption is purely provisional. When we find that particular 
existence claims can be believed for good reasons, themselves subject to the criteria 
specified by the framework, we take this as good reason for a nrmer adoption of the 
framework. We do not take this as evidence of the tnah of the framework. Xeep in mind 
that the choice of framework is always subject to change at some time in the future. 
Again, given the principle of tolerance, we could always decide fo the future to adopt 
some other framework. In such a case, we would adopt this framework tentatively, see 
what sort of ontology it provides, and then decide whether to s tJe11gthen our choice. 
The critic might reply that on this strategy we can give tilese kind of reasons in 
support of any framework. If the justificatory criteria are specified by the framework 
itself, then there will always be these sorts of reasons available. This is p1ecisely the sort 
of question-begging strategy that we examined, and rejected~ in chapter one. Recall, for 
example, the discussion of the Snellen exam for eyesight. rf there are always these sorts 
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of reasons available, then any framework will always have just these sorts of reasons in 
its favor. Thus, no framework can be excluded. But as we have already seen, not all 
frameworks are sufficiently internally coherent so as to be able to give these kinds of 
reasons. Furthermore, the issue of framework choice is not alethic; we are not giving 
reasons for the truth of some framework. If we were, then to give framework-
independent reasons for why some framework ought to be adopted would be a refutation 
of skepticism, and that does not seem possible given the discussion of :skepticism in 
chapter one. Since the issue is not alethic, the objection seems misplaced. This should 
serve to blunt the charge of coherentism, but it does not settle the question of whether 
there are any other sorts of reasons for why phy:sicalism should be adopted. But Let's put 
that question off for a bit, since it takes us beyond the thesis of epi:stemic realism. Let's 
look next the ontological unity thesis. 
The ontological unity thesis says that all ontological frameworks for non-basic 
kinds are compatible with the physicalist framework. This implies that whatever else 
exists that is not physical is not basic. Thus, we can allow for talk of minds so long as 
these are not understood as constituting an ontologically basic kind, which is what 
dualism claims. Minds can meaningfully be said to exist, wi_th the p1oviso that their 
existence is contingent on something physical. rt of course :seems doubtful that minds 
could be immaterial, for it isn't clear how the existence of something immaterial could 
be contingent on something physical. If this were possible, then one could be a logical 
physicalist while simultaneously holding to a view that minds are immaterial. 
The ontological unity thesis does not a:ssert any sort of reel 11ction from one 
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framework to another. It allows for other sorts of relations between basic and non-basic 
kinds of entities. It claims only that, for all non-basic kinds, there must be some sort of 
ontological relation between entities of that kind and the basic kind. The three most well-
known such relations are reduction, supervenience and emergentism. There may be 
others, and this is to be allowed. What is prohibited is the positing of some kind of entity 
that has no ontological relation whatsoever to the physicalist framework. Such an entity 
would either be of some kind that is ontologically as basic as physical entities, or it 
would be non-basic but unconnected to everything else that exists. The former option is 
just dualism, which we have already discussed and rejected. As for the other option, 
presumably this would be some sort of two-world view that could be specified modally. 
The problem with it is that it is not an answer to the question about tlte ontology of this 
world, for the ontology of this world will still be monistic. 
Furthermore, the ontological unity thesis is not unity of explanatory vocabulary; 
it does not require that all explanation is physical explanation. This means that it does 
not require that all explanation employ only the vocabulary of tlte physical sciences. This 
is, for example, what some philosophers mean by ~naturalism' . There are explanatory 
strategies however, such as functionalism, that are not committed to any particular 
ontology. Functionalist explanation appeals to a principle of multiple realizability 
whereby the instantiation of some phenomenon is type-neutral. This sort of strategy is 
allowable since it is ontologically neutral. 
All four of these claims taken together constitute logi.cal phys:icalism. But all we 
have so far is an exposition of the view. As mentioned earlier, we can still ask whether 
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there are any framework-independent reasons for why we ought to adopt this view. We 
have already looked at two kinds of reasons. First, we have the negative approach of 
rejecting the alternatives on the basis of their each having internal inconsistencies. 
Second, we saw that there is a kind of reason that is internal to the physicalist framework 
itself. What we want to know now is whether there are any external reasons in favor of 
LP. If what is wanted are arguments for the truth of LP, then, as we have already seen, 
there are no such arguments, since such an argument would constitute a refutation of 
skepticism, and that is not in the offing. What we can offer are some pragmatic 
considerations of the following sort. 
The best reason to accept LP is that, unlike all the competitors we surveyed, it 
"works." That it works means the following: first, it doesn't break just in the process 
of trying to construct the view. All the competitors face internal problems. Dualism is 
perhaps the closest to LP, and it doesn't work either, but it also must make use of a 
physicalist framework. For dualism to even get started it must presume a plausible 
physicalist framework. If dualism is the chief competitor to physicalism, then it too must 
assume at least this much, so we ought not to hear any arguments from the dualist 
against the internal plausibility of what the dualist takes to be the purely physical aspects 
of physicalism. But since dualism itself breaks, this leayes onl~ physicalism. Second, it 
seems to be the account that best satisfies our philosophical purposes in doing ontology 
as I have specified this task. That is, given the task of ontology as askin,g what is most 
basic, LP seems best suited to this task. It allows for meaningful talk about every 
conceivable kind of thing we might want to talk about, given certain restrictions. It 
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accounts for our best science as well as our somewhat less than scientific notions about 
minds, again with certain restrictions. Taken together with Carnap's principle of 
tolerance, that there is always the possibility of some other framework, this is all the 
positive argument there is for LP. This explains Carnap's as well as Quine' s suggestions 
that, at such a high level of generality all one can do is choose based on these sorts of 
considerations. 
Some Lessons 
One of the chief lessons of LP is that we ought to separate general ontological 
issues from issues about the nature of mind. It is not an objection to physicalism, on the 
view presented here, that, for example, subjective experiences avoid description by a 
purely physical language, or that intentionality is present in propositional attitudes but 
absent in brain states. This is a problem, perhaps, for the eliminativist; it is not a 
problem for logical physicalism, since it can allow for any accmmt of subjective 
experience, so long as that view is not committed to ontologically basic, non-physical, 
concrete entities. 
Insofar as logical physicalism is a normative position, it counsels us not to 
construct any future theory that is in conflict with the language of physical objects. This 
is not to say that it will never be the case that such theories. may at some future date 
come into wide acceptance. But this would require some dramatic reconstruction of our 
present language that, without good reason, we have no need for doing. One could, 
perhaps, construct such a language, and Carnap's principle of tolerance allows for just 
such work on the part of philosophers. But short of showing how such a language would 
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be more useful in satisfying our ontological purposes than the physica.1 language, such 
a construction is merely a conceptual exercise. 
One other indirect lesson of logical physicalism is that it limits philosophers to 
making claims about concepts and not entities per se. Some philosophers seem to think 
that when they are talking about minds, for example, that they are talking about some 
actual entity. But unless and until they give us some account of just what it is that they 
are ontologically committed to by such talk, we can reject such claims as either 
metaphysical, or meaningless. For what is required in specifying what they are 
ontologically committed to is some specification of the sort of language they employ in 
asserting the existence of minds. Short of this, we can r~ect such talk as nonsense. 57 And 
if such talk is metaphysical, we can, for reasons given in chapter one, reject it as mere 
speculation, as the description of some possible reality that we can in no way ever affirm 
to be true in a non-questionbegging manner. 
57Notice that I am not appealing to verificationism in support of the claim that talk 
of minds is nonsense. I am making only the rather trivial point that without some idea 
of the nature of what it is that one is ontologically committed to, claims about the nature 
of particular entities are completely indeterminate. 
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